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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
RESEARCH ON THE INFLUENCE OF BEHAVIORAL FORCES
THAT MOTIVATE TRADER BEHAVIOR AND SENTIMENT -
A PROSPECT THEORY EXEGESIS
by
Deanne Butchey
Florida International University, 2005
Miami, Florida
Professor Ali M. Parhizgari, Major Professor
This study focuses on empirical investigations and seeks implications by utilizing
three different methodologies to test various aspects of trader behavior. The first
methodology utilizes Prospect Theory to determine trader behavior during periods of
extreme wealth contracting periods. Secondly, a threshold model to examine the
sentiment variable is formulated and thirdly a study is made of the contagion effect and
trader behavior.
The connection between consumers' sense of financial well-being or sentiment
and stock market performance has been studied at length. However, without data on
actual versus experimental performance, implications based on this relationship are
meaningless. The empirical agenda included examining a proprietary file of daily trader
activities over a five-year period. Overall, during periods of extreme wealth altering
conditions, traders "satisfice" rather than choose the "best" alternative. A trader's degree
of loss aversion depends on his/her prior investment performance. A model that explains
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the behavior of traders during periods of turmoil is developed. Prospect Theory and the
data file influenced the design of the model.
Additional research included testing a model that permitted the data to signal the
crisis through a threshold model. The third empirical study sought to investigate the
existence of contagion caused by declining global wealth effects using evidence from the
mining industry in Canada. Contagion, where a financial crisis begins locally and
subsequently spreads elsewhere, has been studied in terms of correlations among similar
regions. The results provide support for Prospect Theory in two out of the three
empirical studies.
The dissertation emphasizes the need for specifying precise, testable models of
investors' expectations by providing tools to identify paradoxical behavior patterns. True
enhancements in this field must include empirical research utilizing reliable data sources
to mitigate data mining problems and allow researchers to distinguish between
expectations-based and risk-based explanations of behavior. Through this type of
research, it may be possible to systematically exploit "irrational" market behavior.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
A great deal of evidence suggests that share returns can be predicted by factors
that are inconsistent with Sharpe-Lintner's (1964) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
and Fama's (1970) Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Variables which have been
shown empirically to have explanatory power in predicting the cross-section of share
market returns include size measured by market equity (Banz, 1981), earnings-price ratio
(Ball, 1978; Reinganum, 1981; Basu, 1983; Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield, 1989), the ratio
of book-market equity (Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein, 1985), leverage (Bhandari, 1988),
dividend yield (Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979), and cash-flow-to-price
(Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishny, 1994).
Fama and French (1992) studied the joint effects of market beta, size, E/P ratio,
leverage, and the book to market ratio on the cross-section of average returns on the
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ shares over the period 1963-1990. Their tests did not find
that average share returns are positively related to market beta, the most basic tenet of the
CAPM. They did find however, that the univariate relationships between average return
and size, leverage, earnings/price ratio and book/market (BE/ME) value are strong.
Furthermore, when doing multivariate tests, they find that BE/ME are both robust to the
inclusion of other variables, but that BE/ME plays the stronger role in the prediction of
the cross-section of average returns. Paradoxically therefore, Fama and French (1992),
conclude that in the period 1963-1990 the two variables, size and BE/ME, "provide a
simple and powerful characterization of the cross-section of returns" (Fama and French,
1992:429).
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In 1998, Fama produced a survey of empirical work on the challenges to market
efficiency explained by behavioral finance theorists. He concluded, "Behavioral finance
is nothing more than anomalies dredging since the apparent over-reaction to information
is about as common as under-reaction."
These studies affirm the fact that there is a burgeoning field concerned about
financial market anomalies, which suggests that returns and behavior are still predictable
in specific yet unexplained ways. Social scientists aim to find parsimonious models that
predict human behavior. It is a common belief that Miller's 1977' work on the possibility
of superior returns based on the uncertainty about an IPO, is the forerunner to the
discipline of Behavioral Finance, but Kahneman and Tversky's (1974)2 Prospect Theory
(PT hereafter) provides the core theory in this field. These Nobel Prize winners proved
that humans are innately loss-averse, particularly when it comes to money. Losses hurt
twice as much as gains give pleasure. A central tenet in behavioral choice theory is that
decisions are influenced by how the choices are framed. Consequently the perception of
these choices will be affected by an investor's frame of mind which can be measured by
surveys on his sentiment.
General Statement of Problem
Using the work on Prospect Theory advanced by Kahneman and Tversky (1992)
this study seeks to understand the cognitive/behavioral biases that face traders and
Miller, Edward M., (1977), Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, The Journal of Finance,
Volume 32, Issue 4, 1151-1168.
'Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman, (1974), Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
Science, New Series, Volume 185, Issue 4157, 1124-1131.
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influence their trading. A model that ascertains the probability that an institutional trader
will buy or sell components of his portfolio during periods of extreme wealth altering
periods evolves. Additionally a model is designed to measure a regime shift in economic
conditions based on behavioral factors. Finally a test of contagion based on crisis
conditions originating in Canada is performed.
Objectives for the Dissertation
1. Determine whether Prospect Theory can predict the behavior of traders during
periods of extreme wealth altering circumstances or "crises".
2. Identify components of institutional trader risk aversion and risk preferences, and
determine associations regarding sentiment, herd behavior, overconfidence and other
predictions of behavioral finance.
3. Determine whether there is evidence of herd behavior as exemplified by contagion in
the context of an incident of fraud in the Canadian mining industry.
The first investigation looked for a direct relationship between buying and selling
activity and stock market returns. Good times bring about a positive mood for investors
and, consistent with the experimental evidence (Isen (1999) and others), a heightened
pain from any potential loss. In an attempt to maintain their mood, investors become less
willing to bear any portfolio risk, i.e. they become more risk averse. Conversely, during
bear market conditions they possibly seek additional risk and become less risk averse.
The study also investigated whether understanding buying/selling activities during
market turmoil or catastrophic periods together with other economic measures can help to
predict trader behavior. Finally, existence of contagion or interdependence among
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international markets was investigated and a conclusion made as to whether it is a
phenomenon that can be explained by behavioral factors.
Background and Motivation for the Dissertation
The dissertation has a theoretical basis in Prospect Theory. This is the study of
the integration of economics and cognitive science in assessing how people manage risk
and uncertainty. It focused on loss aversion rather than the typically described risk
aversion. Loss aversion is the bias that people prefer avoiding losses than seeking gains
and evaluate their decisions based on the prospect of losses rather than the presumption
of gains. Some studies imply that experimentally, losses are as much as twice as
psychologically powerful than gains. Consequently, the Prospect Theory utility graph
has a curvilinear shape in the positive domain. Conversely in the loss region of the utility
function, people tend to prefer risks that could possibly mitigate a loss (called risk
seeking behavior). Accordingly it might be argued that a positive change in sentiment
leads to either risk aversion, or depending on the original wealth levels of the investor,
loss aversion. The general motivation of this dissertation is to determine "How do
consumer sentiment and investor propensity interact with market conditions to give rise
to behavior that can be observed?"
Herbert Simon pointed out that individuals do not fully optimize, they optimize
until it is close enough to their ideal state, or in Simon's words, they "satisfice". He calls
this "bounded rationality". Andrew Lo believes "adaptation and evolution" dictate the
balance of "bounded rationality". Kahneman and Tversky's "S' shaped utility theory that
maximizes the probability of creating wealth, implies that if one has lost a lot of money
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he/she will be extremely risk seeking. However, once a level of loss neutrality is
achieved, exemplified by a 'kink' at the origin showing greater sensitivity to losses than
gains, defined as loss aversion, one will again be conservative and consequently risk-
averse.
One can argue that since every financial model depends on uncertainty and its
effect on the behavior of investors, and in due course, market prices, the entire study of
finance is behavioral in nature. An important consideration therefore, is how can the
effect of psychological or cognitive biases in the market be evaluated? The main
question of the dissertation is, "Can Prospect Theory (PT) explain investor or trader
behavior during unusual periods or "market crises"?" While Prospect Theory provides
sufficient methodological structure for tightly controlled laboratory experiments, it is
difficult to derive meaningful econometric exercises that test this theory because of the
myriad of competing forces at play in financial markets. Therefore, it has become
standard in the literature to seek proxies and implications. Even though the behavioral
proxies should have no explanatory power from the perspective of expected utility
theory, decision makers reveal their preferences through their subsequent decisions, thus
allowing the direct examination of the behavioral thesis. This dissertation focused on
determining a proxy for risk aversion and testing for differences in the behavior of
institutional traders with respect to this proxy especially during these unusual periods.
Numerous authors have noted a significant co-movement of risk-aversion in
equity markets around the world suggesting a significant cross-country component of
investor sentiment. The observation of "irrational exuberance" by Shiller and Greenspan
suggests that sentiment plays a role in market pricing. Based on the Kahneman-Tversky
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objective function, the question that can be asked is how is the main argument defined?
The literature in behavioral finance contends that wealth is the argument of the objective
function. In fact, investors have separate "mental accounts" for each asset, evaluating the
investment outcomes on an asset-by-asset basis. In other words, the "kink' at the
reference point is relevant and can determine whether an investor is risk-averse or loss-
averse. Since wealth is a major argument, it is important to measure how "wealthy" an
individual feels. Therefore, Consumer Sentiment is utilized as a proxy, not to measure
his/her absolute wealth, but how the investor/consumer feels about his/her level of
wealth.
In as much as this behavior has a causal effect on the market as a whole and is
itself caused by the market's behavior, a "bi-directional causality effect," a scenario very
common in finance, is encountered. A threshold model was utilized to investigate the
instance when returns, sentiment, as well as several other measures of financial
development and economic growth, show a structural break-point. Finally, the effects of
"contagion" and "spillover" effects on the countries of the G7, Russia, Australia and
Indonesia are investigated. Issues that motivate this study are:
1. Public announcement is known to be of low value. Since institutional traders
typically have more resources available for the collection of exceptional fundamental
information, their trading activity is sometimes viewed as being more astute.
Therefore, while small traders are typically viewed as being "noise traders" which
makes them more prone to succumb to behavioral biases such as past trading
experiences, herding and overconfidence no evidence has been presented that
institutional traders also succumb to these predispositions. Institutional investors
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especially of mutual funds usually sell because they expect massive redemptions
after catastrophic events, if they buy it may encompass a behavioral signal.
2. Errors, caused by biases, made by institutional investors can affect security prices
especially as the size of the trade is usually much larger than that of small traders.
Barber and Odean show that institutional traders trade less often than traders do with
discount brokers suggesting that they avoid the trading bias that can lead to lower
returns. However, they do not recognize that institutional traders also face cognitive
forces that can influence their trading patterns. Therefore, it is important to examine
the predictability of security returns as well its calibration to expected returns,
interest rates, consumption and risk.
3. Barclay and Warner (1993) suggest there is a direct and proportional correlation
between informed (institutional) traders and stock price changes. This suggests that
the type of brokerage house, the size of the trade and the percentage of transaction
volume may predict the rate of return.
4. Varian (1985) suggests investigating the lack of homogeneity in investors' opinions
as a risk factor that may result in excess returns. Chordia, Subramanyam and
Anshuman (2001) show this lack of divergence could be proxied by unexpected
volume and is not simply a well-known risk factor in different guise. This lends
credence to the argument that opinion divergence should be viewed as a factor that
could proxy for additional risk.
"Rational markets" typically mean that investors follow the Savage (1954) axioms
(a set of precepts such as the transitivity principle where "if A is preferred to B and B to
C, then A will be preferred to C"). The implication here is that investors attempt to
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maximize expected utility using unbiased subjective probabilities. Even though human
judgment research suggests that individuals are poor statisticians, for a market to exhibit
rational characteristics, the prices of assets should convey much of what an investor
needs to know to act intelligently. Before Prospect Theory, investment decisions noted in
academia have been solely guided by efficient market theory. The theory is based on the
notion that investors behave in a rational, predictable and unbiased manner. The model
assumes that investors taken together, correctly price stocks to reflect all publicly
available information. Excess returns are not attainable even with asymmetrical
information, (Strong Form of Efficient Market Hypothesis) 3. The field of behavioral
finance challenges these traditional views through the study of how investors' interpret
and act on all available information as well as their personal heuristic biases. The
findings suggest the following:
1. There are individual investor heuristic (rule of thumb) driven biases: this observation
is based on the fact people find out things for themselves and behave based on
mental short cuts used in place of purely (unboundedly) rational thinking. Therefore,
he/she may exhibit overconfidence because of education or past accomplishments, or
may be anchored to the downward trend that had previously provided a successful
investment strategy. Examples in the literature point to the bankruptcy of Orange
County, CA in 1994. Examples that are more recent can be seen in the numerous
explosive recovery attempts by the Nasdaq since its peak in March 2000 and the
subsequent debilitating dives - termed "Bear Market Rallies." Investors have been
3Jensen, Michael, (1978), Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 6, Nos. 2/3, 95-101.
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viewed as creatures that overemphasize the relevant risk both on the downside and
on the upside and consequently overreact.
2. There are anomalies found in the market: these are economic puzzles, which cannot
be explained by the efficient market theory. This is consistent with the conclusion
that as a component of the market as a whole, investors do not behave rationally. If
stock prices were determined rationally, they should reflect the value of the firm and
the only reason for a change in stock prices should be a change in the intrinsic values
of the firm (Marsh and Merton 1986). Therefore the field of behavioral finance has
the potential of identifying investor mistakes in the market, with an expectation that
if one were to fully become knowledgeable about the psychological (including quasi-
rational) aspects of decision-making, investors would be more successful than
market traders, and could possibly beat market benchmarks.
3. The investor is influenced by regret-pain and attempts to shift the blame, which are
experienced from recognizing that a different path could have been taken. These
issues tend to cloud his/her judgment. When faced with cognitive dissonance,
rationalizing their prior investment decision no matter what the consequences, most
people resolve the dissonance by choosing the comfortable route (Shefrin, Beyond
Greed and Fear p 204).
Significance of the Study
The assurance of the efficiency of financial markets especially stock prices is
extremely important and the activity of professional traders, because the volume of their
trading has the potential to significantly affect stock market returns, needs to be
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considered. It is necessary to investigate whether arbitrage forces impede or amplify the
demand shocks caused by the interplay between "noise" traders and rational arbitrageurs.
This type of investigation is useful in our ongoing attempts to determine the factors that
affect the proclivity of investors/traders to buy or sell stocks en masse. In as much as
behavioral factors are interrelated it is common to find experimental investigations rather
than empirical ones. Therefore, when a data file is obtained of actual trading behavior a
valid contribution can be achieved.
Contributions of the Dissertation
While Prospect Theory provides sufficient methodological structure for tightly
controlled laboratory experiments, it is difficult to derive meaningful econometric
exercises that test this theory because of the myriad of competing forces at play in
financial markets. Therefore, it has become standard in the literature to seek proxies and
implications. While behavioral proxies have no explanatory power from the perspective
of expected utility theory, decision makers reveal their preferences through their
subsequent decisions, thus allowing the direct examination of the behavioral thesis. This
dissertation focused on determining a proxy for risk aversion and testing for differences
in the behavior of institutional traders with respect to this proxy especially during these
unusual periods. Since wealth is a major argument of PT, it is important to measure how
"wealthy" an individual feels. Therefore, Consumer Sentiment is utilized as a proxy, not
to measure his/her absolute wealth, but how the investor/consumer feels about his/her
level of wealth. Next, a threshold model was utilized to investigate the instance when
returns, sentiment, as well as other measures of economic activity, show a structural
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break-point. Finally, the effects of "contagion" and "spillover" effects on the countries of
the G9 and Indonesia are investigated.
This study contributed to the literature by examining whether a relationship can
be found in Canadian data between stock market returns, consumer confidence and trader
behavior. The use of a threshold model was an innovative method to check for the
association between returns and sentiment. In addition, the relationship between stock
market returns and consumer confidence changes during market turmoil periods or
"crises" was investigated. Specifically, the coefficients in the relationship between
consumer sentiment and stock returns were allowed to change overtime depending on
whether the economy is in a high or low volatility state. Finding evidence of a stable
significant relationship between consumer sentiment and the stock market is consistent
with the assumptions of Prospect Theory. Conversely, a finding that the relationship
changes overtime implies that consumer sentiment/moods become more or less important
to investor decisions depending on whether the economy is perceived to be in a highly
variable state. Finally, the interdependence of stock market returns was analyzed in an
attempt to determine whether behavioral factors can influence contagion among countries
of the industrialized world. While the study of behavioral finance attempts to investigate
instances of abnormal asset pricing by seeking deviations to the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, it also endeavors to explain the action of certain investors and does not
necessarily claim that these actions affect prices. This dissertation will seek to identify
and explain these actions rather than attempt to investigate the "limits to arbitrage". The
basic argument inherent in the relevant aforementioned studies is the view that
psychological factors influence trading activity. Some of these factors have long been
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identified specifically as heuristics that are incorporated into Prospect Theory, for
example sentiment, herding, and overconfidence. Others views like that of contagion
being classified as a wealth effect that can be explained by Prospect Theory are only just
being advocated4. This study contributed to the literature by utilizing a proprietary
database to identify trader behavior during crises; additionally it identified structural
shifts during times of crises and finally investigated the components of a crisis and
whether contagion in the market returns of the countries with similar economic backdrops
could be predicted.
4Kyle A. S., Xiong, W, (2001), Contagion as a Wealth Effect, Journal of Finance, Volume LVI, No. 4, pp.
1401-1440.
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
While research into the idiosyncrasies of man and his influence in the financial
markets has developed at a rapid pace over the last twenty years, there have been many
unanswered questions. Part of the reason for this debacle is the dearth of publicly
available aggregate trading data and knowledge of the thought processes that contribute
to a trade. The field of behavioral finance can be subdivided into investigations on
anomalies in asset pricing and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, and the field that relies
on psychological biases to explain trader behavior.
Behavioral Finance
Behavioral finance has become a buzzword in the investment community and
numerous articles have appeared in the financial press reporting on anomalies that may
be explained by behavioral finance. However, the study of behavioral finance is not a
recent phenomenon. As far back as the 1800's, in The Crowd by Gustave Le Bon,
Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds by Charles Mackay, there
have been observations of herd irrationality.
The first area of the study of behavioral finance subdivides investors into two
categories: "noise" traders and "arbitrageurs". Research in this area focuses on
deviations from traditional asset pricing theories. The Efficient Market Hypothesis is
predicated on heterogeneous investor beliefs. This heterogeneity of the market has been
explained in traditional finance as 'noise'. Behavioral finance investigates this 'noise'
and considers that it reflects market sentiment that can be priced in traditional asset
13
pricing models. Alpha measures this noise and represents the extra risk priced into a
stock over and above the market risk. While the review of this aspect of the literature is
by no means exhaustive, it is arranged chronologically to provide a historical perspective
on research along these deviations.
" Reinganum (1982) showed empirically that size as measured by market equity has
explanatory power in predicting the cross-section of share market returns.
" Shiller (1984) and Summers (1986) showed that even if noise trader demand is so
strong as to cause a large and persistent mispricing, it may go undetected since
most models of returns will lack predictive capacity.
" De Bondt and Thaler (1985) reported that stock prices overreact to current
changes in earnings and in 1987, they report positive (negative) estimated
abnormal stock returns for portfolios that previously generated inferior (superior)
stock price and earning performance.
* DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, (1993) found that the mispricing
(divergence from the fundamental value) being exploited by the arbitrageur
worsens in the short run.
* Benertzi and Thaler (1995) argued that the equity premium could be explained by
"myopic loss aversion". Loss aversion, referring to the observed tendency for
losses to hurt investors twice as much as gains feel good, and myopic referring to
the tendency of investors even those with long-term horizons, to care about short-
term losses and gains.
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* Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1996) documented the tendency for stock prices to
continue in the same direction over intervals of six months to a year, but to
reverse themselves over longer intervals.
* Shleifer and Vishny, (1997) showed that "noise traders" can force arbitragers to
liquidate their positions early bringing them potentially steep losses, partly
because professional money managers are not managing their own money but
rather managing money for other people. Therefore, when markets are already
lower, selling activity may be magnified since money managers are preparing for
anticipated redemptions.
* Biais and Shadur (2000) offered a counter-argument to Friedman (1953)'s claim
that irrational agents are certain to be eliminated by market forces. They
investigated a financial market where some traders over- and under-estimate the
dividend flow. This "noise" trading permits the trader to enhance his/her
bargaining power, so that he/she benefits from larger gains from trade than a
rational agent does. They analyzed the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of the
fraction of agents who are irrational, and show that they may well survive in the
long term.
" Barberis, Huang and T. Santos (2001) analyzed asset prices based on a model
where investors may derive direct utility not only from consumption but also from
fluctuations in the value of their financial wealth. While investors show loss
aversion tendencies, the degree of loss aversion depends on their prior investment
performance. This framework is tested to explain the high mean, excess volatility,
and predictability of stock returns, as well as their low correlation with
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consumption growth. The design of their model is influenced by Prospect Theory.
However, it is based on experimental evidence on how prior outcomes can affect
risky choice.
" Bleichrodt et al (2001) proposed a model of standard utility elicitation procedures,
such as the probability and certainty equivalence methods, to correct for
commonly observed violations of expected utility. Historically, decision analysis
assumed expected utility not only for the prescriptive purpose of calculating
optimal decisions but also for the descriptive purpose of calculating utilities.
However, descriptive violations of expected utility, adversely affect the
calculation of utility. That such biases are effective became clear when systematic
discrepancies were found between different utility maximization methods that,
under expected utility, should have yielded identical utilities. As it is not clear
how to correct for these biases without further knowledge of their size or nature,
most examples of utility maximization still use the expected utility formula. This
paper speculates on the biases and their sizes by using the quantitative
assessments of probability transformation and loss aversion suggested by Prospect
Theory. It presents quantitative corrections for the probability and certainty
equivalence methods. If interactive sessions to correct for biases are not possible,
then they propose to use the corrected utilities rather than the uncorrected ones in
prescriptions of optimal decisions. In an experiment, the discrepancies between
the probability and certainty equivalence methods are removed.
" Shefrin (2005) has attempted to collate all the theories in the field of behavioral
approaches to asset pricing models.
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Behavioral Finance and Trader Behavior
The alternative consideration of behavioral finance is to explain trader behavior. In
December 1996, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, Alan Greenspan
commented that there was "irrational exuberance" in the markets, but in recent times the
flip side of the question has been asked, "is the market exhibiting signs of irrational
pessimism," or "has 'irrational exuberance' shifted from the stock market to the real
estate market". Behavioral economists have taken on the challenge inherent in this
question by attempting to study how investors and traders behave.
" Myopic loss aversion is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to
gains and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently. Thaler, Tversky,
Kahneman & Schwart (1997) observed that investors who display myopic loss
aversion will be more willing to accept risks if they assess the return of their
investments more infrequently. The investors who benefited from the most
frequent feedback (and thus the most information) took the least risk and earned
the least money. The implication here is that institutional investors who have the
resources to become better informed trade less often and earn excess returns.
" Andreassen and Kraus (1988) found that when people are shown real historical
stock prices in sequence and invited to trade in a simulated market that displays
these prices, their behavior showed that they extrapolated past price changes into
their predictions of the trend in prices. This notion of feedback, where human
judgments of the probability of future events show systematic biases, is also
predicted in Prospect Theory. This is probably why today one sees stocks on an
uptrend continue for a long period while others continue to go down.
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" Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) stressed biases in the
interpretation of private versus public information.
" Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, (1998) argued that rational models typically
measure risk as the covariance of returns with marginal utility of consumption.
Therefore, stocks are risky if they fail to pay out at times of high marginal utility
(bad times) and instead pay out when marginal utility is low (good times).
Evidence against these models is the result of systematic errors that investors
make when using public information to estimate future cash flows.
" Odean (1998a) argued that the results for stock purchases are in part due to an
attention effect. When buying a stock, people do not tend to do research through
the thousands of listed shares until they find a good "buy." Instead, they typically
buy a stock that has caught their attention based on past performance. This
behavioral characteristic is not exhibited for stock sales because of fundamental
short-sale constraints that make the selling decision different from the buying
decision.
* Odean (1998b) found that individuals trade too much because of overconfidence
in thinking they can pick winners, whereas the stocks they buy do worse than the
stocks they sell, and are reluctant to sell losers even though they could potentially
benefit from selling a loser than a winner because of tax laws.
* Hong and Stein (1999) assumed that private information is disseminated slowly.
Since investors are unable to extract private information from each other, price
momentum is created.
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* In one of the few empirical studies on trader behavior, Nofsinger and Sias (1999)
found evidence that the use of momentum strategies by institutional traders is an
important source of herding behavior.
* Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) began with a preliminary question about
relevance. Does some combination of market forces, learning and evolution
render these human qualities irrelevant? Perfect agents survive and influence
market outcomes because there are limits to arbitrage. The decisions made by
man deviate from the standard economic model because of bounded rationality,
which reflects his limited cognitive abilities and hinders his problem solving. The
heuristic of bounded willpower suggests that occasionally people choose things
that will not benefit them in the long run. Another heuristic, "bounded self-
interest" incorporates the comforting fact that humans are often altruistic. They
illustrate how these concepts can be applied in two settings: finance and savings.
Financial markets have greater arbitrage opportunities than other markets, so
behavioral factors might be thought to be less important here, but they showed
that even here, the limits of arbitrage create anomalies that the psychology of
irrational decision-making can help explain. They concluded that behavioral
factors are essential elements of any complete descriptive theory. They believe
poor problem solving occurs because of overconfidence, too much optimism,
anchoring and extrapolation all of which lead to wealth diminishing
consequences.
* Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subramanyam (1998, 2001) identified "overconfidence"
whereby individuals attribute events that confirm the validity of their own actions
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to their own high ability, and events that disconfirm their actions to bad luck or
sabotage.
* Benartzi and Thaler (2001) investigated portfolio diversification. They show that
some investors follow the "1/n" strategy and divide their contributions evenly
across the investment opportunities. This naive notion of diversification leads to
better performance when there are more opportunities offered to an investor.
* Rubinstein, (2001) on the other hand, believes that markets are rational. Some of
his evidence point to research, which reflect the inability of professional money
managers to beat the market. He reasoned, "Although academic models often
assume that all investors are rational, this assumption is clearly an expository
device, not to be taken seriously. What is in contention is whether markets are
"rational" in the sense that prices are set as if all investors are rational. Even if
markets are not rational in this sense, abnormal profit opportunities still may not
exist. In that case, markets may be said to be "minimally rational." Financial
markets have developed to be minimally rational but there are two qualifications.
Realistically, market rationality needs to be defined to allow investors to be
uncertain about the characteristics of other investors in the market. Additionally,
investor irrationality, to the extent that it affects prices, is particularly likely to be
manifest through overconfidence, which in turn, is likely to make the market
hyper-rational"'. It is important to note that irrational decisions are not
synonymous to unpredictable events since it is possible for unlikely events and
'Rubenstein, Mark, Rational Markets: Yes or No? The Affirmative Case, Financial Analysts Journal,
May/June 2001 Volume 57 Number 3.
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consequent actions to be still rational. Even though the demise of the stock
market in March 2000 was not likely or predicted, the reaction of investors in
selling off their stock holdings en masse was not irrational. It was simply a
reaction to the probability that the economy was headed into a downturn.
" Barberis and Huang (2001) attempted to explain aggregate stock market behavior
by combining loss aversion and narrow framing with assumptions of how the
degree of loss aversion changes over time. They found that the investor is loss
averse when there are individual stock fluctuations and the pain of a loss on a
specific stock depends on that stock's past performance. They study equilibrium
firm-level stock returns in two economies, one in which investors are loss averse
over the fluctuations of their portfolio, and another in which they are loss averse
over the fluctuations of individual stocks they own. Both approaches can shed
light on empirical phenomena. However they find the second approach to be
more successful in that the typical individual's stock return has a high mean and
excess volatility, and there is a large value premium in the cross section, which
can, to some extent, be captured by a commonly used multi factor model.
Critics to the Theory of Behavioral Finance
Robert Merton (1987) believed that the evidence against market efficiency was
"premature" based on technical difficulties ascribed to Shiller's (1985) framework on
stock market volatility, and weak statistical effects in the De-Bondt -Thaler (1985) study
on the overreaction effect.
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Eugene Fama (1970) in "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Empirical
Work" extolled the virtues of market efficiency and in 1998 he produced a survey of
empirical work on the challenges to market efficiency explained by behavioral finance
theorists. He concluded, "behavioral finance is nothing more than anomalies dredging."
Merton Miller (1986) used a study on dividends to affirm the existence of stock
market rationality. He argued that while there are many interesting stories in finance, they
should be ignored since they tend to be distracting and divert the attention of scholars
away from identifying the fundamental forces, which drive markets.
Reasons for Expansion of the Behavioral Finance Theory
Answers to and explanations of the anomalies are needed so that past mistakes
could be avoided. The key to evasion is recognition. Why else would past anomalies
like the Tulip Bubble and the NASDAQ bubble of the late 1990's occur? The after
effects of major crises like wars resulting in stock market crashes have been widely
documented, yet it happened again in the week after the stock market reopened following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist activity. The anticipated rapid recovery from these lows
occurred as early as the following month. Therefore, it is obvious that irrational
exaggerations in financial markets are not a new issue since many of the extreme losses
are recovered shortly thereafter. It is important to investigate these exaggerations to seek
a rule of thumb since much pain and suffering could be avoided by anticipation of these
anomalies and to model behavior to combat these wealth destructive forces. It seems that
during "catastrophes" or "crises," investors ignore rational expectations resulting in
observations of herd behavior and other destructive tendencies.
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The fact that so many proponents and critics of this facet of finance have emerged
lends credibility and critics of this facet of finance lends credibility to the study.
However, there remain many challenges regarding the testing of the theories. Since the
field draws significantly from psychology, much of the empirical work is based on
experiments with just a few based on actual data from market participants. The study of
finance postulates that the markets in which "rational man" participates are efficient since
all the information about a stock (even that known by only a select few) is already
incorporated into the stock price. Over the last quarter of a century, research in markets
with asymmetric information has expanded. The forerunners of this type of work are the
2001 Nobel Prize Winners in Economics: George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph
Stiglitz. While much of the work on asymmetric information was produced in the
1970's, the basic premise is still being used in applications today. Several of these
publications attempted to explain anomalies in the Efficient Market Theory and so are the
precursors of the study of Behavioral Finance. This attempts to explain anomalies in
Standard Utility Theory using a broader social science perspective drawn from
psychology and sociology.
Trends in Behavioral Finance -Market Microstructure
The study of the idiosyncratic behavior of man has evolved into the analysis of a
process that details the informational content of prices broadly defined as market
microstructure. This area attempts to link the two areas of behavioral finance, seeking
deviations from traditional asset pricing methods to reflect trader activity. While this is a
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burgeoning empirical field of finance, it requires data accumulated at the micro level and
is beyond the scope of this study.
Experimental Design in the study of Behavioral Finance
Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman & Schwartz (1997) designed an experiment to
simulate investment over time in two hypothetical funds to test the theory of Myopic
Loss Aversion. This theory is reflected in the observed greater sensitivity to losses than
gains as well as the tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently using mental accounting.
It predicts that an investor who frames decisions narrowly will tend to make short-term
choices rather than adopt long-term policies. An investor who frames past outcomes
narrowly will evaluate gains and losses frequently. The combination of these tendencies
defines a myopic investor. In general, this type of individual behavior consistently
predicts poor decision-making and too frequent trading. An experiment with 80
undergraduate Berkeley students substantiates their claim.
Willman, O'Creevy, Nicholson & Sloane (2001) test theory based on professional
London trader data. In this experiment, traders were asked to describe their behavior
under differing instances in order to determine their risk tolerance. They argued that
managers focus on avoiding losses rather than making gains.
Empirical Studies in Behavioral Finances
A theory and its resulting models are only as good as the evidence. Empirical
testing is the logical way to compare alternative theories. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991)
tested their model's prediction that small firm returns will be correlated with closed-end
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fund discounts. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) tested the implications from the Hong and
Stein (1999) model that momentum will be stronger among stocks with thinner analyst
coverage. Other test sought evidence in support of a model for example the Odean (1998)
and Genesove and Mayer (2001) investigations of the disposition effect using actual
market behavior.
Locke & Mann (1999) empirically tested currency and commodity data from the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange to examine the trading activity of professional futures
traders for evidence of the behavioral characteristics generally referred to as
overconfidence and/or "gambling with the house money". The results lent support to the
Gervais and Odean (2001) model of overconfidence and learning, which predicted that
successful and inexperienced traders are the most likely to be overconfident. They found
little evidence of overconfidence in the group of predominantly experienced traders.
However, they noted that the most successful traders are more likely to take risk when
winning than the less successful traders are. This provided support for the notion that
successful traders are more likely to be overconfident. They also found that trader
experience is related to a measure of overconfidence - traders with more experience are
less likely to take more risk after a period of abnormally good profits.
Fielding and Stracca (2003) proposed a model of expected returns under loss
aversion. They found that agents are irrationally shortsighted and forgo superior returns
by being too anxious about short-term outcomes, but they are "rational" in the sense that
they treat safe and risky returns in the same way since they have the same reference point
for both types of investment.
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A unique daily trade level data set from the main stock market in Pakistan
compared the trades done by brokers on their own behalf and those done as
intermediaries for outside investors. A study on this data set performed by Khwaja and
Mian (2003) found the brokers earn at least 8% higher returns for their own trades as well
as evidence of "pump and dump" price manipulation schemes. While this type of
investigation is not the primary focus of our study, the techniques used may uncover
some interesting characteristics.
Coval and Shumway (2002, 2005) study on behavioral biases suggested that
traders behave differently in the afternoons after experiencing morning losses or gains.
They studied the behavior of proprietary traders at the CBOT and found that traders who
experience losses in the morning are more likely to assume above average afternoon risk
than traders with morning gains. Their study was based on their assumption that each
trader closes out his position at the end of each day, thus beginning each day with no
position. The work by Kolb (1991), Kuserk and Locke (1993) and Manaster and Mann
(1996) supported this view.
Coval, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2002) showed that contrary to evidence on
previous studies on professional money managers of mutual funds, individual investors
can beat the market. They reported, "That although individuals under perform the market
over short horizons by trading excessively, over the longer term most performance
persistence is concentrated among individuals with positive ability". They based this
observation on trades placed through a large discount brokerage over 1990 through 1996.
They described a procedure, which they claim adjusts for good performance during a
period when the overall market appreciated.
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Paul Willman et al (1999) observed that traders' behavior within well-established
markets appeared to deviate substantially from that predicted by theory. Using data from
a study of traders within financial markets in London, the paper seeks to document this
apparent paradox and assess its implications. General theories about how the financial
world works are distinct from but compatible with more instrumental behavioral rules
about how to work in the financial world. The latter is seen as an internally consistent
recipe for action, which requires concurrent belief in both the validity of the general
theories - for example about the relationship between risk and return - as well as the
ability of individual agency to secure outcomes. In terms of the general theory, this has a
low probability.
Using logit regressions on a unique data set of two years of investor behavior for
almost the entire set of investors from Finland, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) found that
distance, language, and culture influence stock trades. Investors exhibit reluctance to
realize losses and engage in tax-loss selling activity. Past returns and historical price
patterns, such as being at a monthly high or low, affect trading behavior.
Barber and Odean (2001) predicted overconfident investors will trade too much,
and test this prediction by partitioning investors based on a variable that provides a
natural proxy for overconfidence gender. Psychological research has established that men
are more prone to overconfidence than women are. Thus, models of investor
overconfidence predict that men will trade more, and perform worse, than women do.
Using data from a large discount brokerage firm, they analyze the common stock
investments of men and women. Congruent with the expectation of the overconfidence
models, they give evidence that men trade more than women do, and earn annual risk-
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adjusted net returns that are less than those earned by women. In fact, the differences in
the sexes are magnified among unmarried individuals. Using the same discount
brokerage data Barber and Odean (2002b) tested the idea that for individual investors,
buying decisions are more driven by attention than are selling decisions. They found that
the individual investors in their sample are more likely, on the following day, to be
purchasers of these high-attention stocks than sellers.
Prospect Theory
The most current theories in behavioral finance that incorporate the tenets from
Prospect Theory have been collated, and put forward as explanations for the deviation
from standard utility theory. This theory has been promoted as an exegesis of behavioral
finance anomalies.
Kahneman and Tversky have long been viewed as the pioneers in the field of
behavioral finance. In awarding the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002 - the following observation was disseminated.
"Traditionally, economic theory has relied on the assumption of a "homo economicus,"
whose behavior is governed by self-interest and who is capable of rational decision-
making." Economics has also been regarded as a non-experimental science, where
researchers - as in astronomy or meteorology - have had to rely exclusively on field data,
that is, direct observations of the real world. During the last two decades, however, these
views have undergone a transformation. "Controlled laboratory experiments have
emerged as a vital component of economic research and, in certain instances,
experimental results have shown that basic postulates in economic theory should be
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modified. Researchers in two areas have generated this process: cognitive psychologists
who have studied human judgment and decision-making and experimental economists
who have tested economic models in the laboratory. This Nobel Prize was awarded to the
innovators in these two fields: Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith" 2. Honorable
mention was also given to Tversky for his work with Kahneman on Prospect Theory.
An essential component in any model that attempts to understand trading behavior
is an assumption of investor preferences - how he/she evaluates risky gambles. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) showed that if investors followed the axioms of
completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence then their preferences in
reviewing choices made under risky conditions, could be represented by some utility
function. Historically, models of decision making under uncertainty or risky situations,
assume that investors are risk- averse. When the utility of wealth is defined by U (w),
risk aversion implies that U'(w) > 0 and U" (w) < 0 (Markowitz (1952a); Samuelson
(1958); Pratt (1964); Sharpe (1964); Arrow (1965); and Lintner (1965)). These models
imply the market is homogeneous. However, the market's participants are very much
heterogeneous in their beliefs and actions. In fact, the Efficient Market Hypothesis is
predicated on heterogeneous investor beliefs. This heterogeneity of the market has been
explained in traditional finance as 'noise'. Behavioral finance investigates this 'noise'
and considers that it reflects market sentiment that can be priced in traditional asset
pricing models.
Since Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952b) theorists have
suggested that the utility function should also have a risk-seeking segment with U" (w) >
2Source: www. J-bradford-delong.net/movable-type/archive/001010.html.
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0-. While these theorists only speculated on the existence of risk-seeking segments,
psychologists led by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) began conducting experimental
studies to investigate this property. Tversky, the late Stanford University cognitive
psychologist, and Kahneman, of Princeton University, declared that the ever-rational
economic person or "homo economicus" did not correspond to observed human behavior.
They found in their experiments, for example, that investors focus more on the risk of a
prospect (losses) than the benefits (gains), and espoused the now famous "Prospect
Theory".
Philosophical Base
The "Chicago School" approach to human behavior led by Milton Friedman
(1953) has many followers. The most important characteristic of 'homo economicus' is
his rationality. However, what has been termed anomalies in the stock market probably
has a large part to do with the fact that very often investors do not act rationally.
The scope of the price anomalies is diverse, for example, Vriend (1996) asserts
while rational agents do not generally buy at the lowest price available in the market, they
will normally search objectively for the best strategy available in their environment,
affirming that irrational behavior does not occur. However, an anomaly is the commonly
observed one where investors, especially institutional traders and market makers react to
a falling stock or bond price by buying more in an attempt to prop up the price.
3Levy H., and Wiener Z., (1998) Stochastic Dominance and Prospect Dominance with Subjective
Weighting Functions, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Volume 16, Issue 2, Pages 147 - 163.
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Under uncertainty, and assuming Friedman's position, an individual's ranking of a
prospect (the object of choice) is usually denoted by the mathematical expectation of
utility or benefit resulting from the action. Utility is derived from outcomes
(consequences). It occurs because of beliefs (probability assessments over states of the
world) in the occurrence of certain outcomes. These preferences are incorporated by
some mathematical function (for example lognormal, exponential, power function) to
give some level of utility. The usual criteria for these utility functions are monotonicity
and convexity to imply risk-aversion. Non-convex preferences are avoided since they
tend to have indifference surfaces, which are tangent to budget, and set boundaries at
several places. As well, risk preferences change over time. In addition, it has been
shown that measurement errors in variables could bias utility function coefficients
(Knowles 1984) and that changes in wealth cannot to explain the preference shifts over
time. Fishburn (1988) presents a survey of decisions under uncertainty, which violate
Von Neuman-Morgenstern's Expected Utility (VMUT) theory.
Apparent violations of expected utility theory are sometimes explained by
information processing costs, which lead researchers to use a simplified rather than
complete model (Demski, 1972). Kahneman & Tversky (1979, later modified in 1992)
(hereafter referred to as KT) proposed an exegesis, which they called Prospect Theory, as
an alternative theory of behavior in response to these violations of expected utility theory.
This theory postulates that individuals behave differently after periods of losses
compared to periods of gains. While a loss minimizing investor may be more risk averse
after gains have been secured, behaving like a portfolio insurer, when confronted with
losses, the investor attempts to maximize the probability that terminal wealth exceeds his
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aspiration level. Therefore, he may tend to employ activities such as averaging down,
window dressing, or some other type of misguided action. This behavior is reflected in
his trading activity.
Definition of Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (KT) developed Prospect Theory as an alternative
method of explaining individuals' choices made under conditions of risk or in terms of
the common buzzword of today "volatility." KT's basic theory proposes that the choices
that individuals make in risky situations exhibit several characteristics that are
inconsistent with the basic principles of risk aversion hypothesized by Von Neuman and
Morgenstern (VM). VM predicts that decisions in risky situations are based on an
individuals' expected final wealth and probabilities of different states in the economy.
Prospect Theory theorizes that when individuals are faced with making a choice among
different prospects, they disregard components that are common to all prospects under
consideration and make a decision based on values assigned to gains and losses from a
certain reference point and decision weights. These decision weights are lower than the
corresponding probabilities of VMUT. This may explain why individuals buy insurance,
but at the same time are willing to gamble.
This theory postulates that individuals behave differently after periods of losses
compared to periods of gains. While a loss minimizing investor may be more risk averse
after gains behaving similar to a portfolio insurer, when confronted with losses, the
investor attempts to maximize the probability that terminal wealth exceeds his aspiration
level. Therefore, he may tend to employ activities such as averaging down, window
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dressing, or some other type of misguided action. This behavior is reflected in his trading
activity and has been used to explain investor behavior in avoiding selling losers.
They assert that individuals face choices or prospects, which are defined in terms
of gains and losses relative to some neutral reference point. The relevance of the
reference point results from the observation that people are usually risk averse when
gains are experienced, but risk seeking when losses have been incurred. Therefore when
choosing among risky and uncertain prospects with a finite number of outcomes, a person
may prefer a large uncertain loss to a sure small loss, whereas a small sure gain may be
preferred to a gamble involving a large uncertain gain. K-T refers to this as the reflection
effect where reflection occurs at the origin, i.e. for zero losses and zero gains. The
reflection effect implies there is risk aversion in the positive (gains) domain but risk
seeking behavior in the negative (losses) domain. Thus, the value (or utility) function is
concave for gains and convex for losses. Expected utility theory makes no restriction on
the shape of the utility function, therefore this reflection effect does not represent a
violation.
The origin or reference point characterizes K-T's Value Function, which is
derived from Prospect Theory, which is the perceived status quo. They propose loss-
averse utility functions that are convex over losses and concave over gains. Value is
measured by the change from the perceived starting point. The function is theorized to be
steeper for losses than for gains. In Prospect Theory, how the situation is "framed" i.e.
the attainable gains or losses, determines the path the individual may take. The
individual also distinguishes between losses on paper versus realized losses. When an
individual has already experienced a given monetary loss, greater hurt is experienced and
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the curve is steeper from the origin (see Figure 1). The curve is less steep from the
starting point (status quo) when gains have already been enjoyed.
Figure 1
Value Function Hypothesized from Prospect Theory
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The utility or value function (denoted by V (xi) in Figure 1) is defined in terms of
two scales. The first is the decision weighting function denoted as 7t (p), which reflects
the impact of p (the probability of receiving x) on the total value of the prospect. The
second scale v reflects the value of changes from the reference point, its gains or losses.
It is important to note that the xi's in the value function are outcomes and are defined as
changes in wealth or position rather than absolute wealth, unlike expected utility theory.
However, K-T's utility function is similar to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility theory (VMUT) function, which is convex for losses and concave for gains above.
Convexity implies most probabilities are underweighted while very small probabilities
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are over weighted. In addition, K-T's value function is steeper for losses than for gains,
compared with the typical expected utility function. KT finds that individual decision-
makers have limited ability to process information when making decisions and suggests
the preference for a risk-taking attitude in the domain of losses. They believe that the
prevalence of risk-taking attitude may be "rooted in people's limited sensitivity to low
probability events."
Prospect Theory Methodology
V(x,p:y,q) = 7(p)v(x) + (1 -t)(q)v(y) (1)
Pratt's absolute risk aversion coefficient (R) for individual investors is used to
measure investors' responses under conditions of gains and losses in wealth.
R = -U" (W)/U' (W) (2)
While the ideal situation is to study investors' preferences under different wealth
changing scenarios and to add them up in a coherent manner to test the total effect, this
method is impractical. Therefore, special cases of wealth altering conditions can be
highlighted by analyzing abnormal or major events in an aggregate sense or by reviewing
Wall Street Journal's announcements of unusual events that may lead to significant
wealth losses. In the terminology of Prospect Theory, this would constitute the editing
phase. Examples of wealth losing events are "Black" Monday, "Blue" Monday, "Turn-
around" Tuesday, and days when the DJIA changed by a specific number of points in a
single day.
Prospect Theory provides no prediction of the changes in R if changes in wealth
have already been incorporated into investors' choices. However, failure to incorporate
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prior wealth changes into choices, gives definite predictions for changes in R. Recent
reductions in wealth should result in the value function being convex for both gains and
losses. The patterns identified by KT are:
1. risk-seeking over low probability gains (lottery)
2. risk-aversion over low probability losses
3. risk-aversion over high probability gains
4. risk-seeking over high probability losses
Thus, measures of R would tend to be negative after the wealth loss and positive
after the wealth gain. These arguments lead to the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis: During periods of catastrophe, when investors experience massive
wealth losses as defined by an appreciable absolute change in the index, the change in
the absolute risk aversion coefficient, R, should be below zero i.e. investors should
become less risk-averse or exhibit risk-seeking behavior, and above zero if investors
become more risk-averse i.e.:
H0 : AR <0
HA: AR>0 (3)
While Equations (2) and (3) are theoretically accurate, they pose difficulties at the
empirical level. Realistically a formularized expansion is needed that leads to the testing
of equations (2) and (3).
A few other features of Prospect Theory are of special interest. These have been
identified as isolation and certainty effects. The isolation effect occurs when people who
are faced with a choice among different prospects, often disregard components that the
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alternatives share and focus on the distinguishing features. This approach to choice may
lead to inconsistent preferences, since a pair of prospects can be decomposed into
common and distinct components in more than one way leading to different preferences.
The certainty effect is described as a systematic overweighting of outcomes considered
certain, relative to outcomes, which are probabilistic. These observations which occur
during the decision making process are not adequately explained by conventional
expected utility theory. Thus when there are "departures from expected utility theory
which lead to normatively unacceptable consequences such as inconsistencies,
intransitivities, and violations of dominance," the value function, the underlying concept
of Prospect Theory render a suitable alternative.
Prospect Theory describes decisions as having two stages - editing and evaluation.
Editing is a reviewing process, which simplifies the decision problem for the evaluation
stage. Aspects of editing involve coding (for example, when alternative outcomes of a
decision are redefined as gains and losses from a reference point Pr(in Figure 1). This
can be the current wealth or equity capital position of an individual (or, in the case of a
mutual fund manager, the net asset value of his bond or equity fund). Another operation
that occurs during the editing phase is combination where probabilities associated with
identical outcomes are combined. In segregation, aspects of editing involve separating
the risky component from the riskless component of a prospect. Finally, common
components contained in all the prospects evaluated are discarded (cancelled).
The second major operation described in Prospect Theory is evaluation, which
occurs subsequent to editing. The prospect is evaluated in a manner similar to an
expected utility formulation; subjective values are assigned to the outcomes in the
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prospect. Then decision weights (analogous to subjective probabilities) are assigned to
the outcomes. The values and weights across outcomes are combined (using a multiply
and add rule-just like the Rational Expectations Principle in Utility Theory). Finally, the
decision-maker chooses the prospect with the highest value based on the operations from
the editing phase that has the highest preference rating.
Newman (1980) explains that while VMUT is based on an explicit set of axioms
or is deductive, Prospect Theory is inductive or based on observations of behavior. Arkes
and Blumer (1985) apply PT to examine the irrational behavior of individuals who
continue with a losing prospect simply because they have already invested money in that
project. They argue that the concept of individuals' "throwing good money after bad": is
appropriately described by PT. They present 10 experiments involving a decision
prospect to a group of college students. Each student is presented with one experiment
where a sunk cost decision has already been made. The experiments range from deciding
whether to proceed with a $10 million investment project to choosing between two ski
trips. They find that the characteristics of PT explain the "sunk cost" reaction. First, the
value function represents the relation between objectively defined gains and losses and
the subjective value a person places on these gains and losses. Secondly, the certainty
effect implies that a sure gain is overvalued and a sure loss is undervalued. However, PT
does not explain why sure losses are so abhorrent and sunk costs are so difficult to
ignore.
Fiegenbaum (1990) use COMPUSTAT data of U.S. industrial firms to explain
Bowman's risk-return paradox. They found that firms tend to demonstrate risk-seeking
behavior (a convex value function) when they are suffering losses or are below targeted
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ROE levels. In contrast, when targets have been achieved, they tend to exhibit risk-
averse behavior (i.e. a concave value function. These findings are consistent with
Prospect Theory.
The utility function alone does not incorporate losses into prospective gambles of
uncertain outcomes. In this instance, prospects will have to be re-evaluated and can even
be evaluated with a convex value function. This is very different from expected utility
theory, which postulates concave utility function for risk-averse individuals. Thus,
individuals in a loss situation would exhibit risk-seeking behaviors. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) cite a well-known example of this, the tendency toward betting on "long
shots" near the end of a trading day. Coval and Shumway (2005) presented evidence of
loss aversion in a study where proprietary traders displayed significantly more risk in
afternoon trading following morning gains placing price-setting trades more frequently,
paying higher prices for purchases and accepting lower prices for sales. By contrast,
afternoon prices set by traders with morning losses show the reverse noticeably more
than the prices set by others. This study directly linked the value function from Prospect
Theory to gains and losses in the futures pit. They predicted a curvature of the value
function, which implies that traders with profits (losses) by the middle of the trading day
will take less (more) risk in their afternoon trading.
The decision weighting function distinguishes Prospect Theory from expected
utility theory. This function is applied to the probability of each occurrence and reflects
the impact of probability on the overall value of the prospect. Thus, small probabilities
are overweighted and large probabilities are underweighted. Allais (1953) famous
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paradox has been used to highlight the benefits of Prospect Theory. It focuses on the
choice of rational man:
Decision 1: Choose between A and B:
A $1,000,000 with probability 1.00
E(A) = $1,000,000
B $5,000,000 with probability 0.10
$1,000,000 with probability 0.89
$0 with probability 0.01
E(B) = $1,390,000
Decision 2: Choose between C and D:
C $1,000,000 with probability 0.11
$0 with probability 0.89
E(C) = $110,000
D $5,000,000 with probability 0.10
$0 with probability 0.90
E(D) = $500,000
Many subjects chose A when faced with Decision 1 even though there was a 10%
probability of a larger payoff, with only a 1% chance of losing it all, and D when faced
with Decision 2, breaking the expected utility rule of linearity of preferences in choices.
Based on the 'strong independence' axiom of expected utility theory, the mixtures
involved in Decisions 1 and 2 should not affect the ranking of these gambles, just the
expectations. However investors' preferences were more affected by the probabilities of
0.99 (0.89 + 0.10) to 1.00, than the smaller probabilities of large payoffs.
Assuming a utility function which satisfies concavity for r > 0 and convexity for r
< 0 i.e. v(r) = r 1/3 and a nr function which satisfies K-T's requirements, i.e. 7t(p)=0.1 + 0.9
(p2) for pE(0,1) and n(p)=0 for p=0, Allais' (1953) famous paradox can instead be
evaluated using Prospect Theory:
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Decision 1: Choose between A and B:
A $1,000,000 with probability 1.00
B $5,000,000 with probability 0.10
$1,000,000 with probability 0.89
0 with probability 0.01
V(A) = v(1,000,000)7t(1) = (1,000,000) 1/3 = 100
V(B) = v(5,000,000)7r(0.1) +v(1,000,000)n(0.89) +v(0)7r(0.01)
= 99.928
Decision 2: Choose between C and D:
C $1,000,000 with probability 0.11
0 with probability 0.89
D $5,000,000 with probability 0.10
0 with probability 0.90
V(C) = 11.089
V(D) = 18.639
Thus, Alais' paradox can be solved accurately by using Prospect Theory.
However, a descriptive theory should be reconcilable with empirical results involving
violations of independence axioms. K-T shows that the preference axioms are usually
satisfied (risk aversion) when gains have already been made. When losses are incurred,
risk taking occurs. This problem, known as framing/context, may lead to the failure of
the axioms of invariance, dominance, independence and transitivity. Therefore K-T
suggests that Prospect Theory can be used as a viable alternative to expected utility
theory.
They noted that occasionally investors perform activities that violate the axioms
of dominance or invariance. They show experimentally that typical preferences are given
by an S-shaped value function, V(x), (to distinguish from utility function) with the
following properties: V'(x) > 0 for all x, V"(x) < 0 for x > 0 and V"(x) > 0 for x<0, where
x stands for the change of wealth. Thus risk seeking prevails in the range x < 0. The
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result is concave utility functions in the domain of gains (denoting risk aversion) and
convex in the domain of losses (indicating risk seeking behavior).
K-T showed that the preference axioms are usually satisfied (risk aversion) when
gains have already been made. However when losses are incurred, risk taking occurs.
This problem, known as framing/context, may lead to the failure of the axioms of
invariance, dominance, independence and transitivity. However, K-T's utility function is
similar to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory (VMUT) function,
which is convex for losses and concave for gains above. Convexity implies most
probabilities are underweighted while very small probabilities are over weighted. In
addition, K-T's value function is steeper for losses than for gains, compared with the
typical expected utility function. Therefore K-T suggests that Prospect Theory can be
used as a viable alternative to expected utility theory.
These findings contradict expected utility theory, and, cast doubt on the validity
of most fundamental economic, and finance models. PT has gained many believers over
the years, and increasingly academicians employ PT to explain phenomena in the capital
markets. PT plays a central role in the area called "behavioral finance" or "behavioral
economics", which has recently attracted much attention both from practitioners and
surveyed in academia (chronologically for example, Thaler (1994); Benartzi & Thaler
(1995); Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny (1998); Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyan
(1999); Barberis, Huang, & Santos, (1999) and Shefrin (2005)).
Plous (1993) summarized the psychological research into investor heuristics in his
book, "The psychology of judgment and decision making". Slovic (2000), additionally,
translated psychological research methods, and research results on decision-making into
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the language of economics. By their studies, these researchers and other psychologists
have introduced psychological research methods and findings to economists/finance
researchers who were looking for a more accurate model for human judgment, than
"Homo economicus". These studies conclude that investors act under cognitive
constraints failing to achieve rationality, in a manner that can potentially be accounted
for, predicted, and exploited.
Herbert Simon (1955) challenged the economic orthodox of the definition of
rationality by proposing the concepts of 'satisficing', bounded and procedural rationality.
He believed that the alternative to the traditional notion of rationality is by no means
irrationality but the notion of bounded rationality. This is described as limited cognitive
abilities that constrain problem solving. "Despite - and sometimes even because of - their
bounded resources in knowledge, time, and computational resources, humans are able to
make good decisions." This theory showed man has a "choice" in decision-making.
Theoretical Aspects
Investors' investment decisions may change because of adverse economic or
social conditions. In the context of Prospect Theory, when losses have already been
made, risk- seeking behavior is exhibited, as the investor prefers the slim chance of
returning to a reference point, the origin in Figure 1, to the option of a sure loss with a
higher expected value. Therefore, the investor is expected to show a tendency to commit
new resources to the same negative prospect.
If one were to adhere to expected utility theory, the set of desirable options was
only as good as the assumed stable utility function. Prospect Theory on the other hand,
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while it is inherently based on expected utility, is strongly influenced by cognitive
theories of bounded rationality. The term bounded rationality is used to designate
rational choice that takes into account the cognitive limitations of both knowledge and
cognitive capacity. This theory emphasizes the fact that investors' capabilities are
constrained by perception, logical power and economic capacity (Vriend 1996).
Therefore, it does not eliminate times when investors are irrational.
Several researchers have contended that the right choice of mean-variance
efficient portfolios will give precisely optimum expected utility if and only if all
distributions are normal or if the utility function is quadratic (Levy and Markowitz
(1979), and more recently, Robison and Barry (1987)). A corollary to this argument is
implied: that a well-selected point from the mean-variance efficient set can be trusted to
yield almost maximum expected utility if and only if the investor's utility function is
approximately quadratic or the investor's a priori beliefs are approximately normal.
Since many people reject the hypothesis that return distributions are normal, and Pratt
and Arrow (1964) have each shown that quadratic utility functions produce absurd
implications, it makes sense, that another specification of the utility function is desirable.
Numerous researchers have investigated other utility functions using various
mathematical aberrations for example lognormal, exponential etc. Though each of these
has been shown to have relatively good approximations, they do not stand up in times of
irrationality. Traders have shown that they sometimes react irrationally when faced with
extremely volatile conditions. Many observations have been presented to explain their
behavior. The herd atmosphere sometimes prevails whereby traders do not want to be
caught holding unwanted positions and so start selling in large chunks once the market
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moves downward. Again, on the downside, some traders have tried to prop up the stocks
in which they have a large position simply by buying more. Traders may also view these
times as opportunities to "average-down". Individuals tend to be less risk-averse or
bolder during catastrophic times. On the other hand, when the market shows volatility on
the upside, traders who do not want to "miss the boat" jump in without any regard for
changes in the fundamentals of the stock.
Sentiment
Shefrin (2005, p 219) defines market sentiment, a concept typically described in
finance as 'noise', as the measurement of the degree of excessive optimism or pessimism
among investors. Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory has been
incorporated into traditional asset pricing models in order to explain asset price anomalies
such as the equity premium and excess volatility in stock returns. A central feature of
Prospect Theory is the idea that agents/investors derive utility from their financial wealth,
not just from the level of consumption as is assumed in traditional utility theory. In
addition, it is assumed that agents' risk aversion changes depending on whether they
experience gains or losses, a feature termed loss aversion. Overreaction and under-
reaction of stock prices is linked to a model of investor sentiment or how investors form
earnings expectations by Barbaris, Shleifer and Vishy (1998). Two of the most recent
theoretical contributions to the asset pricing literature are found in Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001) (BHS hereafter) and Falato (2003)4.
4Falato, 2003. "Happiness Maintenance and Asset Prices," Finance 0310003, Economics Working Paper
Archive at WUSTL.
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BHS showed that incorporating Prospect Theory ideas into the traditional model
helps to explain many of the empirical findings on stock returns. Their model allowed
agents to derive utility directly from changes in financial wealth in addition to
consumption growth. Specifically, agents become more risk averse if they experience
prior stock market losses and less risk averse after prior gains. Falato (2003) used the
term "happiness maintenance" to describe the feature that: "investor's risk aversion
depends partly on their current affective state, which, in turn, is a function of the current
state of the economy. In particular, good times bring about a positive mood for investors
and, consistent with the experimental evidence (Isen (1999) and others), a heightened
pain from any potential loss." (Falato, p 5). Using this modification to the preference
structure of the model, Falato was able to reproduce many features observed in U.S data
such as the equity premium and the volatility and predictability of stock returns.
The two aforementioned studies show that assuming that investor preferences
depend on economy wide state variables such as the stock market is crucial to developing
a successful theoretical model of asset prices. Since estimating risk aversion is an
extremely difficult exercise it is necessary to consider a proxy for this emotion. Baker
and Wurgler (2003) find that "when sentiment appears to be high, stocks that are
relatively attractive to optimists and speculators (young stocks, small stocks, unprofitable
stocks, non-dividend paying stocks, high-volatility stocks, extreme-growth stocks, and
distressed stocks) experience low future returns relative to other stocks" and vice versa.
They noted that the rise and fall of dividend payouts between 1963 and 2000 closely
tracked investor sentiment. They grew when investors were most risk averse. This
suggests that sentiment can be used as a proxy for risk aversion.
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There are several papers directly linking sentiment to stock market returns. Otoo
(1999) documented a strong contemporaneous relationship between the Michigan
consumer confidence index and stock market returns in the U.S using monthly data for
the period from June 1980 to June 1999. A more recent paper by Brown and Cliff (2004)
found a strong relationship between investor sentiment and the stock market using data
on survey measures of investor sentiment as well as a variety of investor sentiment
indicators, such as advance-decline ratios and closed-end fund discounts.
Ding et al (2004) found the asymmetry in the impact of positive and negative
earnings growth on analysts' forecast errors (which they use as a proxy for analysts'
sentiment since analyst's forecasts are influenced by market sentiment) is similar to the
value function of Prospect Theory, where gains and losses have an asymmetric impact on
the value of a prospect. They noted, "Since investors have a loss aversion according to
the predictions of Prospect Theory, analysts would avoid making pessimistic forecasts if
their incentives are tied to investor trading activity".
The aforementioned studies show that the assumption that investor preferences
depend on economy wide state variables such as the stock market, is crucial to
developing a successful theoretical model of asset prices. It is important to check for
stability of regression coefficients when the model is estimated on sub-samples that are
specifically selected based on categorical or continuous variables. A decision has to be
made at which point or threshold is it reasonable to split the sample. A method devised
to make this selection is a special case of the threshold regression model. A threshold
variable is endogenously determined and is used to split the sample into two groups
called classes or regimes. The Threshold Autoregressive Model (TAR) was first devised
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by Tong (1983, 1990). Bruce Hansen (1996) approached the problem with a simple
threshold model involving an analog of the two regimes. In deriving the distribution, he
allowed for conducting inference using the model where previously standard errors could
not be computed giving no theoretical basis for inference. He noted, "We find that if we
let the threshold effect (the difference in slopes between the two regimes) become small
as the sample size increases, then the asymptotic distribution of the threshold estimator is
free of nuisance parameters (up to scale)". The threshold estimator is assumed to have an
asymptotic distribution and a Brownian motion. When the homoskedasticity condition
does not hold a scaled likelihood ratio statistic and an amended confidence region deals
with the problem of biased correlation coefficients.
Contagion
Recent research into financial crises, suggest that they appear in tandem. In
September 1992, the lira and sterling were expelled from the Exchange Rate Mechanism
of the European Monetary System (EMS). In 1993, Spain and Portugal, Ireland and
France were also forced to devalue again due to another surge of speculative pressure.
This caused the demise of EMS and Europe's attempt at unified monetary policy. In
1994, a number of countries were affected by the sudden and dramatic devaluation of the
Mexican peso, nicknamed the "Tequila" crisis. A series of crises in 1997 affected several
Asian economies. These episodes have led economists to suggest that financial crises are
contagious, that they spread from the originating country to other countries, and that an
understanding of the reasons for contagion is essential for forming appropriate economic
policies.
48
Explanations for the transmission of a crisis across countries include fundamental
factors, trade linkages that transmit a crisis, where currency depreciation in one country
weakens the fundamentals in other countries by reducing the competitiveness of their
exports. Additionally, financial inter-dependence can contribute to the spread of a crisis,
as initial turmoil in one country can lead to loan redemptions, thereby creating a credit
crunch in other debtor countries. Finally, a currency crisis in one country can worsen
market participants' perception of the economic outlook in countries with similar
characteristics and elicit a fall in investor confidence throughout the region.
Lee and Kim (1993) found evidence of contagion in stock markets around the
world after the 1987 U.S. stock market crash using correlation statistics. The verification
of inter-relationships in stock market returns is muddied since the World Bank's
definition of contagion is similar: contagion exists when cross-country correlations
increase during crisis times relative to correlations during tranquil times. It is therefore
necessary to find a definition of contagion that can be identified and not confused with
other less catastrophic conditions.
Some of the conclusions that have been predicated include the theories of
"monsoonal effects", "spillovers", and "pure contagion". The theory of "monsoonal
effects" suggests that financial crises appear to be contagious because the underlying
macroeconomic causes are correlated. "Spillovers," describes a crisis which affects
another country through external links such as trade. The theory of "pure contagion"
theorizes that the market jumps from a "good" to a "bad" equilibrium. The jump could be
caused by a reversal in a long-standing information cascade. A financial crisis in one
country could be considered a signal that, for example, a certain type of economic
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development strategy is unsustainable. Investors would withdraw their money from
countries with apparently similar development strategies and cause a cluster of financial
crises. The first two cases, monsoonal effects and spillovers, are examples of inter-
dependence. Crises resulting from inter-dependence should be largely predictable using
macroeconomic fundamentals. If the inter-dependence during non-crises periods is
known, the effect of a financial crisis in one country on the likelihood of a crisis in
another country can be evaluated. The third case, jumps between states of equilibrium, is
what is referred to as contagion in this study: a largely unpredictable, higher correlation
during crises times. This definition of contagion means that a crisis in one country
increases the likelihood of a crisis in another country over and above what would be
implied by the inter-dependence that prevails between these countries in non-crises times.
This definition corresponds to that given by Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
Implications of understanding the distinction between contagion and inter-
dependence are crucial for gaining the benefits of international portfolio diversification.
If markets exhibit higher correlation after crises than before, diversification of portfolios
across countries might be less useful than previously established.
Part of the empirical literature on contagion has focused on currency crises.
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) used a set of macroeconomic variables and a
dummy variable for contagion in a probit model to explain a binary indicator of currency
crises. Their results show that a crisis elsewhere raises the likelihood of currency crises
by about 8%. They interpret this as evidence of contagion. Other research focuses on
investigating contagion of financial markets by testing for higher correlation between
markets during times of crises that could be identified ex post (King and Wadhwani
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(1990), Boyer, Gibson, and Loretan (1999), Loretan and English (2000), Forbes and
Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2002)). Bae, Karolyi and Stulz
(2003) tested whether the number of contemporaneous extreme stock market returns
across a number of markets in a given region can be explained. They found that the
average exchange rate in the region, the average interest rate in the region, and the
conditional volatility of a regional stock market index are all significant predictors.
Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) suggested consideration of sample sizes has to be
taken into account when investigating contagion since most crisis periods are much
smaller in size than non-crisis period data, greatly reducing the power of the test.
Kyle et al (2004) found "that when an agent with a Prospect Theory utility
function (compared to a risk-averse agent) realizes gains and losses, he delays liquidation
when the project is in losses". This assumption is different from Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001) that allowed unrealized paper gains and losses to affect an agent's utility.
They make two assumptions. First, the investor is more sensitive to paper losses than to
paper gains due to loss aversion. Second, after a prior loss, the investor becomes more
risk averse: after being injured by the initial loss, he is more sensitive to additional
setbacks. Note that the second assumption, which is motivated by an earlier study by
Thaler and Johnson (1990), could generate an incentive for the agent to liquidate early in
the presence of earlier losses, because the agent is more risk averse in these situations.
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2002) have
attempted to identify contagion effects from pairwise correlation of stock market returns
by testing whether correlation is significantly higher during crises times compared to
normal periods. "The three criteria are: a major shift in market volatility; clear
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identification of which country generates this shift in volatility; and inclusion of the
relevant country as one market in the estimated correlation," Forbes and Rigobon (2002
p14 ).
The studies required a priori specification of the crises periods. The tests by Boyer
Gibson and Loretan, and Rigobon and Forbes, for instance, are developed under the
strong assumption that country noise is small and invariant. Corsetti Pericoli and Sbracia
(2002) show the striking result of this literature ("no contagion, only interdependence") is
no longer valid because of these biases. When contagion is defined as a significant
increase in market co-movement after a shock to one country, previous work suggests
contagion occurred during recent crises and is conditional on market volatility. Corsetti et
al (2002) however found that after adjusting for the bias caused by market volatility there
is no evidence of contagion since there is no increase in the unconditional correlation
coefficients during the 1997 Asian crisis, 1994 Mexican devaluation, and 1987 U.S.
market crash. However, there is a high level of market co-movement in all periods,
which they call interdependence.
Rigobon (2003) recognized that the endogeneity problem could be circumvented
by separating crises periods from non-crises periods. However, since crisis periods are
identified ex post, after passing through the observations, the endogeneity bias is re-
introduced in the form of a sample selection bias. The main difference among the studies
is the method of adjustment for the correlation coefficient in crises periods. Forbes and
Rigobon's (2002) methodology ignored the importance of country specific shocks which
biases the results towards no contagion.
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In the context of behavioral finance, there has been evidence of herding and
contagion. After the catastrophic attack on the United States on 9/11, stock markets
around the world reacted in tandem. Hon, Strauss and Yong (2004) showed that since
international markets especially in Europe followed the US stock market so closely in the
three to six months after the event, benefits from international portfolio diversification
are significantly reduced.5 Additionally, since Prospect Theory asserts behavior changes
after severe wealth altering circumstances, Kyle and Xiong (2001) found evidence that
financial contagion is a wealth effect. They noted that when noise or "convergence"
traders lose money in one market they liquidate positions in both markets, a process
defined as contagion. Therefore, returns become more volatile and correlated. Since
these "convergence" traders take large risky positions in a small number of assets,
unfavorable shocks cause liquidation of entire portfolios. This liquidation in itself can
magnify the original shocks and cause the transmittal to other asset classes. They believe
that there is cause for concern since "contagion reduces benefits from portfolio
diversification and raises issues for risk management". They note that even if "long
series of data are available, the potential changes in the structure of the market can make
it hopeless to determine these extreme risks from historical data". This argument has
been suggested as the reason why Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
interjected to avoid the liquidation and meltdown of the assets of Long Term Capital
Management. Since asset prices and traders' wealth are simultaneously determined, risk
is endogenously introduced in the form of contagion.
5Hon M.T.; Strauss J., (2004), Yong, Soo-Keong, Contagion in financial markets after September 11: myth
or reality, Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 95-114.
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Conclusion
Chairman Greenspan (2001) has recognized the value in understanding the
idiosyncrasies of economic man. He noted, amid the weakening of the U.S. economy in
early 2001, "The unpredictable rending of confidence is one reason that recessions are so
difficult to forecast. They may not just be changes in degree from a period of economic
expansion, but a different process engendered by fear. Our economic models never have
been particularly successful in capturing a process driven in large part by nonrational
behavior." 6 Inherent in his statement are the views that fear and sentiment are factors that
affect the behavior of market participants and consequently the returns of the market.
The literature review reflects the fact that while important work has been accomplished in
a short space of time, improvements to the theory will only be accomplished by testing
the hypotheses under actual trading conditions instead of experimental ones. This type of
research is essential to the improved decision making of practitioners.
6Greenspan Alan. 2001. Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. Before the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs. U.S. Senate. February 13.
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CHAPTER III - TRADER REACTIONS AND INVESTOR RATIONALITY
Introduction
There is an extensive body of research documenting significant market reaction to
changes in market conditions. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)" (BHS) posited that
an investor becomes less risk averse after stock prices increase because his previous gains
underpin subsequent losses making him less loss averse, and more risk-seeking.
Consequently he has a tendency to pay even higher prices for the stocks, whereas after
declines in stock prices, he becomes more concerned about further losses, exhibits a
higher degree of risk aversion and becomes more loss averse. They note, "After being
burned by the initial loss, he is much more sensitive to additional setbacks", implying
fewer purchases of stocks.
Shefrin (2001) presented the case of potential bankruptcy at Sony Corporation in
which a co-founder led a project that had suffered heavy losses . He showed that even
though traditional corporate finance and accounting theory stipulate ignoring sunk costs
there was a tendency for the co-founder to continue to invest in it, refusing to accept a
sure loss.
Based on survey data, Thaler and Johnson (1990) (TJ) found that in the presence
of prior losses, individuals who suffer initial losses were more willing to take gambles
"N. Barberis, M. Huang, and T. Santos, Prospect Theory and asset prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics
116, (2001), 1-53.
'
2Shefrin, H., 2001, Behavioral corporate finance, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Fall issue.
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that would allow them to break even.13 They noted that subjects indicated that new losses
hurt more when they occur after a loss than when they occur in isolation. This is
interpreted as an indication that prior losses "sensitize people to subsequent losses of a
similar magnitude" (p. 656), while prior gains are perceived as "house money" and that
"losing some of the house money doesn't hurt as much as losing one's own cash."
There is an obvious dichotomy in the views parlayed by BHS and TJ. BHS' view
implies more loss aversion (or more risk aversion in an expected utility framework) after
prior losses, whereas TJ's view (like Shefrin's anecdotal evidence) implies more risk
seeking or less loss aversion after similar prior losses. These opposing points of view are
puzzling since both these studies rely on Prospect Theory as the underlying framework.
Prospect Theory postulates that individuals make decisions under uncertainty by
maximizing a value function that evaluates wealth changes, rather than an expected
utility function that ranks choices according to the level of expected utility.
While, it should be noted that Prospect Theory was designed to understand single
period decision-making and these studies imply multi-period horizons, it seems that the
main reason for the contradiction is that the reference point turns out to be crucial for risk
taking. The perceived change in wealth, a notion that is ignored in a rational framework
is crucial in the behavioral framework. Different assumptions about what reference point
subjects use to evaluate outcomes can lead to very different predictions about risk taking
and about the effect of prior outcomes on risky choice. BHS's study suggests that
investors feel wealthy after their investments increase in value while TJ's view is based
'
3Thaler, R., and E. Johnson, 1990, Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: The effects
of prior outcomes on risky choice, Management Science 36, 643-660.
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on the investors' original wealth endowment. Prospect Theory suggests that after periods
of losses, 'economic man' no longer follows the idealized behavior attributed to expected
utility maximizers. This occurs because his decisions in uncertain conditions are
weighted more heavily with prospective losses than prospective gains.
This chapter empirically investigates these decisions. It is unusual in that it uses
actual trading data to check behavioral patterns rather than indirect measures like price
changes and survey data. The question to be examined is whether or not traders exhibit
behavior consistent with more purchases in periods of turmoil (decreases in wealth) and,
correspondingly, fewer purchases after increases in wealth. It is postulated here that
during periods of market turmoil, a higher level of risk aversion displayed by additional
purchases reflects an attempt to return to the reference point. In terms of Prospect
Theory, this tendency of more risk aversion in an expected utility framework is noted as
exhibiting more 'loss aversion' or more 'risk seeking'. In contrast, fewer purchases
reflect less loss aversion. Loss aversion is a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains of
the same size, and is represented by a kink in the utility function. Prospect Theory
generally predicts that investors prefer long-shots, avoid sure-things, buy insurance
against unlikely losses, and take risky chances to win back large losses. The theory notes
that those suffering from loss aversion do not measure risk consistently.
In order to test for differences in trader reactions to varying economic conditions
two primary data elements are required: a measure of information and a measure of
reaction. In this chapter, reaction is measured by a trader's inactivity, purchases or sales
of securities. The measure of information is a significant change in the value of a major
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index. A significant change in market returns will ensure a clearly identifiable and
important event since it will directly affect the wealth of the trader.
Portfolio managers, institutional traders and investors are known to act differently
when markets are "up" versus when they are "down". Wermers (1999) finds that these
market participants "herd".14 Behavioral influences like overconfidence and optimism
make portfolio managers sell their winners too early to chase better opportunities.
Shame, avoiding regret and embarrassment, and unwillingness to admit errors make
managers hold their losers.1 6 Investors are prone to a mean reverting mindset; a
permanent positive change will not be recognized at first. They may first under-react.
Investors will rethink their position after several positive changes in information emerge,
then they may over-react, a procedure Thaler (1985) terms "mental accounting".' 7
Research Hypothesis and Methodology
Prospect Theory analysis involves defining an editing phase. Here a reference
point is designated to differentiate between potential gains and losses. The theory
stipulates that after a period of considerable losses, sentiment changes. The process of
14Wermers, R. (1999), Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices, The Journal of Finance,
Volume 54 Issue 2 Page 581-622.
15Barber, B.M., T Odean, (2000) Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment
Performance of Individual Investors, Journal of Finance 55:2 p. 773-806.
16Shefrin, H., and M Statman, (1985) The Disposition to Sell Winners too Early and Ride Losers too Long:
Theory and Evidence, Journal of Finance, 60:3 p 777-792.
17De Bondt, W., and R. Thaler (1987), Further evidence on investor overreaction and stock market
seasonality, Journal of Finance 42:557-581.
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establishing a reference point that defines a significant change in sentiment is ascertained
by a significant change in a major market index like the DJIA. The DJIA is a useful
index for representing short-term market movement since it concentrates on large,
actively traded firms; this minimizes problems associated with non-synchronous trading
(Rudd 1979).
After an event that results in market turmoil, traders may feel less wealthy. Their
reactions, predicated by their behavioral characteristics, may compound losses. The null
hypothesis formulated is one of no direct relation between the institutional trader's
probability of purchasing more securities when the market is in a downtrend and
probability of selling when the market is in an uptrend. A model structure, which
incorporates behavioral factors, is not consistent with expected utility maximization, for
it assumes decision-makers put weight on something that is meaningless in a rational
framework, but in the Prospect Theory framework, weight is placed on the perceived
change in wealth relative to the reference point. The validity of Prospect Theory is
investigated on a data file of volatile swings in the Dow Jones Industrial Average by
employing relationships (1) and (2) from Chapter II.
V(x,p:y,q) = 4p) v(x) + (1 -)(/q) v(y) (1)
R = -U" (W) / U' (W) (2)
The following hypothesis is set forth: During periods of market turmoil, when investors
experience massive wealth losses as defined by an appreciable absolute change in the
index, the change in the absolute risk (loss) aversion coefficient, R, is below zero if
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investors become less risk-averse (i.e. exhibit risk-seeking behavior), and above zero if
investors become more risk-averse i.e.:
HO: AR<0
HA: AR>0 (3)
These equations suggest that people use a weighted value function to think about risky
decisions, and standard economic theory predicts that people are roughly risk neutral
when faced with small gambles.
While the ideal methodology is to devise a study that measures investors'
preference under different wealth changing scenarios and add them up in a coherent
manner to test the total effect, this method is impractical. To cast relationships (1) and
(2) into testable form, an assumption is made, that investors' risk-aversion, or the lack
thereof, is exemplified by the purchase or sale of securities. To that end, since the goal of
this study is to analyze the behavior of individual investors, an alternative way to address
the problem is to review their actions under normal conditions in comparison to market
turmoil ones - 'editing' in PT terminology. Risk-averse investors should avoid risk when
markets are under pressure and only seek risk when markets are orderly, and the typical
risk-reward trade-off is observed. Given this assumption, the hypothesis in (3) can be
restated as:
(Ho): There is no difference in investors/traders' behavior during market turmoil and
the alternative,
(HA): Investors/traders behave differently during market turmoil.
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If one considers small changes around the current reference point as important in
determining a trader's loss aversion and a loss is twice as important (in terms of utility
consequences) as a gain of equal size, the above hypothesis can be tested by an analysis
of the market turmoil and non-turmoil days under two alternatives. Here instead of
inequality in the risk aversion coefficient, R we have equality between two alternatives,
which is more empirically manageable.
The empirical model is thus given by:
y = a+ (3x + E on market turmoil days
y'= a' + f'x + C' on non-turmoil days (4)
Where the y's are increases, decreases or no change in security position, and the
x's are the change in the value of a select market index. Equation (4) shows that the
reaction of traders to the market index may be different on turmoil days. More
specifically, the variables are defined as:
y & y': increases (buys), dummy variable is 1; decreases (sells) or no change in security
position, dummy variable is zero;
x : the percentage change in the value of a representative market index;
a and $ : coefficients for market turmoil observations;
a' and $': coefficients for non-turmoil market observations.
The null hypothesis can now be stated specifically as a test of equality of
coefficients in equation 4, as follows:
Ho: a' = a
13' = $ and
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(a',$') = (a,)
The null hypothesis states that the coefficients are invariant between the two sets of
observations. If the null hypothesis is not true, and investors become risk seekers during
market turmoil times, then as a first and necessary condition, the above coefficients will
not be equal.
Sample & Data
It is necessary to formulate the association between information and reaction to
test the above hypothesis. The measure of information needs to be a noteworthy event
that forces the trader to evaluate his position of wealth. Coval and Shumway (2004)
showed that proprietary traders at the CBOT evaluated their wealth position at the end of
each morning and traded differently in the afternoons following morning losses.'" It is
postulated here that a trader may behave similarly during days of market corrections. A
market correction is typically defined as a decrease in the value of stocks, usually 10% or
more over several days. The market corrections of the 1990's and early in the current
millennium occurred over a more extended period. Chicago researchers Ibbotson and
Associates argued in 2004, "Since 1926, the market has advanced more than two out of
every three years-with an average annual gain of 22.87% in up years. Although the
average annual stock market return since 1926 has been 10 percent, many individual
years have seen losses. The most recent example is the four-year period 2000 through
2003 when the stock market lost an average of 5 percent per year". Daily swings
18Coval, J., and T. Shumway (2004), "Do behavioral biases affect prices?" Journal of Finance, Volume 60
Issue 1, pp 1-34.
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however achieve more notoriety. An example of the swings under consideration is Black
Monday, October 19, 1987 - a 508 point (or 22.61%) loss. The largest one day point
drop in history, Monday October 27, 1997 of 554.26 points (or 7.19%) was followed by
the largest one day point gain of 337.17 (or 4.71%) on "Turn-around" Tuesday October
28, 1997, an event with little corresponding fundamental rationale. More recently, after
the events of September 11, 2001, the stock market closed for a week. On September 17,
the day the NYSE and the NASDAQ reopened after the market turmoil, the DJIA fell by
684.81 points, a 7.13% fall.
The period under consideration in this study does not cover these more recent
events. The database investigated consisted of the daily closing prices of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average from the period October 6, 1987 through October 30, 1992. There
were only 9 days in 1987 when the index fell by more than 100 points, 3 in 1988, 4 in
1989, 3 in 1990, 8 in 1991 and 5 in 1992. There were only 36 days when the Dow fell
more than 50 points, and 7 days when it fell more than 100 points. Beginning in 1996
when there were 19 such days, a 100-point fall has become more frequent. Effectively,
investors have become blas6 about large index swings and may tend to avoid letting
behavioral biases affect their activity as frequently. Absolute capitulation is now a rarity.
Rather than considering absolute index changes like 50 or 100 point deviations,
outcomes can be identified on the basis of percentage changes in the "Dow," for example
1%, 1 %, and 2%. More recently, the high absolute level of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average has led to up and down swings of 1 - 2% points to be relatively insignificant
events. However during the period under consideration, larger sample sizes of 146 days
were found for days when the Dow fell more than 1%, 104 days when it fell more than
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1.25%, 73 days at 1.5% and only 36 days when the Dow fell more than 2%. These
benchmarks are arbitrarily set but are to some extent dictated by the feasibility of the data
to allow statistical significance. A fairly significant sample size of 159 days was
achieved during this period for a drop in the DJIA of 0.95% and greater. Since the major
averages were at significantly lower nominal values and lower levels of volatility, a
0.95% fall was viewed as being an unusual event. This interval (October 6, 1987-
October 30, 1992) is chosen for several reasons. Too long an interval will involve
several shifts that may confound the outcome. Additionally, this period includes the
effects of several days of near capitulation in the markets, days when investors really
believed "the sky was falling".
Measurement of the reaction of traders is obtained through their daily purchases
and sales of securities. The database under investigation is a selective one. It is made up
of the changes in daily position in securities for which the brokerage has a sizeable
position. Two brokerage houses are considered, the Toronto offices of First Boston
(Canada) Ltd., and Merrill Lynch (Canada) Ltd. The activities of proprietary traders at
these firms trading on the firm's own account, including trading as a market maker are
identified. Since the period over which data were collected, significant changes have
occurred with these facilities. First Boston (FB) closed its Canadian enterprise shortly
after Credit Suisse purchased the American parent and remained closed for several years.
Merrill (MER) has since merged with a large independent retail Canadian broker.
While the study acknowledges that there are significant weaknesses in the data,
the benefits of obtaining actual versus experimental data to investigate the behavior of
traders, compensate for these shortfalls. Typically, revealed preferences have more
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relevance over stated preferences for an analysis of the determination of economic value.
When data are self-reported it is difficult to verify and can be heavily influenced by the
interviewer. As a result, it is necessary to construct the modeling effort to be applicable
considering the limitations of the data. We will consider the two companies separately to
avoid confounding effects. The raw data is available on request; a sample is displayed in
the appendix. Part of the data collected is highly proprietary. The researcher was forced
to compile this data set under extreme secrecy conditions since many of the trades were
made under restrictive circumstances. While the paucity of this data is regretful, the
benefits outweigh the deficiencies. Although it is necessary to preserve the anonymity of
the traders involved, the raw data points are available on request. The risk preferences of
the large traders in the data file were examined after each of these events to determine
their market reactions. The bid prices of these investors showed whether they still sought
risk (by purchasing more securities at the market price) or averted risk otherwise.
After days when the index closed down by a predetermined percentage level, a
review is made of the daily trades of the Toronto branches of the two large multinational
brokerage houses. The focus is on sizeable positions of individual stocks, that is, stocks
which comprise more than 10% of the portfolio holdings. Risk seeking behavior is
displayed when traders purchased more shares of stock where positions had already been
taken. Notations are made when position sizes are increased, signifying purchases.
Alternatively, notations are made when position sizes decrease or remain the same,
signifying sales or otherwise. Note in some cases, there are two or more securities that
encompass more than 10% of the portfolio's holdings. Under these circumstances, there
was more than one observation on a particular market turmoil or conversely, non-turmoil
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day. On several of the days, more than three stocks fitted the criteria but on most days,
only one stock ended up meeting the 10% benchmark. Many of these stocks were shares
of principally Canadian Corporations. However, several stocks were inter-listed on
major world exchanges. The data was then subdivided into periods of market turmoil
defined as days when a major market index fell by at least 0.95% and coded as one
during these periods and zero during the much larger data set of non-turmoil periods.
There were some limitations on the data, for example, specific daily portfolio sizes were
not given and the value of the other securities held in the portfolio was unknown. The
portfolio size dilemma is difficult to solve since these companies were privately held and
absolute monetary values were usually lumped under dubious categories. However, it is
fair to assume that in the 1980's these companies were willing to put up sizeable capital
chunks to build their presence in Canada. The causal relationship of a massive change in
the price of a stock being effected may be a problem since large institutional purchases or
sales may lead to others following suit. However, the fact that these traders are very
small components of the market and are often price takers should alleviate that concern.
The data can be summarized in two groups, the market turmoil data and the non-
turmoil events. The DJIA had 159 days when the index fell by 0.95% or more with a
range of -22.61% to 10.15%, during the five year period under review. FB had 180
market turmoil observations and 1259 non-turmoil observations in this period. MER
had 182 market turmoil observations and 1255 non-turmoil.
The S&P500 had 154 days when the index fell by 0.95% or more with a range of -
20.46% to 9.10%, similar statistics to the DOW. FB had 173 market turmoil observations
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and 1271 non-turmoil observations in this period. MER had 182 market turmoil
observations and 1262 non-turmoil.
In the case of the S&P/TSX, there were only 74 days during the period under
question where the index experienced market turmoil conditions (defined as a fall of
0.95% or more). In fact the daily range of changes during this period was -11.31% to
9.04% as compared to a much larger range for the DJIA. However, there were 196 cases
of market turmoil conditions for FB versus 1247 cases of non-turmoil conditions. MER
however did not have substantially more observations, 108-market turmoil and 1339 non-
turmoil.
Empirical Applications
Considering the scope of the data as discussed above, empirical application of the
testable model in equation (4) poses some restrictions since the y's are binary. Therefore,
application of OLS is not appropriate. The logistic regression model (Cox 1970) is
conventionally used to predict the likelihood of the outcome (the odds ratio) based on the
explanatory variables (called covariates in logistic regression).
To investigate the research question, a logit model is specified and applied on the
dataset of trader buys and sells for the initial task of determining investor's risk
preferences during periods of "market turmoil" versus "non-turmoil. The logistic
regression model attempts to predict the probability of the event such that:
p(y= 1 Ix)=e(a+fx)
1+e (a + fix)
Or:
logit(p)= n [ /(1-p)]= (a+,x)+e
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Where:
. p follows an independent Bernoulli function and is the probability that the event y
occurs, p(y = 1) given x
* p/(1-p) is the "odds ratio" or the ratio of the probabilities or the probability of the
outcome event occurring divided by the probability of the event not occurring
* In [p/(1-p)] is the actual log odds ratio, or "logit" which corresponds to the unit
change of x
* x is the predicting independent variable or covariate
* a is the intercept parameter and # is the slope parameter
Pertinent factors of the Empirical Applications
1. The logistic regression model fits the log odds through a linear function of the
explanatory variables (similar to multiple regression models).' 9 Instead of choosing
parameters that minimize the sum of squared errors, estimation in logistic regression
chooses parameters that maximize the likelihood of observing the sample data. This
occurs because the logit function is non-linear; therefore, the sum of squared errors is
no longer a convex function and may not have a unique minimum solution. After
transforming the dependent into a logit variable, the logistic regression uses
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) techniques to calculate the logit coefficients.
The likelihood function is the probability that a model could generate the actual data.
The technique maximizes the log-likelihood function, which reflects how likely the
observed values of the dependent variable may be predicted from the observed values
19Hosmer, D.W. and Lemeshow, S. (2002). Applied Logistic Regression. 2nd ed. Wiley: New York.
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of the independent variables. The MLE method lowers the mean square error and
increases the probability of the event. 20
2. For ordinary least squares (OLS) to yield best linear unbiased (BLUE) estimators, the
classical regression assumptions must be met. OLS models require quantitative,
continuous, unbounded dependent variables. One of the assumptions is that the
variance of the dependent variable is constant across values of the independent
variable (homoskedasticity). This cannot be the case with a binary variable, because
of its discrete nature. The variance is given by p * (1-p). When 50 percent of the
observations are l's (p = 0.5), then the variance is .25, its maximum value. As more
extreme values occur, the variance decreases. When p = 0.10, the variance is .1*.9 =
0.09, so as p approaches one, the variance approaches zero. Consequently while the
OLS coefficients will still be unbiased they will not be efficient, invalidating
hypothesis tests.
3. Logistic regression has many analogies to OLS regression: logit coefficients in the
logistic regression equation correspond to slope coefficients, the standardized logit
coefficients correspond to the weights of the slopes, and an adjusted R2 statistic is
available to summarize the strength of the relationship. Unlike OLS regression
however, logistic regression does not assume linearity of the relationship between the
independent variables (covariates) and the dependent, does not require normally
distributed predictor variables or error terms, nor does it assume homoskedasticity or
homogeneity of variance , and in general has less stringent requirements to ensure
2Note MLE and OLS give equivalent results when the errors in the OLS model are assumed to be normally
distributed.
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unbiased and efficient coefficients. It does however still assume that all observations
are independent and the model is correctly specified. If the variables display
multicollinearity and are linear functions of each other, the resultant large standard
errors will result in inaccurate estimates of the coefficients. Another major concern in
logistic regression is the omission of outliers. Misspecification can lead to bias and
erroneous results.2 '
4. Unfortunately, time series data cannot be treated as randomly selected observations
from a population. Lagged dependent variables can affect the estimation since the
data is likely to exhibit some degree of dependence over time. That circumvents the
violations of the assumption of independence. Return data (computed as percentage
change in index prices) as compared to the actual level data are generally not serially
correlated. Therefore it is customary to treat stock price data as non-stationary and
stock return data as stationary. Accordingly, using the return data can ensure the
assumption of independence is not violated.
5. The structure of the error term is important in binomial choice models. By making
assumptions about the probability density of the residuals, one can choose from
several different binomial choice model formulations. The logistic regression model
assumes a logistic distribution of errors, and the probit model assumes normal
distributed errors. Since the probability p that the dependent variable takes the value
of one (and by extension, the probability (1-p) that it takes the value of zero) is being
considered, the linear regression model poses serious inference problems. This is
21DeMaris, A. (1992). Logit modeling: Practical applications. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, No. 86.
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because for extreme values of the independent variable, the predicted value of the
dependent variable will be either less than zero, or greater than one, values not
appropriate for probabilities. OLS if used can give incongruent predictions.
Probability must be modeled by a function that never exceeds the {0, 1} boundaries,
consequently the natural log of the odds or logit specification lends itself to this
modeling.
6. Another problem that can arise in using logistic regressions on rare events data (like
wars, catastrophes or market turmoil) are inefficient coefficients. This can be
rectified in the statistical package SAS however, through weighting the likelihood
function and performing maximum-likelihood logit analysis by finding the value of
the coefficients that gives the maximum value of this weighted function. Weighting
can therefore outperform prior correction when both a large sample is available and
the functional form is mis-specified (Xie and Manski 1989).
7. Logit and probit models are based on the same underlying threshold model. The
threshold (Long 1997) defines the dichotomous variable and is used to divide the two
portions of the y distribution, for example, the probability that the event occurs is one
and zero otherwise.2 Since the threshold model is based on the probability of
observing the error term in a certain range, a distribution must be specified for
estimation. The generalized linear model (GLM) corresponding to the binomial (1, p)
distribution with canonical link is the binary logistic regression model. The logistic
distribution is easier to calculate than the probit since no tables are required to
22Long, J. S. (1997). Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
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compute the cumulative probability; therefore its use has been more proliferate. In
general, the coefficients derived from logit estimation are equal to 1.6 times the
coefficients obtained from using probit. The logistic distribution has a variance of
n2/3 while the probit function is based on the standard normal distribution with
variance one, so in many instances the difference is only in a matter of scale.
8. This raises the question of whether logit modeling is preferable to probit. If the
responses are "unordered", a logistic transformation is preferred. Logit is typically
used in the literature when the categorical dependent variable is more qualitative
whereas probit assumes the dependent variable reflects an underlying quantitative
variable. The fundamental theoretical difference between the two approaches
concerns the distribution of the error term, logistic versus normal. While there is
typically an important difference between odds-ratios and risk-ratios, with binary
logit there is no difference between the two ratios. The odds ratio provides a way of
assessing the relationship between the dependent and independent variables by
comparing whether the probability of a certain event is the same for two groups. A
ratio of one implies the event is equally likely in both groups. Aldrich and Nelson
(1984) provide a detailed comparison of logit and probit models.
9. Logistic regression is a non-parametric technique for determining the estimates of
independent variables on a dependent variable. Because it is a non-parametric
technique, the tests available are not as powerful as for OLS regression and other
parametric statistical tests. This means that logistic regression will not pick up
relationships between variables as comprehensively as OLS regression analysis for a
given number of observations, however, given departures from normality conditions,
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the results are more robust (Cox and Snell 1989, p. 132-134). To compensate, Mc
Cullugh and Neder (1989) suggest using several diagnostic tests to check for
goodness/lack of fit thus ensuring robustness. The Pearson chi-square value (used
with the number of degrees of freedom) indicates the level of certainty with which
one can reject an associated model. -2 log likelihood is similar to an F statistic, it tells
whether or not the entire model is any better at predicting the outcomes than no
model at all. It has an approximate chi-square distribution for large samples. F and
chi-square statistics are essentially the same thing after normalization and as the
denominator degrees of freedom goes to infinity. -2 log likelihood ratio test reflects
the desirability of running separate models for different groups. Deviance residual is
another type of residual. It measures the disagreement between the maxima of the
observed and the fitted log likelihood functions. Since the logistic regression uses the
maximal likelihood principle, the goal in logistic regression is to minimize the sum of
deviance residuals. Recall that the least squares estimator for the ordinary linear
regression model is also the maximum-likelihood estimator in the case of normally
distributed error terms. Therefore, this residual is the GLM equivalent of the residual
sum of squares (RSS) in linear regression as it compares the log-likelihood for the
"model" with the maximal achievable value and tests the significance of individual
independent variables.
10. The success of the logistic regression can be assessed by looking at the correct and
incorrect classifications of the dichotomous dependent variable. A statistic that
measures the strength of the association is the pseudo R2 approach of McFadden
(1974). Another common measure of goodness of fit is the percentage of correctly
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classified cases. Although the logistic model can provide accurate estimates of the
probability p, it has weaknesses. First, it is hard to determine when a satisfactory
model is found, because there are few diagnostic procedures to guide the selection of
variable transformations and no true test of good fit, and secondly it is difficult to
interpret the coefficients of the fitted model, except in very simple situations.
Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) provide a relatively good approximation for a lack-of-
fit test on logistic regressions. In fact, it is more aptly called a "badness of fit" test
since the null hypothesis is rejected if this statistic is significant.
11. Interpretation of the coefficients is ambiguous since it gives the relationship between
the independent variable and the unobservable predicted dependent one. Since y is
observable, the interpretation of the marginal effect is less ambiguous, giving a robust
result. The marginal effect is the effect of the independent variable on the probability
of observing a success for the dependent variable. For every unit increase in the
independent variable, the odds that the event will occur (Y=1) is increased by e 0.
12. There is potentially a problem with dispersion. In logistic regression, the expected
variance of the dependent can be compared to the observed variance. The overall
correlation may be either positive, where the actual observed variance from the data is
larger than the variance imposed by the model (over-dispersion relative to binomial
variation), or negative (under-dispersion).23 Over-dispersion is a phenomenon that
sometimes occurs in data that are modeled with the binomial or Poisson distributions.
The source for this may be a lack of independence in the data or a misspecification of
23Engel, B, Joop te Brake, Analysis of Embryonic Development with a Model for Under-or Overdispersion
Relative to Binomial Variation, Biometrics, Vol. 49, No. 1. (Mar., 1993), pp. 269-279.
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the model. Lack of independence arises when there is unobserved heterogeneity for
"grouped data", that is, many observations for each value of the input variables, so
that the probabilities of the event in one group differ from the probabilities in another
group because of some factor(s) not considered in the model (Burnham and Anderson
1998, Allison 1999). The effects of over-dispersion are the same as
heteroskedasticity in the OLS model. Cox and Snell (1998) suggest that over-
dispersion produces standard errors that are too small, resulting in misleading
inferences. To solve this dilemma, McCullagh and Neder (1989) suggest a correction
that can be applied that is analogous to weighted least squares - obtain an estimate of
the dispersion parameter, either Pearson or deviance divided by the residual degrees
of freedom, and using it to adjust the correlation. Williams (1988b) suggests that
when the number of observations is small, the Pearson dispersion is preferable to the
deviance for estimation of dispersion parameters.24
Empirical Model
While acknowledging the above caveats, the option of using binomial choice models
is unavoidable. Specifically, the equation estimated is the probability that a trader will
buy (1) or sell/no change (0) as a function of the return of the market and the
environment (market turmoil or not)2:
BUYSELL= a +/3* RETURN (5)
24SAS provides this adjustment through either a SCALE=DEVIANCE or PEARSON option in its model
statement.
25Estimation of the model was performed using PROC LOGISTIC from the SAS® statistical package. The
method utilizes the Fisher scoring technique, a model fit with iteratively weighted least squares.
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Where BUYSELL is a 0-1 dichotomous variable equal to 1 for a "buy" transaction and 0
for a "sell" or "no change" transaction; RETURN represents the percentage change in a
market index. To compute the restricted and unrestricted sum of squares, necessary to
conduct a test of structural change in the separate group regressions, three logistic
regression procedures are designed, for the non-turmoil events, for the market turmoil
events, and a separate model for the complete (restricted or full) sample data set
including both market turmoil and non-turmoil events. By estimating three different
regressions it is possible to first look for relationships and associations between index
returns and the probability that a trader will buy, sell or not change his position. The
Chow F test is typically used to check for structural changes. However since it assumes
equal variances, it must be modified in the presence of heteroskedasticity. One method
of correcting for non-equal variances is to use the dummy variable approach with White's
Robust Standard Errors. Thursby 1992 (Journal of Econometrics 53, 363-386) shows if
the data shift is known one can test for parameter constancy, stability of linear trends and
single slopes, with a single heteroskedastically correct asymptotic likelihood ratio test, a
variant of the Chow test. Since the Chow test and the "pool the data, interact, and test"
procedure are the same, the results will be the same using both procedures.
In as much as there is a significant disparity between the number of turmoil
observations and stable ones, another option is to concatenate the data and differentiate
the observations using dummy variables. The model can therefore be specified as
BUYSELL= a +#I* RETURN +,/2*GROUP + P3 *RETURN*GROUP
76
Where GROUP = 1 for market turmoil events and GROUP = 0 for non-turmoil events.
The generalized formulation above is appropriate for the full model. Allison (1999)26,
reports the following:
"In logit and probit regression analysis, a common practice is to estimate separate models for two
or more groups and then compare coefficients across groups. An equivalent method is to test for
interactions between particular predictors and dummy (indicator) variables representing the
groups."
GROUP is a binary vector, i.e. 0 or 1. Since this equation is to be estimated for
the overall sample as well as the two sub-samples, the (X'X) matrix on the right hand
side becomes singular for the sub-samples and possibly for the overall sample. Thus, the
interaction effect is dropped from the above specification. The final form for estimation
is:
BUYSELL= a +131* RETURN + P2*GROUP (6)
The use and interpretation of this model must be explicitly adjusted for the
presence of the other predictor in the model especially since over-dispersion is likely to
be an issue. Following this estimation for FB, the steps were repeated for the MER data.
The analysis on each brokerage house attempted to determine whether market turmoil as
determined by a specified fall in a market index (representing a wealth effect), predicated
buyer behavior.
The questions that need to be addressed regarding the estimation are, how well
does the model fit the data and what is the significance of the estimated coefficients?
Other relevant issues are a test of the structural change in the parameters of the
"Allison, "Comparing Logit and Probit Coefficients Across Groups," Sociological Methods & Research,
Vol. 28 No. 2, November 1999 186-208.
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regressions as well as a measure of the marginal effects of the independent variables or
covariates. Since the estimated coefficients themselves do not indicate the change in the
probability of the event occurring given a one-unit change in the relevant explanatory
variable, (the sign of the estimated coefficient indicates the direction of the change in
probability only), the actual level of the change in probability, given a one-unit change in
an explanatory variable, will differ based upon the initial values of all the explanatory
variables and their coefficients. Thus, it is conventional to evaluate the explanatory
variables at their mean values as a basis for inferring a change in probability.
The first set of results was obtained for the market as defined by the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) since changes in this index are most heavily reported in the
press and its movement can lead to a significant level of trading activity. It has been
viewed as a sentiment factor because of the emotion aroused by investors and in the press
(Bange 2000).2 Next, the S&P500 index measured the return on the market since it is
the most typically used representative of the market. Subsequent results were given using
the S&P Toronto Stock Exchange index (S&P/TSX) data since all the stocks under
investigation trade on that exchange. A short covering of using the S&P/TSX to measure
Canadian trader behavior is that the index is heavily weighted in the resources sector
especially gold and other mining companies, whose stock returns can sometimes be
negatively correlated with the market. However since the database is made up primarily
of Canadian stocks it is useful to employ the S&P/TSX index as well.
27Bange, M (2000), Do the Portfolios of Small Investors Reflect Positive Feedback Trading?, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol 35, No. 2, p 239-255.
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Estimation Results
Sensitivity analyses were performed including modeling the probability of the
event 'buy' being zero versus one, interaction effects of the independent variables from
Equation 6, and various levels of changes in the indices.
The most parsimonious and statistically significant results are presented. The
tables are displayed for the logistic regressions using the daily returns and trader
activities when the three different indices experience a 0.95% daily fall. Table 1 presents
summary statistics for the data; it is noteworthy that the sample means from the two
brokerage houses are relatively similar with the DJIA data but not the other indices.
Table 1
Summary Statistics for the Index Return Data
Pair of Mean of the Standard
Variables Index Returns Deviation Minimum Maximum
DJIA-FB 0.02346 1.3036 -22.61 10.15
DJIA-MER 0.0138 1.3084 -22.61 10.15
S&P-FB 0.2179 1.2103 -20.46 9.10
S&P-MER -0.0033 1.1916 -20.46 9.10
S&P/TSX -FB 0.05159 1.1045 -11.31 10.15
S&P/TSX - MER 0.144 1.075 -11.31 10.15
Pair of Total Number Market Market
Variables of Observations Turmoil Stable
DJIA-FB 1439 180 1259
DJIA-MER 1437 182 1255
S&P-FB 1444 178 1266
S&P-MER 1430 175 1259
S&P/TSX -FB 1443 196 1247
S&P/TSX - MER 1447 108 1339
It is necessary to determine if separate models for different groups of observations
lead to better explanatory power. While the Chow test is a popular test for parameter
stability, this test requires a priori knowledge of the break-point date. If there is
heteroskedasticy in the restricted model, then this F-statistic is biased upward and
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indicates greater instability in the coefficients estimate than actually exists (Toyoda
1974). Additionally, in the event of multicollinearity, the estimates of the coefficients
are less reliable. The SAS PROC LOGISTIC procedure utilizes penalized logistic
regression which iteratively solves any problems of multicollinearity through the use of
the AIC statistic. The key idea in penalization methods is that over fitting is avoided by
imposing a penalty on large fluctuations on the estimated parameters and thus on the
fitted curve. It can be identified when the standard errors are greater than two, because
too many of the subjects have the same value of zero. However, this is not a major issue
in this estimation.
The following issues are pertinent to the specification of Equation (5). Levene's
test of the Homogeneity of Variances between the two sets of observations, Welch's test
of Equality of Means28 when the variances are known a priori to be unequal as well as
Chow's standard test of equality of coefficients are performed. These test the assumption
that the regression line expressing the dependent variable as a function of covariate is
constant across various conditions. The ordinary residual sum of squares (RSS)
necessary for computation of the Chow statistic is calculated as follows:
RSS = E(Yi - Yi) 2
where i is the i fitted value on the logistic "curve":
i= 1 / (1 + e (-(a+Xi)))
and Yi is the i"' observed frequency of response. This residual variance is a measure of
the deviation of the predicted probability of the event success from the actual probability.
mLogistic regressions belong to the class of Generalized Linear Models (GLM). Therefore these statistics
were computed using the GLM procedure in SAS.
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Even when the variable is not normally distributed, the residual variance is still
useful in determining how well the model fits the data. The Pearson Chi-square, which
is the standardization of the ordinary residual, produces test statistics for the null
hypothesis that the logistic function adequately describes the observed frequencies versus
the alternate that it did not. DF are the degrees of freedom associated with each Chi-
square test.
The tests of comparing the two separate groups of data directly within Equation
(6) is accomplished through an odds ratio between GROUP =1 and GROUP = 0. The
techniques of computing adjusted Chow Tests using the -2 Log Likelihood and the
deviance (analogous to the residual sum of squares) statistics are presented here in the
spirit of non-reliance on any single statistic to show significance. Hanushek and Jackson
(1977, 1992) consider the -2 Log Likelihood statistic a variant of the Chow test.29 The
deviance statistic measures the group effect directly here by comparing the three different
regressions. Here the assessment of dummy variables or the group effect can be made
using the chi-square difference, a nested technique based on an adapted Chow test.
Adjustment for over-dispersion is made since it is likely that the two groups exhibit this
problem. The Pearson residual is used because of the smaller number of turmoil
observations.
Table 2 reports the results for Equation (5) of both brokerage houses for the DJIA,
Table 3 for the S&P500 and Table 4 the Canadian S&P/TSX for the First Boston (FB)
and Merrill Lynch (MER) data. The first parts present the estimation results and the
29Hanushek, Eric A.; Jackson, John E. 1977. Statistical Methods for Social Scientists, New York Academic
Press.
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second parts present various tests of equality and structural change. The Tables 5, 6, and
7 report the results from Equation (6). The first parts in these tables present the
estimation results and the second parts present several tests for structural change.
Pertinent points regarding the statistical estimation follow the tables.
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Table 2-2: Tests of Equality between Turmoil and Stable Observations of DJIA Returns
on Broker Buys/Sells or No Change: Probability modeled is buy versus sell/no change =1
EQUATION 5 Levene Test of Welch Test of
FIRST BOSTON Equality of Means Equality of Variances
F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F
Total (Full) observations 1.25 0.0143* 0.41 1.000
Turmoil observations 4.51 0.0001* 0.02 0.994
Stable observations 1.25 0.0143* 0.41 1.000
RSS (Full) = 269.366 RSS (Turmoil) = 8.646 RSS (Stable) = 247.479
Chow Test of Amended Chow Test of
Equality of Coefficients Equality of Coefficients
F Value X2 Pr>ChiSq
PANEL A:
Equality of Intercepts,
a (turmoil) = a (stable) 24.22* 25.280* 0.0001
PANEL B:
Equality of Slopes,
p (turmoil) = 3 (stable) 24.24* 29.349* 0.0001
PANEL C:
Equality of Regressions,
a, P (turmoil) = a, P (stable) 18.17* 30.628* 0.0001
EQUATION 5 Levene Test of Welch Test of
MERRILL LYNCH Equality of Means Equality of Variances
F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F
Total (Full) observations 1.65* 0.0001 0.25 1.000
Turmoil observations 11.77* 0.0001 0.00 1.000
Stable observations 1.65* 0.0001 0.25 1.000
RSS (Full) = 95.876 RSS (Turmoil) = 3.893 RSS (Stable) = 84.343
Chow Test of Amended Chow Test of
Equality of Coefficients Equality of Coefficients
F Value X2 Pr>ChiSq
PANEL A:
Equality of Intercepts,
a (turmoil) = a (stable) 21.68* 4.393* 0.0361
PANEL B:
Equality of Slopes,
p (turmoil) = (3 (stable) 21.70* 19.969* 0.0001
PANEL C:
Equality of Regressions,
a, p (turmoil) = a, P (stable) 16.24* 17.434* 0.0001
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Table 3-2: Tests of Equality between Turmoil and Stable Observations of S&P500 Returns
on Broker Buys/Sells or No Change: Probability modeled is buy versus sell/no change =1
EQUATION 5 Levene Test of Welch Test of
FIRST BOSTON Equality of Means Equality of Variances
F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F
Total (Full) observations 1.21** 0.0424 0.37 1.00
Turmoil observations 12.38* 0.0001 0 1.00
Stable observations 1.21** 0.0424 0.37 1.00
Chow Test of Amended Chow Test of
Equality of Coefficients Equality of Coefficients
F Value X2 Pr>ChiSq
RSS (Full) =270.246 RSS (Turmoil) = 7.0502 RSS (Stable) = 250.435
PANEL A:
Equality of Intercepts, 35.72* 31.1744* <0.0001
a (turmoil) = a (stable)
PANEL B:
Equality of Slopes, 29.17* 21.8690* <0.0001
$ (turmoil) = (3 (stable)
PANEL C:
Equality of Regressions, 23.76* 24.4130* <0.0001
a, R (turmoil) = a, $ (stable)
EQUATION 5 Levene Test of Welch Test of
MERRILL LYNCH Equality of Means Equality of Variances
F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F
Total (Full) observations 1.38* 0.0013 0.23 1.00
Turmoil observations 1.61 0.1160 0.07 0.9861
Stable observations 1.38* 0.0013 0.23 1.00
Chow Test of Amended Chow Test of
Equality of Coefficients Equality of Coefficients
F Value x2  Pr>ChiSq
RSS (Full) = 95.41 RSS (Turmoil) = 6.628 RSS (Stable) = 84.436
PANEL A:
Equality of Intercepts, 26.90* 6.0249** 0.0141
a (turmoil) = a (stable)
PANEL B:
Equality of Slopes, 20.92* 20.17* 0.0001
s (turmoil) = 3 (stable)
PANEL C:
Equality of Regressions, 20.88* 17.284* 0.0001
a, P (turmoil) = a, p (stable)
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Table 4-2: Tests of Equality between Turmoil and Stable Observations of S&P/TSX Returns
on Broker Buys/Sells or No Change: Probability modeled is buy versus sell/no change =1
EQUATION 5 Levene Test of Welch Test of
FIRST BOSTON Equality of Means Equality of Variances
F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F
Total (Full) observations 1.68* 0.0001 0.45 1.00
Turmoil observations 2.58* 0.0004 1.13 0.4132
Stable observations 1.68* 0.0001 0.45 1.00
Chow Test of Amended Chow Test of
Equality of Coefficients Equality of Coefficients
F Value X2 Pr>ChiSq
RSS (full) = 268.078 RSS (Turmoil) = 39.979 RSS (Stable) = 226.011
PANEL A:
Equality of Intercepts, 10.90* 9.3776* 0.0022
a (turmoil) = a (stable)
PANEL B:
Equality of Slopes, 3.64** 1.1782 0.2777
(3 (turmoil) = (3 (stable)
PANEL C:
Equality of Regressions, 2.58 1.0198 0.3127
a, P (turmoil) = a, P (stable)
EQUATION 5 Levene Test of Welch Test of
MERRILL LYNCH Equality of Means Equality of Variances
F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F
Total (Full) observations 1.59* 0.0001 0.23 1.00
Turmoil observations 0.86 0.594 0.11 0.9949
Stable observations 1.59* 0.0001 0.23 1.00
Chow Test of Amended Chow Test of
Equality of Coefficients Equality of Coefficients
F Value X2 Pr>ChiSq
RSS (full) = 99.025 RSS (Turmoil) = 12.18 RSS (Stable) = 86.028
PANEL A:
Equality of Intercepts, 13.62* 8.0611* 0.0045
a (turmoil) = a (stable)
PANEL B:
Equality of Slopes, 2.82 2.1817 0.1397
P (turmoil) = 3 (stable)
PANEL C:
Equality of Regressions, 2.00 0.8467 0.3575
a, p (turmoil) = a, p (stable)
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INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGISTIC COEFFICIENTS
Tests of the Significance & Influence of the Logistic Regression Coefficients:
The initial assessment of the procedure involved tests to determine whether the
independent variables are significantly related to the variable that measures the outcome.
Accordingly the parameters of interest are calculated and interpreted. Positive (negative)
signs of the estimated coefficients suggest linear increases (decreases) in the log of the
odds or probability. Typically the intercept coefficient is of little interest. Many times
when it is significant however it suggests missing independent variables. The slope
coefficient is of greater interest and "represents the change in the logit corresponding to
the change of one unit in the independent variable" (Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000 p 48).
Consequently a positive slope (beta) coefficient estimate of the market index indicates
that the events (1) in this case buy, is more likely given a level of return than a (0) or
sell/no change. A negative coefficient estimate indicates that buys are less likely given a
level of return. Consequently if turmoil conditions exist as measured by the change in the
market index, a positive beta implies a larger probability of buying securities versus
selling or no change.
Conventional t statistics for the statistical significance of each estimated
coefficient, that is whether the coefficients are statistically different from zero, can be
computed. Hypothesis tests for significance of the regression coefficients attempt to
determine whether any omitted variables have an effect on the model. The results for
Equation (5) show a positive beta for the market index with statistical significance during
turmoil conditions for both brokerage houses using the DJIA and S&P500; the results for
the S&P/TSX, show a significantly negative coefficient during stable periods for both
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sets of traders, and for MER's total set of observations. It has been noted that the
S&P/TSX itself is negatively correlated with the rest of the market because of its heavy
weighting in securities of resource-based companies. However, a detailed perusal of the
companies whose stock made up the database showed that very few of them were
resource based. The results for the coefficients of total observations at MER are probably
significant because the turmoil observations have an undue influence. On tests of
Equation (6), the coefficients for the total (full) set of observations are all statistically
significant, suggesting the group effect is a real one, i.e., market turmoil conditions
significantly affect the probability for both brokerages. The coefficients and their
significance levels in Equation 6 are slightly different from Equation 5 for two reasons.
Some of the model misspecification is reflected in the alphas of Equation 5 and the
standard errors are smaller in Equation 6 because of the over-dispersion adjustment.
Strength of the Association - Measures of Marginal Effects:
Estimated coefficients are used to interpret association among explanatory
variables in logistic regressions. The logistic coefficients themselves unlike with OLS
are not marginal effects. The marginal effect here is the slope of the probability curve
relating x to Pr(Y=1jx), holding all other variables constant. The effect is such that the
model will never predict a probability greater than one, and will diminish as the
probability gets closer and closer to one. These effects are evaluated by assuming a
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trader has a mean response for every independent variable. The mathematical basis for
the marginal effects is available in Greene (1997).3o
The marginal probability will have the same sign as the coefficient when
evaluated at the means. As mentioned previously, proper interpretation of these variables
depends on the difference between two logits, the effect on the margin. Marginal effects
at the mean are directly built into the coefficients because of the exercise of taking
logarithms. An elasticity measure gives the percentage change in the probability of a
success in response to a one percentage change in the explanatory variable. Greene
(2000, p. 816) notes that the elasticities vary for every observation so it is desirable to
report a summary measure by evaluating the expression at every observation and then
taking the average.3' Since the coefficients of the logistic regressions can be interpreted
as the change in the dependent variable associated with a one unit change in the
independent variable (Menard 1995), the elasticities can be computed at the mean
through the odds ratio and a confidence interval can be computed. The "Elasticity at
Means" indicates the percentage change in the probability of a trader buying more of a
security as a result of a one-percent change in the relevant explanatory variable (the
market index return) when all variables are evaluated at their mean values, the starting or
reference point. The result is meaningful when the explanatory variable of interest is
roughly continuous, such as return, but not for the dummy variables.
3Greene, W., Econometric Analysis, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1997.
3 tGreene, W. H., (2000) Econometric Analysis, 4 h edition, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
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This test is one of whether the individual odds ratios are significantly different
from one (no association) or test whether two odds ratios are different from each other.
Some view it as a measure of relative risk (Rothman and Greenland 1998)32. These non-
parametric tests use the chi square statistic. If the statistic is large relative to the degrees
of freedom then the model does not significantly describe the data. Analysis using the
odds ratios illustrates the change in the probability of the dependent variable for a unit
change in the independent variable. The Elasticity at Means and the Odds ratio show
significant levels for the turmoil data using the DJIA and the S&P500. The coefficients
of the return variables are very similar based on estimation of both equations (5) and (6)
and suggest a negative relationship especially between the probabilities of "buys versus
sells/no change" and returns especially using the DJIA and S&P500 as representative of
the market. While the strength of association is statistically significant for the total
observations from MER, the results for the turmoil observations are very obvious for both
brokerage houses. The results are also significant for the total as well as the stable
observations at FB and MER using the S&P/TSX. This is probably a result of the
negative correlation of mining stocks at the S&P/TSX and the total market index at
S&P500.
The estimation of the odds ratio using Equation (6) is useful in determining the
interaction effects. If there is an interaction effect between a risk factor and another
variable, the estimate of the odds ratio of the risk factor will vary. If they are different, it
implies the only variables that do not exist in the other specification are significant. In all
cases there are differences suggesting that the group effect is important. A direct test is
3Rothman, K. J. and Greenland, S. (1998). Modern Epidemiology, 2nd ed. Lippincott-Raven, Philadelphia.
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on the odds ratio comparing GROUP =0 with GROUP=1 which is presented as an
adapted (since it is also nested) Chow test in the second sections of all the tables and
discussed at length in Hosmer & Lemeshow (2000, pg 75).
95% Confidence Intervals of the Odds Ratios:
The interval provides additional information about the parameter. It is useful to
measure the likelihood that the odds ratio one is found within the interval, in which case
the model does not significantly describe the data. The only consistently statistically
suitable odds ratio statistics are for the turmoil observations. The tables using the DJIA
data show the odds of buying over selling during the turmoil observations are six times
that of the stable observations for FB and 16 times for MER. For the stable and total
observations, the probabilities are statistically equally likely that the trader will buy or
sell except in the case as mentioned previously for MER. The number one occurs in the
confidence intervals for all the remaining regressions except for MER's total
observations and in the turmoil observations of the S&P/TSX data. This lends some
support to the postulation that the buy actions of traders are inversely related to the
returns on the S&P/TSX. The tables that present the results of Equation (5) show similar
results as those that report on Equation (6) for the individual odds ratios but with a 95%
confidence interval.
Test of Significance of the Model, Influence or Goodness of Fit:
In OLS regressions r2, the coefficient of determination can be used to measure
overall fit of the model or the strength of association. Several analogous measures of fit
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have been suggested for logit models but none of them supports a straightforward
interpretation as r2. The adjusted or pseudo R 2 of logistic methods can be calculated
using a variety of methods and are all based on comparisons of the predicted values from
the fitted model to those from a model using an intercept only. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm
Jr. (2005), in their study of "weather" as providing a behavioral bias use "probit"
regressions and consider a "pseudo R2 of 23.5%" in conjunction with a significant
Pearson chi-square statistic as providing evidence of a "good" model. Unfortunately low
R 2 values are the norm in logistic regression, a fact difficult to reconcile with the
relatively higher r2 common in OLS regressions. Consequently it is important to review
R2 in conjunction with other measures to determine "goodness of fit".
Aldrich and Nelson's (1984) pseudo or adjusted R2 measure suggests significant
support only for the model during times of turmoil using the DJIA on the data from both
brokerage houses. The R 2 squared for the turmoil set of observations is roughly 60% at
FB and 78% at MER while it is negligible for the stable set.
The residual sum of squares in logistic regressions is not as useful as in OLS since
the deviation of each observation from one will give a negligible result. These are
calculated for all the market indices for both brokerage houses and are seen to have only
fractional remainders of the sum of the two separate sets from the total set. In logit
regressions the equivalent measures of sum of squared residuals are the deviance
residuals and the likelihood ratio. The statistics follow a x2 distribution rather than an F
one, can be calculated and used in adapted Chow tests. Another measure of discrepancy
between observed and fitted values analogous to the residual sum of squared errors in
OLS is the Pearson residuals. The test statistics are the Pearson , statistic which is the
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sum of the Pearson residuals and the deviance, the sum of squared deviance residuals.
The Likelihood Ratio Goodness of Fit statistic (LR) is also based on the comparison of
the restricted and unrestricted maximum of the log likelihood function. These tests are
described in Mc Cullagh & Nelder (1989) and follow an asymptotic chi-square
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to (m-1)*(k+1), where m is the number of sub-
samples and k is the number of independent variables in the model. The Pearson
statistic on the other hand is a true goodness of fit test since a significant statistic suggests
a good fit.
Mc Cullagh & Nelder (1989) 3 pg 33 is typically quoted as the standard reference
for deviance. The formula for the deviance residual, d is given by
d(p, y) = 1- 2(yyln ^ + (1- y;)ln(1-- j3))
The deviance residual for a logistic model is similar to the residual error in ordinary least
squares regression for the linear model. A smaller the deviance residual reflects a better
fitting logistic model. The deviance is the sum of squared deviance residuals
J
j=1
Since the deviance test statistic determines whether a given logit model is worse
than a perfectly fitted (saturated or full) model, it is more appropriately known as a
"badness of fit" test since non-significant residual deviances or residuals are considered
good fit. A "smaller" deviance value given a particular sample size would indicate that
the fitted model describes the data as a whole well whereas a "large" value would suggest
otherwise. Thus, the deviance can also be used directly to test the goodness of fit of the
33Mc Cullagh & Nelder (1989), Generalized Linear Models, 2nd ed. London: Chapman and Hall.
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model. A well fitting model is not significant. The deviance statistic gives support for
the model during turmoil conditions for both brokerages using the DJIA. It also gives
some support for the actions during turmoil conditions at FB using the S&P500.
Surprisingly it also shows statistical significance at MER for all observations and
conditions using the S&P500.
The log-likelihood statistic is adjusted to present the -2 Log Likelihood test that
determines the difference between the model with intercept only and the one with all the
covariates. The results presented include the total statistic which measures all the
covariates and the difference from the model with only the intercept. A good fitting
model will have a very significant difference between the two statistics. The absolute
value of the statistic is heavily dependent on the number of observations in the sample.
Meaningful differences are prevalent for both brokerage house turmoil observations using
the DJIA.
A third measure of standardized residuals is provided by the Hosmer-Lemeshow
(H-L) Goodness-of-Fit Test (also know as the Lackfit test). Some studies suggest that the
deviance statistic is not distributed as chi-square when there are a small number of
observed values (less than 400). The Hosmer-Lemeshow fit test is designed to correct for
the small sample size (especially when there are continuous predictors). This provides a
chi-square-based test that assesses how well the data under analysis perform under the
null hypothesis that the model fits the data. Again, when this test is not significant then
the model being tested is a good fit to the data because this means the parsimonious
model is not significantly worse than the well-fitting saturated model. Mc Cullagh &
Neder (1989) caution against using a single statistic to draw conclusions about goodness
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of fit, so several are presented with a conclusion based on the significance levels of more
than one of them. Based on all the measures of model fit, it can be concluded that
especially using the DJIA for the turmoil data, the model is a good fit (or not a bad fit) to
model the probability that a broker will buy securities during a down market versus
sell/no change.
TESTS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Test of Homogeneity of Variances and Tests of Equality of Means:
The test of Homogeneity of Variances, the Levene test and the Test of Equality of
Means if the variances are known a priori to be unequal, the Welch test, are typically not
measured for logistic regressions since the dichotomous dependable variable is not
normally distributed. However, there are benefits to computing these statistics to
understand the characteristics of the data. The Levene tests show convincingly using the
DJIA and various other sets of observations using the S&P500 and the S&P/TSX that the
variances are not homogeneous. Given the lack of homogeneity, the Welch tests show
there are virtually no differences in the means. 34 Consequently, there are no observed
differences in these tests between the stable and total observations. There is however a
noticeable difference in these tests in the turmoil observation for all three parts. The null
hypothesis of homogeneous variances can be decisively rejected when the DJIA is used
on both brokerage house data and only FB with the S&P/TSX. Given that this is the case
in these parts, the Welch test is not meaningful. However using S&P500, the null
34The procedure in SAS automatically drops groups in the Levene test for homogeneity of BUYSELL
variances across different return groups. In addition, groups are dropped from Welch's ANOVA of return
effect for BUYSELL for no observed variability.
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hypothesis that the means are equal once tests show that the variances are not equal, can
be rejected.
Tests of Equality of Regressions:
Most statistical tests rely on the assumption of static parameters of the model (or
the covariances of the data have remained constant over the sample observation).
However during periods of unusual circumstances it is likely this is an unrealistic
assumption and that the model can be improved by accounting for structural changes that
may have caused the model parameters to change. Chow's (1960)35 Breakpoint Test
divides the data into two sub-samples. It then estimates the same equation for each sub-
sample separately, to see whether there are significant differences in the estimated
equations. A significant difference indicates a structural change in the relationship. The
Chow test for ordinary linear squares regression is an F test that involves computing the
residual sum of squares of the regression. The F test with df = k, N2 + N3 - 2k is
computed. If the computed F exceeds the critical Fk, N2 + N3 - 2k, the hypothesis that
the two regressions are the same is rejected.
In logistic regression, since the analogy to this residual is the deviance, one test
consists of determining the significance probability of the deviance for a given degrees of
freedom. If this probability is small, then the null hypothesis of no significant change in
the data prior to and after the structural change is rejected, suggesting evidence of a
"Chow, G. (1960). Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions,
Econometrica, vol. 28: 591-605.
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structural change in the data. Toyoda (1974)36 shows that the Chow test "is well behaved
even under heteroskedasticity as long as at least one of two sample sizes is very large".
For logistic regressions, the Chow test can also be adapted using the chi-square value
produced by subtracting the -2 Log Likelihood for the two nested models. It has one
degree of freedom. 37
Some studies however believe that the Chow tests can provide wrong conclusions
in the presence of heteroskedastic disturbances. Additionally it is not conceptually
feasible to use the deviance in exactly the same manner as the residual sum of squares in
OLS. This is because a very large denominator (which is comprised predominantly of
the number of observations) will produce a large F statistic that may seem to be
statistically significant even if the deviance is small. Consequently, this statistic has to be
adapted somewhat for a logistic equation. Instead it is more suitable to divide the data
into groups depending on the different characteristics, for example turmoil observation
versus stable observation and then checking for similarities between the two groups.
When the two different methods give the same indications, the result is a robust test for
the structural equality of logistic regression parameters, a Chow test that is chi square
distributed.
Another definition of the 'Chow test' equivalent to pooling the data, estimating
the fully interacted model, and then testing the hypothesis that the Group 1 coefficients
36Toyoda, T., Use of the Chow Test under Heteroskedasticy, Econometrica, Vol. 42, No. 3 (May, 1974) ,
pp. 601-608.
"Jaccard, J. (2001), Interaction Effects in Logistic Regression, Sage Series: Quantitative Applications in
the Social Sciences Sage Publications, Inc. CA.
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are significantly different to the coefficients estimated in Group 0, is a preferential
method for testing for parameter consistency. This is an odds ratio test on Equation (6).38
The tests show significant structural change results for both brokerage houses
using the DJIA and S&P500. Consequently, the null hypothesis that the regression
slopes, intercepts and total regression for the market turmoil and non-turmoil
observations are equal is rejected and supported by all three versions of the Chow test
and the odds ratio variation. These statistics show statistically significant structural break
points occurred principally for the loss greater than the 0.95% of the DJIA and S&P500
indices.
Implication of these Results
It is noteworthy that the coefficients derived for the variables using logit/probit
procedures only have meaning relative to each other, therefore the absolute magnitude of
the coefficients is not interpretable like it is in ordinary least squares regression models.
The model represents the association of the dependent variable, which represents the
probability of a particular choice being made, and the independent variable. Therefore,
the regression parameters represent the change in the buys/sells associated with a unit
change in the incremental return of the market, and do not necessarily represent causal
effects. Hence, the model represents a convenient way to explain relationships or predict
the propensity to buy or sell given the known inputs or extreme change in the market
conditions.
38This Type 3 analysis of effects is reported as part of the logistic procedure in SAS.
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The results reported from the different brokerage houses indicate robustness of
the effects because of their similar conclusions. Arguably, the more experienced traders
at various brokerage houses may be less prone to behavioral biases. The differential
experience levels can account for significantly different trader behavior. An exercise for
future exploration can include a test of statistically significant difference between the two
brokerage houses.
The results using the DJIA consistently lend support to the null hypothesis that
during periods of market turmoil, investors trade differently while the other two indices
lend some support. Specifically they buy more securities during down markets. The
exercise affirms behavioral biases suggesting that perceptions and sentiment may heavily
influence trading patterns. This observation leads to an extension of the methodology of
this study. It may also be useful to investigate how the above results change with the
inclusion of another indicator of investors' risk preferences, sentiment.
Extensions of the Methodology
Fama and French (1993) argue that a three-factor asset-pricing model is the
appropriate benchmark against which anomalies should be measured. In other words,
other factors are priced as risk. In as much as interpretations and robustness of the results
are heavily influenced by the type of distributions and sample sizes, the results may be
improved through an alternative specification of the model. The results so far indicate
that traders in Toronto significantly base their trading decisions on the daily changes in
the DJIA. This thesis now attempts to follow Fama and French (1996)'s multifactor
approach to Merton's (1973) Intertemporal CAPM to determine whether other factors
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like the return on DJIA, change in Consumer Sentiment and Trader Activity contribute to
changes in the market index as a whole as defined by the S&P500. The framework will
however be limited to a behavioral one.
Since there are many more non-turmoil observations than market turmoil, the data
can be combined into one sample with the different types of observations being assigned
dummy variables. The resulting model specifies these different observations as
independent variables.
Model: RETURN = a + f1 (BUY SELL) + P2 GROUP + E (7)
The test would be therefore on whether or not the P's are significantly different
from zero. If they are, this supports the hypothesis that investor behavior is different
because of behavioral factors as well as market conditions (turmoil versus non-turmoil).
A major advantage of this specification is the assumptions of ordinary least squares are
no longer violated and more robust statistics can be computed. 39 The caveat here is the
interpretation. Is the market return predicted by these behavioral factors, or does market
return predict consumer behavior? It may be argued that the DJIA is also a behavioral
factor since it has the capacity to create either euphoria or fear.
In as much as interpretations and robustness of the results are heavily influenced
by the type of distributions and sample sizes, the results may be improved through an
alternative specification of the model. The results so far indicate that traders in Toronto
significantly base their trading decisions on the daily changes in the DJIA. This thesis
now attempts to follow Fama and French (1993)'s multifactor approach to Merton's
(1973) ICAPM to determine whether other factors like the return on DJIA, change in
39Unfortunately the endogeneity issue remains.
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Consumer Sentiment and Trader Activity contribute to changes in the market index as a
whole as defined by the S&P500. The result is a multi-factor model as suggested by
Fama and French (1996). The framework will however be limited to a behavioral one.
Since the previous section noted that the results based on the DJIA showed a high
correlation between trader behavior and market returns it is a good candidate for
inclusion in an extension of the methodology. In this specification of the model, the
dependent variable is the market return. The dummy variable GROUP is defined as 1 for
the group of market turmoil observations, and 0 for the non-turmoil ones. The other
independent variable is as defined as the brokerage data from the previous section, the
BUYSELL responses of the traders. This methodology serves a two-fold purpose, since
the number of market turmoil observations is far less than the non-turmoil ones, it
eliminates biases that may be caused by inferences made from extreme differences in
sample size. Secondly, it allows for testing of sub-hypotheses that check for the effect of
several behavioral factors. Since the return of the market is the new dependent variable,
sub-hypotheses include whether the lagged returns of the DJIA or other behavioral
factors like the traders' buy or sell activities and investor sentiment are parsimonious
predictors. Adding lags may also enhance the plausibility of the assumption of normalcy
in the error term, with mean zero and constant variance.
Since the dependent variable is no longer binary a logit or probit specification is
no longer necessary and predictive tendencies can be discerned using OLS. Lakonishok
and Smidt (1988), in a test for seasonal patterns in rates of return on 90 years of data, also
specified the predicted variable as the return on the market. An F-test is conducted on
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the joint significance of the regression coefficients. The general model is presented as
follows:
Model: RETURN = a + P1 (xI, x2, x3) + P2 GROUP + E (8)
Where x], x2, x3 may be any independent variables that can determine buy/sell
activity for example sentiment, bankruptcies, volume of stock traded, buys or sells. The
dummy variable (GROUP) will again be one during market turmoil and zero otherwise.
The caveat here is the interpretation. Is the market return predicted by these behavioral
factors, or does market return predict consumer behavior? It may be argued that the
DJIA is a behavioral factor since it has the capacity to create either euphoria or fear.
Lagged endogenous and/or exogenous variables are typically introduced in order to
reduce the autocorrelation and endogenous regressors problems. The lagged return is
especially useful since anecdotally and empirically it has been noted that based on mean
reversion of returns, traders first over-react and then eventually pull back (Shefrin 2001).
Therefore, it can also be used as a behavioral factor in this multi-factor model. Hence, an
alternate index like the S&P500 can be classified as the market return as is the norm in
empirical studies.
Lagged DJIA, Consumer Sentiment & Trader Activity as Predictors of the Market Return
(S&P500)
There is a large difference in sample sizes among the market turmoil and non-
turmoil observations. Consequently, the implications may be skewed if the data is tested
separately. Therefore, by aggregating the data one large sample can be tested with the
observations from the turmoil and non-turmoil environments being categorized using
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dummy variables. Since the model no longer involves estimating a discrete choice
dependent variable, the estimation is no longer constrained to calculating probabilities.
Hence, the model can be estimated using ordinary least squares achieving the benefits of
coefficients with special meanings; however, it is important to determine that the
assumptions of normality and equal variances are not violated. In regression models,
when the data are time-series in nature, there is a possibility that the error terms follow an
autoregressive process. An autoregressive error model corrects for serial correlation.
Since ordinary least-squares regression assumes constant error variance,
heteroskedasticity problems cause the OLS estimates to be inefficient. Another problem
that arises is the OLS forecast error variance is inaccurate since the predicted forecast
variance is based on the average variance instead of the variability at the end of the
series. Therefore, the estimation has been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation in this section. 40
The specification of this model suffers from a drawback. The DJIA is serially
correlated with the S&P500. Even though it is not an extremely large component of this
market, the results may be compromised. Using a lagged return of the S&P500 should
solve this problem. Additionally, the lagged return will check for evidence of herding.
Herding occurs when a group of investors trades the same stock in the same
direction over time, while feedback trading occurs when lagged returns act as the
common signal that the investors follow. The analysis will begin by presenting a general
model, which incorporates other economic variables that could possibly be predictors of
4OThe estimation procedure in SAS, PROC AUTOREG accounts for changing variance and as a member of
the family of GARCH models provides a means of estimating and correcting for the changing variability of
the data. The GARCH process assumes that the errors, although uncorrelated, are not independent and
models the conditional error variance as a function of the past realizations of the series.
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the return on a market index. If it is assumed that investors' buy/sell decisions are
exogenous to the daily return of a market index and are one of the priced factors that can
successfully be used in "assessing the information processing ability of financial
markets" (Roll 1992)41, then the following specification is useful.
RETURN = a + 01(RETURN-1) + 12 (SENT) + 03 (SENT-1) + 4 BUY SELL1 +35 GROUP +E (9)
The variables are defined as follows:
RETURN] = return on S&P500
a = intercept
1, = coefficient estimate of the impact of the lagged S&P return
RETURN,j = the one-day lagged return on the S&P500
32= coefficient estimate of the impact of change in sentiment
SENT = change in sentiment, as measured by the change in the consumer sentiment index
P3 = coefficient impact of the one period lagged change in sentiment
SENT,. = lagged change in sentiment
$4 = coefficient impact of trader activity
BUYSELL = dummy variable defined as one for trader "buys" and zero otherwise
$s = coefficient impact of "market turmoil" versus "non-turmoil" condition
GROUP = dummy variable defined as one for market turmoil observations and zero
otherwise
E= Error term
All the variables have been defined before except for the sentiment data.42 During
the period under investigation, this index was only collected quarterly. Therefore, it was
essentially the same over a three-month period. The results are also treated for
heteroskedasticity. Another confounding effect as mentioned before is, while investors
may over-react one day, they may re-think their behavior and compensate the following
41Roll, R. W., 1992, Weather, in Peter Newman, Murray Milgate, and John Eatwell, ed.: The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Money and Finance 3, 789-790 (Macmillan Press, London).
42The measure of sentiment used here is the Index of Consumer Confidence (ICC). The monthly Index of
Consumer Confidence is constructed from responses to four attitudinal questions posed to a random sample
of Canadian households. The Index has been accumulated monthly since December 2001 but quarterly
since 1971.
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day, eventually leading to mean-reversion. Since the behavioral bias of over-reaction is
not being investigated in this thesis the DJIA can be removed from this specification and
replaced with a lag of the S&P500. Table 8 presents results using DJIA and its lag and
the specification reported in Table 9 utilizes the S&P500 and its lag to verify that the
results produced by the two indices are similar. Intuitively the specification in equation
(9) using the DJIA in lieu of the S&P500 undoubtedly leads to high predictive capacity
based on the results from the first set of equations that show that the DJIA was a good
predictor of the brokers' buy/sell or change decisions during this time frame. Estimation
results are presented first for FB and subsequently MER.
R$TURN= 0.058 +0.20RETURN,, + 0.OOSENT+ 0.003SENT, + 0.2315BUYSELL - 1.8209GROUP
(0.058)* (0.0228)* (0.004) (.004) (.06)* (0.10)*
R$TURN= 0.072 + 0.1978RETURN,.I -0.OOSENT + 0.003SENT,,+ 0.1683BUYSELL - 1.7613GROUP
(0.1018)* (0.0230)* (0.004) (.004) (0.11)* (0.0990)*
Table 8: Regression Results of DJIA on lagged DJIA, Sentiment, Lagged Sentiment and Buy/Sell Statistics
FIRST BOSTON
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.3594
Durbin Watson 1.9381
Total R-square 0.7502
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 7.45*
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 42.28* Structural Break Point 173
MERRILL LYNCH
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.3520
Durbin Watson 1.9337
Total R-square 0.7486
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 6.35*
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 32.25* Structural Break Point 175
Table 9 reports regression results for the estimated models on FB and then MER using
the S&P500 and its lag.
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RAETURN= 0.037 +0.2827RETURNt,1 - 0.002SENT + 0.001SENT,1+ 0.1704BUYSELL - 1.2754GROUP
(0.054)* (0.0238)* (0.004) (.004) (.06)* (0.09)*
RATURN= -0.27 + 0.2652RETURN,., -0.0015SENT + 0.001SENT,1+ 0.4826BUYSELL - 1.3167GROUP
(0.0967)* (0.0233)* (0.004) (.004) (0.10)* (0.0920)*
Table 9: Regression Results of S&P500 on lagged S&P500, Sentiment, Lagged Sentiment and Buy/Sell
Statistics
FIRST BOSTON
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.3144
Durbin Watson 1.9061
Total R-square 0.7740
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 8.47*
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 35.37* Structural Break Point 173
MERRILL LYNCH
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.3280
Durbin Watson 1.9051
Total R-square 0.7688
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 8.22*
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 32.25* Structural Break Point 175
Another Specification of the Model: Consumer Sentiment & Trader Activity as
Predictors of the Market Return (S&P500)
Since the DJIA and S&P500 produce similar results, the analysis using the DJIA
can be dropped henceforth. The previous model can provide a reference point to see how
much predictive power is lost by removing the lagged S&P500 as a regressor.
The new model to be estimated therefore is:
RETURN = a + 01 (SENT) + 32 (SENT. 1) + 13 BUYSELL + R4 GROUP + e (10)
The variables are defined as previously described but excludes the lagged
S&P500. Table 10 reports regression results for the specification in Equation (10) for the
estimated models on FB and then MIER.
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R ETURN= 0.12 + - 0.002 SENT + 0.002 SENT,.,+ 0.1523 BUYSELL - 1.8142 GROUP
(0.056)* (0.004) (0.004) (.06)* (0.0843)*
R TURN= -0.26 -0.002 SENT + 0.002 SENT+ 0.5374 BUYSELL - 1.839 GROUP
(0.1009)* (0.004) (0.004) (0.1037)* (0.0833)*
Table 10 Regression Results of S&P500 on Sentiment, Lagged Sentiment and Buy/Sell Statistics
FIRST BOSTON
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.2442
Durbin Watson 1.2781
Total R-square 0.2702
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 23.88*
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 44.07* Structural Break Point 178
MERRILL LYNCH
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.2672
Durbin Watson 1.3247
Total R-square 0.3374
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 32.84
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 28.62* Structural Break Point 175
Implication of these Results
From Tables 8 and 9 we can see that the behavioral factors lagged S&P500,
lagged DJIA and the BUYSELL dummy variables are significant in this multi-factor
model. During turmoil times when the GROUP dummy is 1, return is shown to be
significantly negative since it outweighs the coefficient for BUYSELL. Sentiment is not
a significantly priced factor. This is probably reflective of the fact that during the period
under consideration in this chapter the Canadian Consumer Sentiment data was
aggregated only quarterly. Consequently, much of the daily effects may have been lost
by dated information. In an analysis of r squared, it did show some small contribution to
the general strength of the regression. Therefore, a further exercise could be to utilize a
better measure of consumer sentiment than this quarterly data. This is investigated in the
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subsequent chapter. It is noteworthy that the lagged value of the S&P500 and the DJIA
are significantly priced risk factors, lending support to herding behavior.
It is useful here to test whether the power of the specification is greatly reduced
by removing all explanatory factors except for the buy-sell dummy variable. While this
specification may be nonsensical since it is presumptuous to believe that the trader
activity of two small brokerage houses can significantly affect the return on the market,
the spirit of the argument is motivated by a study by Hirshleifer & Shumway (2003).13
This study seeks exogenous factors like the sunshine effect, rain and snow conditions to
determine the probability that stock market returns in New York are positive. They
determine that the sunshine effect consistently predicts positive daily returns, and
investors can improve their Sharpe ratios by trading on morning weather conditions.
They conclude that after accounting for transactions costs, the benefit of this information
is greatly diminished but "sunshine is just one of the many influences on mood". The
implications of this study make reconciliation with fully rational efficient markets
difficult and suggest that a traders' reference point (i.e. whether he has experienced
wealth losses or not) plays an important role in market returns. Consequently, if it is
assumed that investors' buy/sell decisions are exogenous to the daily return of a market
index and are one of the priced factors that can successfully be used in "assessing the
information processing ability of financial markets" (Roll 1992)", then the above
specification is useful. It is noteworthy however that this specification is entirely
43Hirshleifer, David & Shumway, Tyler (2003), Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the Weather, The
Journal of Finance 58 (3), 1009-1032.
"Roll, R. W., 1992, Weather, in Peter Newman, Murray Milgate, and John Eatwell, ed.: The New Palgrave
Dictionary of Money and Finance 3, 789-790 (Macmillan Press, London).
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different to the original specification in this thesis, which suggests that the buy/sell
decisions depend on the state of the market. The resultant estimation gives the following
equation and Table 11 reports the results:
RETURN=0.12 +0.15 BUYSELL - 1.8137 GROUP FB
(0.0554)* (.06)* (0.0842)*
RA TURN= -0.26 + 0.538 BUYSELL - 1.839 GROUP MER
(0.10)* (.10)* (0.0801)*
Table 11 Regression Results of S&P500 on Buy/Sell Statistics
FIRST BOSTON
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.2439
Durbin Watson 1.2769
Total R-square 0.2439
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 232*
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 59.20* Structural Break Point 178
MERRILL LYNCH
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.2670
Durbin Watson 1.3234
Total R-square 0.2670
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 262*
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 70.84* Structural Break Point 175
Table 12 reintroduces the DJIA since it was a better contributing factor in the initial logit
specification. These results are similar. Apart from the estimations using the lagged
return index, the serial correlation problem remains.
RATURN= 0.12 + 0.22 BUYSELL - 2.2815 GROUP FB
(0.0560)* (.0651)* (0.0867)*
RATURN= 0.06 + 0.242 BUYSELL - 2.2138GROUP MER
(0.10)* (.11)* (0.0860)*
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Table 12 Regression Results of DJIA on Buy/Sell Statistics
FIRST BOSTON
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.3248
Durbin Watson 1.4943
Total R-square 0.3248
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 347*
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 81.97* Structural Break Point 173
MERRILL LYNCH
Total R-square Corrected for heteroskedasticity 0.3182
Durbin Watson 1.4996
Total R-square 0.3182
Test of the Model (Pr > F = <.0001) 336*
Tests of Structural Change Chow Test 16.76* Structural Break Point 175
Interpreting the Results
The results are consistent with the initial specification presented in this thesis.
Even though it is not practical to model the return on a major index as being predicated
by the buy/sell activities of two small brokerage houses, the relatively high r squared and
the significance of the coefficients show that they are highly correlated. Additionally
structural change as measured by the Chow statistic is statistically significant at the point
where the turmoil versus non-turmoil break in observations occurred.
While we expect that institutional investors will generally sell when markets are
down and buy during up markets since there is an expectation that their mutual fund
clients and other investors would require redemptions, the activity does not have to be
repeated in the brokers' "own" accounts. Several considerations may play a role here,
traders/brokers may buy since they see value or they see potential for arbitrage profits
during periods when markets deviated from normal trading patterns according to
Merton's (1987) zero arbitrage risk-return relation. Unfortunately the data cannot clarify
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these ambiguities. However, during times of extreme wealth altering conditions these
considerations may play less of a role in investor behavior.
There is an ongoing argument regarding market anomalies. One theory suggests
that anomalies exist and are currently being exploited as sources of alpha (the constant) in
the regression, while some note that anomalies disappear over time. Therefore it is useful
to incorporate a multi-factor model to search for factors that compensate investors for
risk as suggested by Fama and French (1993).
Limitations and Robustness of this Methodology
This methodology, while it can not formulate utility functions, places loss
aversion as opposed to risk aversion as defined in rational expectations theory, as being
prevalent during periods of extreme wealth altering circumstances or "market turmoil".
A limitation of this methodology occurs because we are unable to obtain risk preferences
or risk aversion directly, which is a necessary component of Prospect Theory. 45 A
detailed survey of the literature showing attempts to measure risk aversion directly in
included in Starmer (2000).46 Therefore, the assumption that risk aversion or loss
aversion is reflected in the buy/sell decision is reasonable.
Since the coefficients in the sample of non-turmoil data as well as the total sample
of both market turmoil and non-turmoil data were found to be insignificant (Equations 5
45Benartzi, Shlomo & Thaler, Richard H, (1995) Myopic Loss Aversion Myopic Loss Aversion and the
Equity Premium Puzzle, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(1), pages 73-92.
4Starmer, C, Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice
under Risk, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXXVIII (June 2000) pp. 332-382.
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and 6), suggesting other variables may be more important, it is necessary to check for
robustness of the econometrics and the specification of the model.
Potential Extensions
Checks of robustness may include tests for heteroskedasticity, with arbitrary
within-year correlation (cluster by year) and arbitrary between firm correlation (cluster
by brokerage). Another question that can be asked is, can some set of other independent
variables that determine buy/sell activity be able to predict the buying or selling (no
change) behavior? Subsequently, an expanded version of the full model with additional
independent variables can be considered.
Similarly, tests can be conducted as to whether year or brokerage fixed effects in
the regressions affect the results. Whether results are sensitive to variations in the cutoff
values for small and large trades can also be investigated. The regression can be repeated
for each year in the sample, and for various other sub-samples including cut-offs for
"market turmoil" definitions.
Special situations that bear further investigation include events that occur when
the market increased by specified percentage levels. This is an attempt to formalize Mr.
Greenspan's observation of "Irrational Exuberance". There is also a possibility that the
changes in positions (i.e. bought or sold) are not accurate since the data only details the
change in percentage of the security in the portfolio. Thus, the portfolio as a whole may
have gone down in value more than the security in question, or vice versa. An additional
test can then be performed on the data under a "binary dependent" variables approach.
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Conclusions
A logit specification was employed to predict the probability that traders at the
Toronto branches of two large multinational brokers would buy securities during periods
of wealth reducing periods. This specification was chosen in lieu of OLS because of non-
normality concerns, heteroskedasticity and the constraints that predicted values were
constrain between zero and one. Alternative specifications using OLS were also
employed to check for robustness of the effect.
Consistent with Thaler & Johnson's (1990) survey and Shefrin's (2001) anecdotal
account, but in contrast to Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001), the probability of traders
buying stock after a period of wealth losses as defined by a substantial fall in the returns
of a major index increases. From the perspective of expected utility theory, behavioral
biases should have no explanatory power. However, empirical investigation of the
buy/sell actions of institutional traders at the Toronto branches of two large brokerage
houses show that the traders seem to be able to withstand significant losses to their
portfolios until they reach some threshold of intolerance, or reflection point in the jargon
of Prospect Theory. At this threshold point, they reacted differently.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that individual investors evaluate their portfolio
performance at the end of every quarter and react or make changes to the portfolio, after
reviewing its efficacy. The performance of professional traders is also evaluated against
some benchmark at the end of every quarter. This study seeks answers from a more
frequent assessment period, daily evaluation of a trader's portfolio. Evidence supporting
different behavior under market turmoil conditions was found especially with returns
based on the DJIA and to a lesser extent the S&P500. A strong relationship between
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these market indices and traders' purchases, sales and no change in their market making
and proprietary accounts was found. If trader behavior can be connected to consumer
behavior and assuming traders make changes to their portfolios based on these
characteristics, then it would be feasible to investigate aggregate behavior at an economy
wide level. A definitive characterization of trader behavior and the applicability for
generalization remains a meaningful challenge for future research.
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Chapter IV - EFFECT OF SENTIMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF PROSPECT THEORY
Introduction
De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) devised a model which
incorporated irrational traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs to explain the equity
premium puzzle. Unfortunately however researchers have been unable to precisely
obtain empirical evidence of a sentiment factor that reflects fluctuations in the opinions
of these traders regarding the future prospects for the stock market. If sentiment could be
measured directly, the model could be tested and implications could be devised.
By constructing a sentiment index Baker and Wurgler (2003) find that large
highly profitable firms, with large dividend payouts earn lower subsequent returns once
sentiment starts falling. This suggests sentiment is a lagged predictor. This chapter's
motivation is to determine how consumer sentiment and investor propensity to buy/sell
together interact with market conditions to give rise to behavior that is observed.
Research Hypothesis and Methodology
To the extent that consumer sentiment is an indicator of investors' risk taking
behavior, in this section, consumer sentiment is used to test the hypothesis that risk
aversion (or risk preferences) is affected by stock market returns as is implied by the
assumptions of Prospect Theory. A further exercise may incorporate a discussion as to
whether consumer sentiment predicates Investor Confidence as is suggested in the
previous Chapter. However, in as much as the average consumer today invests in the
markets both directly and indirectly, it is a fair assumption. In the spirit of the previous
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section, the empirical work is first performed on US data and then extended to the
Canadian case.
The US case is reflected in data from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) as
an index that draws the most attention among investors and the financial press, and the
University of Michigan's Index of Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI). Another widely
followed survey which measures how consumers feel about the upcoming six months and
their plans to make purchases (or not) is the Conference Boards' Consumer Confidence
Index (CCI). While both indices measure consumer-spending expectations, the CCI is
more heavily weighted towards business. Both surveys try to measure consumer spending
and saving behavior. The Consumer Confidence Index comes from a nationwide sample
of 5,000 households, 60% based on future expectations and 40 percent on current
conditions. The University of Michigan's Index of Consumer Sentiment covers three
broad areas: personal finances, business conditions and buying conditions. The university
surveys at least 500 households each month and asks about 50 core questions.
Households are included that represent all U.S. households, except Alaska and Hawaii.
The University of Michigan's Expectations Index is included in the Conference Board's
U.S. Leading Economic Indicator Index, formerly compiled by the U.S. Department of
Commerce. Each month Michigan releases a preliminary index on the second Friday and
a final index on the fourth Friday.
On May 1 2002, Standard and Poor agreed to take over management of the
Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Composite Index and renamed it the S&P/TSX. Previously
it was known as the TSX. The Canadian return data is measured by this index. Since
May 2002, the index is reviewed quarterly and companies that do not meet the criteria for
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size and liquidity are dropped from the index and replaced ones that do. However, the
S&P/TSX does not make up the universe of a typical Canadian investor's holdings.
Registered retirement savings plans (similar to 401ks) are permitted to contain 30% of
foreign ownership. In fact as of February 2005, Canadian pension plan investors no
longer have these constraints. Part of the reason for this as suggested in Chapter III is
because of the nature of the Toronto Stock Exchange and its heavy weighting in sectors
which exhibit negative correlation to the global stock market principally mining and oil
and gas industries. Data on the Canadian Consumer Confidence' Index are used to
represent Canadian economic agents' mood or sentiment. This data is published
quarterly since 1978, and monthly since September 2001 by the Conference Board of
Canada. An index, which uses the same methodology and is analogous to the University
of Michigan's Consumer Sentiment Index, is the Decima-Investor's Group Index of
Canadian Consumer Confidence. However, this has only been collected quarterly since
September 2001. Since a relationship between consumer's sentiment and stock market
returns has not been tested for Canadian data this section contributes to the literature,
especially in light of a possible correlation in the returns for industrialized countries.
To test the assumption (from Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and Falato
(2003)) that consumer sentiment is affected by the stock market, the following linear
'The Index of Consumer Confidence, the Conference Board's survey of Canadian households has been
ongoing since 1960. It measures consumers' levels of optimism regarding current economic conditions.
This is a crucial indicator of near-term sales for companies in the consumer product sector. It is constructed
from responses to four attitudinal questions posed to a random sample of Canadian households. Those
surveyed are asked to give their views about their households' current and expected financial positions and
the short-term employment outlook. They are also asked to assess whether the present time was a "good" or
a "bad" time to make a major purchase such as a house, car or other bit-ticket items.
Source: http://www.conference-board.org/economics/methodology.cfm.
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relationship between the percentage change in the sentiment index and the stock market
return may be estimated:
A in MCSI,= /3o + /31 A in Stock, + P2 A in Stock,,1 + /3 A in MCSI.1 + ct (1)
Variables Defined
MCSI is the Michigan index of consumer sentiment,
Stock is the Dow Jones Industrials Average stock market index
/3o is a constant, 31, ,82, ,3 are coefficients to be estimated, and e is a random error.
The case for the American variables is eventually extended for the Canadian variables as
defined below.
TSX is the S&P/TSX Composite Index, formerly known as the TSE 300
CCI is the Canadian Index of Consumer
Equation (1), similar to the one estimated by Otto (1999)2, assumes that the
relationship between stock market returns and consumer sentiment is constant overtime.
Intuitively, one would expect large swings in market returns to have a greater impact on
consumer sentiment since they imply more significant changes in consumer wealth.
Therefore, the coefficients in Equation (1) would be expected to be different depending
on the magnitude of the change in stock market returns (Chapter III investigated the
effect of the direction of change).
Regime switching models provide a systematic approach to test for multiple
breaks and regime shifts in the data generating process. Regime shifts in the literature are
considered to be governed by exogenous stochastic processes rather than singular,
20tto (1999) uses the Wilshire 5000 index and estimates equation 1 from June 1980 to June 1999. She finds
the coefficients on the stock index and its lagged value to be 0.33 (0.09) and 0.19 (0.08) respectively with
an R2 = 0:11 and S:E = 4.3. In our equation, we also include the lagged value of the sentiment index
variable in order to account for potential autoregressive behavior in A In MCSI,.
126
deterministic ones. A Markov chain hypothesizes that information from the distant past
is irrelevant given knowledge of the recent past. In Markov switching models it is
important to secure long data samples so that the time-variability of the parameters could
be properly identified.
Hanson (1996) proposed a formal test of Markov switching models against the
linear alternative of no-switching, or no structural change. This method, which produces
valid inferences, evaluates the log-likelihood function for a grid of different values for the
regression coefficients, standard deviation and the transitional probabilities.
The threshold effect is tested against a null hypothesis of linearity in Equation 1.
Hansen's Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is used to test for heteroskedasticity if it is
suspected and is robust in its presence. The LM threshold test tells if the null hypothesis
of no threshold can be rejected, but it does not tell which variable is the threshold.
Hansen (2000) suggests computing p values using a bootstrap by fixing all the regressors
individually and generating a bootstrap dependent variable from the normally distributed
OLS residuals. After 1000 replications, a low p-value suggests a significant threshold
variable, and a high one, an insignificant variable. It is performed by regressing the
squared residuals against all the independent variables. The null hypothesis of no
heteroskedasticity y, = 72 = 0 and the LM statistic converges to a chi-square. If the
threshold is known the standard F-test could be used, otherwise the bootstrap procedure
should be used.
In order to allow for consumer sentiment to react differently to the stock market
depending on the level of returns, the relationship between the variables is modeled using
the following threshold specification, which draws heavily on Hansen's (2002) model:
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A in MCSI, = /3o + fl A in Stock, + P21 A in Stock,.q + P31 A in MCSI,. 1 + Et for q, < y (2)
A in MCSI,= /3o2 +,/12 A In Stock, +,/22 A In Stock,.q +,/32 A in MCSIt 1 + Et for q,> y (3)
The threshold variable q, is an endogenous variable that will be determined on the
basis of A In Stock,. Therefore, it is deducted from the data. According to this model, if
the return on the stock market index increases above a certain level y, the relationship
between sentiment and the stock market is described by the coefficients in equation (3).
For example, the coefficient /i describes the contemporaneous relationship between
sentiment and stock returns when returns are below the threshold level, y, whereas the
coefficient 812 is relevant when returns are above y. The model in (2) and (3) can be
written more compactly in one equation as follows:
A in MCSI, = o + I_1 A In Stock, + & A in Stockt.1 +, f_ A in MCSI,.1 + Et (4)
Where:
Po = Pot I (q,) + P02 (1 - I (q,))
fL= /311 I (q,) + /12 (1 - I (q,))
2 = P 211 (q,) + /3 22 (1 -1 (q,))
= /3311 (qt) + /332(1-I (q,)) (5)
The indicator function is I(q,) = 1 when the threshold variable q, < y and is equal
to zero otherwise. Equation (4) can be thought of as a restricted version of Equation (1).
Since it is not known a priori whether the threshold model is a good description of the
data, it is possible to test the hypothesis that sentiment reacts differently to the stock
market during unusual periods by testing whether the unrestricted model in (4) is
significantly better than the linear model (1) using the Likelihood Ratio statistic
developed in Hansen (1996). Note: One major difference between this model and the one
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in the previous chapter is that here the threshold (or turmoil) value of market returns is
determined by the data whereas it is set a priori in the analysis for Chapter III. Therefore,
while the hypothesis here is that when market returns reach a certain level, consumer
sentiment/mood will be affected more than at other times, it is not assumed to be known
beforehand but instead, the data reflects this information. This feature of the model is an
important characteristic and is part of the motivation for this analysis.
To estimate the model, it is necessary to find the optimal value for the threshold
variable q, along with estimating the rest of the parameters in the model. The distribution
theory relevant for constructing confidence intervals for the threshold parameter and
testing the validity of the threshold specification versus the linear model are all developed
in Hansen (1996, 1999, and 2000). The basic steps are:
1) Estimate equation (2) and compute the residual sum of squares (RSS) for
various levels of q, ranging from YL to YH. Following Hansen (2000), the lower
and upper bounds for q,, YL and YH, are set such that the highest and lowest 15% of
the observations are excluded from the search space for the threshold variable.
The threshold estimate is the one that minimizes the sequence of RSS.
2) Compute the following likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the
coefficients are the same in the restricted and unrestricted models using the
following likelihood ratio:
LRo=(So - S1)/ 6 2 (6)
Here So and S1 are the RSS under the following Ho and H1 respectively:
Ho. /ol = /302; /11 = P12 ; /21 = /22 ; /31 = /332 and 62is the residual variance
under H1 .
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3) Since the distribution of this LR statistic is non-standard, it is necessary to
bootstrap 3 the critical values as described in Hansen (1999).
4) Assuming the hypothesis Ho can be rejected, supporting the existence of a
threshold effect, the best estimate of qt is chosen as the value that minimizes the
LR computed as a function of the threshold value.
Sample & Data
Unfortunately, the Canadian data is not as extensive as the US equivalents.
However, the indices show a 53% correlation with the quarterly data from 1978 to the
present and a 42% correlation with the monthly data since 2001. The Decima-Investor's
Group gives an 88% correlation with the 14 data points that overlap with the quarterly
University of Michigan's data. Again, meaningful considerations cannot be made with
this few data points. In as much as quarterly data may lose its explanatory potential since
it will not capture the spontaneous responses, the study focuses on monthly data in both
the US and Canadian cases. The Appendix to this chapter shows summary statistics for
the percentage change in monthly consumer sentiment and the return of the market.
These variables under investigation follow a stochastic process where all the
values are drawn from a discrete set. A Markov chain hypothesizes that information
from the distant past is irrelevant given knowledge of the recent past. In a first-order
Markov process only the most recent draw affects the distribution of the next one; all
such processes can be represented by a Markov transition density matrix. A special
3In statistics, bootstrapping is a method for estimating the sampling distribution of an estimator by
resampling with replacement from the original sample.
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complex statistical case of Markov switching models useful as a parsimonious strategy
for nonparametric function estimation is a threshold model. Bruce Hansen generously
provided his Gauss Procedures to estimate and test this threshold model.
Empirical Applications
Part I. US data
The analysis began by estimating a simple Ordinary Least Squares regression
(OLS) of the relationship in equation (1) in order to establish benchmark results
comparable to the previous literature. Using monthly data on the Michigan index of
Consumer sentiment and the Dow Jones Industrials Average for the period January 1978
to December 2004, the following equation is estimated:
A In MCSI, = -0.351 + 0.193 A In Stock,+ 0.284 A In Stock,.1 - 0.065 A In MCSIt.I (7)
(0.25) (0.054)* (0.049)* (0.063)
R2 = 0.1099; S.E = 4.35
In the presence of heteroskedasticity, correlation coefficients are biased so
heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. The coefficients
on the stock index variables are both highly significant (at a 1% level of significance)
indicating a strong positive relationship between consumer sentiment and stock returns. A
positive correlation is consistent with the assumption of Prospect Theory that positive
changes in wealth improve investors' mood or sentiment. Although the equations are
estimated over different sample periods and use a different variable for the stock index,
the coefficient estimates shown above are very close to those found in Otto (1999). This
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suggests that the relationship between the stock market and consumer sentiment has been
relatively stable and is not highly dependent on the choice of data used for estimation.
In order to test for the existence of a threshold effect, it is necessary to test the
null hypothesis that the coefficients in equations (2) and (3) are equal. That is the
following hypothesis was tested:
Ho:,ol =/802; /11 =1812; /21 = 822; /31 =832
Since the threshold level y is not identified under the null hypothesis, standard
tests are not applicable. Hansen (1996) suggests using the likelihood ratio statistic in
equation (6) which has a nonstandard asymptotic distribution. Hansen (2000) develops
asymptotic methods to construct confidence intervals for the least squares estimate of the
threshold parameter. Hansen (1996) shows that the bootstrap p-values are asymptotically
valid when the number of replications in the bootstrap procedure is large. The basic steps
for computing the bootstrap p-values shown in Table I are as follows:
" Estimate the model under the null hypothesis (equation 1) with least squares and
obtain the residuals (E) and sum of squared residuals. Given the estimated threshold
parameter (obtained by minimizing the RSS over a range of threshold values),
compute the LR statistic in equation (6).
" Randomly selecting from the distribution N(0, - ), and fixing the regressors in
equation (1), create a bootstrap sample of size n for the dependent variable using
equation (1). Using this bootstrap sample, estimate the model under the null (equation
1) and the alternative (equation 4) and calculate the bootstrap values of LR (equation
6).
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* Repeat this procedure 1000 times and calculate the percentage of draws where the
simulated LR exceeds its actual value (found in step 1). This is the asymptotic p-
value for LR under the null of no threshold. The null of no threshold is rejected if this
value is smaller than the desired critical value.
Table 1: Estimation Results of the Threshold Effect on Monthly US Data
Threshold Variable Stock Index Lagged Stock Index
Threshold Estimate -0.44671055 1.0938499
Lagrange-Multiplier
Test of No Threshold 6.845881* 17.919628*
Bootstrap P-Value 0.694 0.003*
As can be been seen in Table 4-1, the null hypothesis of no threshold can be
rejected at the 1% significance level when the threshold variable is the lagged stock
market index return but the bootstrap p-value is not significant for the threshold variable
stock market index return. This means that when the previous month's stock market
returns reach a certain threshold value, consumer sentiment reacts differently to the stock
market variables. Table 4-2 shows the full estimation results from the threshold model.
The threshold value, y, is estimated to be 1.09. The 95% confidence interval is
[0.888128, 1.858924]. The confidence region shows that the threshold estimate is not
significantly different from a large of other potential threshold levels, which implies that
the threshold value is estimated with reasonable certainty. The confidence region is
obtained by finding the set of values of y for which the likelihood ratio lies below the
asymptotic critical values for LR(y) that are Tabulated in Hansen (2000).
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Table 2: Full Estimation Results of the Threshold Effect in Both Regimes on Monthly US Data
Threshold Variable PCSTOCKL
Threshold Estimate 1.0938499
95% Confidence Interval: [0.888128, 1.858924]
Sum of Squared Errors 5895.3520
Residual Variance 18.775006
Joint R-Squared 0.15945333
Heteroskedasticity Test (p-value) 0.94636834
Parameter Estimates for Regime 1: PCSTOCKL < 1.093849
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Constant -0.75142500 0.43418522
PCSTOCK 0.18085839 0.065785365*
PCSTOCKL 0.29371237 0.081114404*
PCCSENTL -0.19481092 0.079617479*
Number of Observations 165
Degrees of Freedom 161
Sum of Squared Errors 3110.476
Residual Variance 19.31973
R-Squared 0.114653
Parameter Estimates for Regime 2: PCSTOCKL > 1.093849
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Constant 1.5939085 0.59570868
PCSTOCK 0.22074039 0.086336756*
PCSTOCKL -0.10431936 0.13014208
PCCSENTL 0.13184444 0.076979080
Number of Observations 157
Degrees of Freedom 153
Sum of Squared Errors 2784.876
Residual Variance 18.20183
R-Squared 0.050807
Notes:
PCSTOCK is defined as A In Stock,
PCSTOCKL is defined as A In Stock,,
PCCSENTL is defined as A In MCSI,.
* and ** denote 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively
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Figure 1
Figure 1 shows a graph of the LR statistic as a function of the threshold variable,
y, the lagged stock market index. The least squares estimate of y is 1.09, the value that
minimizes the graph4. While the asymptotic distribution is non-normal, it is free from
nuisance parameters and it is closed form so p-values can be generated as in Hanson
(2000). The broken line plots the 95% critical value of 7.35, which is obtained from
Table 2 of Hansen (2000). The graph shows that the LR crosses the dotted line at the
values 0.88 and 1.86, which gives us the asymptotic 95% confidence interval of the
estimated value of y. As can be seen in the graph, the interval is relatively tight by
comparison with those obtained in the growth equation application that is discussed in
4Hansen (2000) notes that one may equivalently plot the residual sum of squared errors S(y ) against y. In
that case, the dotted line is drawn at S (y) + c Q 2, where c is 7.35 for the 95% interval.
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Hansen (2000). According to this estimate, when stock market returns reach a level of
1.09% per month, the relationship between consumer sentiment and stock market returns
changes from regime 1 to regime 2 where the coefficient on the contemporaneous
correlation between sentiment and returns (PCSTOCK) changes from 0.18 to 0.22.
Given that over our sample period, the mean and median monthly change in the stock
market index are 0.81% and 0.94%, respectively, these results are consistent with the idea
that individuals sentiment or feelings about the state of the economy are affected by the
stock market during times when stock market returns are higher than averages. Consistent
with the result that the linear model was rejected in favor of the threshold specification, it
can be seen that the threshold model joint R-squared of 16% (Table 4-2) is higher than
that found for equation 1 (11%). Note that the coefficient estimates for regime 1 (low-
volatility regime) are very similar to those obtained from the linear model with the
exception of the lagged sentiment variable, which became significant in the threshold
model. It is interesting that in regime 2, when the stock market return is above its
threshold value (high volatility); the only variable that remains significant is the current
stock market returns variable (which is also why the R-squared is low in regime 2, 5%).
The fact that the recent history of the sentiment index variable, as captured by the lagged
sentiment variable, A In MCSIt,, loses its predictive power in regime 2 indicates that
other variables that are not reflected in our equation become more important to current
sentiment during times of unusually high changes in stock market returns. Developing a
5Note that in our sample period monthly market returns are highly variable with a standard deviation of
4.47. The result that the threshold variable is not much higher than the average monthly return suggests
that consumers discount outlier values.
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model that incorporates additional explanatory variables is an interesting subject for
future research as will be discussed in the next section.
Given that, the dependent variable in equation (7) is highly variable and to
improve the fit of the model, the study attempted to capture more dynamics in the data by
including an additional lag of the stock variables in the equation6 . The full threshold
model results for this extension are shown in Table 4-3.
As can be seen in Table 4-3, the results from this estimation are virtually the same
as those obtained in Table 4-2, with a slightly better fit due to the additional explanatory
power of the stock market variable in t-2. The joint r-squared increased from 16 to 18%
but the threshold level of 1.09 and the associated 95% confidence level of [0.88, 1.8]
remain unchanged. In empirical work, it is rare to get a much higher fit as measured by r-
squared. This indicates that the results are not very sensitive to the number of lags that
are included in the model. Again here the coefficient on the current stock variable is
positive and significant in both regimes but is higher in regime 2 (0.18 in regime 1 and
0.23 in regime 2). Note however, that the other coefficients in this case behave slightly
differently when the two regimes are compared. Specifically, the twice-lagged stock
variable and the lagged sentiment variable remain significant at the 5% level in regime 2.
This may indicate that the additional lags have captured some of the omitted variables
effect that was exhibited in Table 4-2. Potential future research to deal with these and
other modeling issues are discussed in later sections.
6A version of the model with additional lags of the dependent variable was also estimated but these were
not found to be significant.
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Table 3: Full Estimation Results of the Threshold Effect in Both Regimes with a second lag of the Stock
Index
Threshold Variable PCSTOCKL
Threshold Estimate 1.0938499
95% Confidence Interval: [0.888128, 1.858924]
Sum of Squared Errors 5702.0957
Residual Variance 18.334713
Joint R-Squared 0.18160977
Heteroskedasticity Test (p-value) 0.70895534
Parameter Estimates for Regime 1: PCSTOCKL < 1.093849
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Constant -1.0486017 0.45850716
PCSTOCK 0.17922154 0.066506694*
PCSTOCKL 0.25476950 0.078477151*
PCSTOCKL2 0.19521815 0.11402066
PCCSENTL -0.23606049 0.074950741*
Number of Observations 164
Degrees of Freedom 159
Sum of Squared Errors 2972.6833
Residual Variance 18.696121
R-Squared 0.14648825
Parameter Estimates for Regime 2: PCSTOCKL > 1.093849
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Constant 1.3854162 0.59863352
PCSTOCK 0.23784354 0.085009188*
PCSTOCKL -0.069031825 0.13074396
PCSTOCKL2 0.13912996 0.063026296**
PCCSENTL 0.09326651 0.077100459**
Number of Observations 157
Degrees of Freedom 152
Sum of Squared Errors 2729.4124
Residual Variance 17.95660
R-Squared 0.069711405
Notes:
PCSTOCK is defined as A In Stock,
PCSTOCKL is defined as A In Stock,
PCSTOCKL2 is defined as A ln Stock,-2
PCCSENTL is defined as A In MCSI,,
* and ** denote 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively
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Part II: Canadian data-monthly
Similar to the U.S. data, the analysis began by estimating a simple Ordinary Least
Squares regression (OLS) of the relationship between sentiment and returns. Using
monthly data on the Canadian Consumer Sentiment Index (CCI) and the Toronto Stock
Exchange index (TSX) for the period from September 2001 to December 2004, the
following equation is estimated:
A In CCI = 0.184 + 0.081 A In TSX + 0.078 A InTSX t.1 (8)
(0.399) (0.100) (0.096)
R2 = 0.035; S.E = 2.78
Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are shown in parentheses. The
insignificant coefficient estimates and low R-squared in equation (8) suggest that there is
no relationship between the stock market index and sentiment in Canada. The linear
model estimated above shows that the stock market does not help predict consumer
sentiment. The possibility that the relationship between sentiment and returns undergoes
regime shifts and thus is not well described by a linear model such as in equation (8) was
considered. Following the methodology outlined in the previous section, the study tested
for the existence of a threshold using the stock market variable and its lagged value as
potential threshold variables. The results are shown in Table 4-4:
Table 4: Estimation Results of the Threshold Effect on Monthly Canadian Data
Threshold Variable Stock Index (TSX) Lagged Stock Index (TSX)
Threshold Estimate -0.0953 -0.60547
Lagrange-Multiplier
Test of No Threshold 8.069442 9.597595
Bootstrap P-Value 0.099 0.024
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Table 4-4 shows that the null hypothesis of no threshold when the threshold
variable is the lagged stock market index return can be rejected at the 5% significance
level. However it can only marginally be rejected at the 10% level bootstrap for the
threshold variable stock market index return. This result, which is similar to what was
found for the U.S. data, implies that the relationship between sentiment and returns is not
linear and that it changes depending on the level of stock market returns. Table 4-5
shows the full estimation results from the threshold model.
The threshold value, y, is estimated to be -0.605 % with a 95% confidence
interval of: [-0.60546, -0.09530.] The confidence region shows slightly more uncertainty
about the value of the threshold as compared to the results obtained for the US monthly
data.
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Table 5: Full Estimation Results of the Threshold Effect in Both Regimes on Canadian Monthly Data
Threshold Variable PCSTOCKL
Threshold Estimate 
-0.60546921
95% Confidence Interval: [-0.60546, -0.09530]
Sum of Squared Errors 261.87109
Residual Variance 6.5467772
Joint R-Squared 0.24336425
Heteroskedasticity Test (p-value) 0.22727185
Parameter Estimates for Regime 1: PCSTOCKL < -0.60546
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Constant -1.7013226 0.92753969
PCSTOCK 0.41081134 0.13252473**
PCSTOCKL -0.24355180 0.15575428
Number of Observations 17
Degrees of Freedom 14
Sum of Squared Errors 123.89396
Residual Variance 8.8495685
R-Squared 0.25532786
Parameter Estimates for Regime 2: PCSTOCKL > -0.60546
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Constant 1.3360669 0.52218041**
PCSTOCK -0.11905985 0.084838141
PCSTOCKL -0.15580132 0.18382528
Number of Observations 29
Degrees of Freedom 26
Sum of Squared Errors 137.97713
Residual Variance 5.3068126
R-Squared 0.063350834
Notes:
PCSTOCK is defined as A In TSXt,
PCSTOCKL is defined as A In TSXt,,
PCCSENTL is defined as A In CCI,
* and ** denote 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively
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Figure 2 shows a graph of the LR statistic as a function of the threshold variable,
y, the lagged stock market index. It can be seen from the graph that the estimated
threshold value occurs at the lower bound of the 95% confidence region (the region
where the LR is below the dotted line). Comparing the coefficients from the two
regimes, it can be seen that the stock market variable is positive and highly significant in
regime 1, when then the lagged stock market index is below its threshold value of -
0.60%, a value greater than the mean value of -0.01% (see Appendix A). A positive and
significant coefficient on the stock market variable is consistent with the assumption of
Prospect Theory that higher returns are associated with better consumer sentiment. The
predictive power of the stock market variable is also reflected in the dramatically higher
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r-squared in Regime 1 and in the joint r-squared for the overall threshold model, (r-
squared is 24% as compared to 0.034% for the linear model). The results in this section
highlight the importance of modeling the relationship between sentiment and returns in a
regime-shifting framework since our conclusions regarding the results would be
completely reversed had the study relied solely on the linear (OLS) model.
Part III: Canadian data-Quarterly
In order to examine the relationship between sentiment and returns in Canada
over a longer time span, our model is estimated using quarterly data on the CCI and the
TSX that covers the period from the first quarter in 1978 to the fourth quarter of 2004.
The OLS estimates are as follows:
A In CCI, = -0.79 +0.16 A In TSX+ 0.27 A InTSX, 1 - 0.19 A InCCI,-1 (9)
(0.579) (0.063)* (0.072)* (0.100)**
R2= 0.179; S.E = 6.16
Equation (9) shows that the coefficients on the stock market variable are positive
and significant consistent with the assumption from Prospect Theory that better returns
are associated with improved investor mood. The model has relatively good fit with an r-
squared of approximately 18%7. Another version of equation (9) with the DJIA as the
stock market variable instead of S&P/TSX is estimated to see this improves the fit of the
model. The estimated OLS equations are:
7Although the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is only significant at the 10% level, we found
the r-squared drops to 15% if we remove this variable from the set of regressors.
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A In CCI = -0.107 + 0.082 A In DJIA,+ 0.404 A InDJIA ,- -0.126 A lnCCI t. (10)
(0.583) (0.086) (0.087)* (0.096)
R2 = 0.201; S.E = 6.12
Interestingly, the fit of the linear model improves slightly when the US stock
market is used as the regressor as in equation (10). In this case, the contemporaneous
relationship between sentiment and the DJIA returns is not significant but the coefficient
on the lagged stock market index is positive and significant, consistent with expectations.
In addition, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is negative and highly
significant indicating that the model is capturing autoregressive behavior in the data.
Given these encouraging results, the LR test is performed to see if the relationship
between sentiment and returns undergoes regime shifts. Table 4-6 shows the LR statistic
and the corresponding p-values for the various potential threshold variables.
Table 6: Estimation Results of the Threshold Effect on Quarterly Canadian Data
Threshold Variable Stock Index (TSX) Lagged TSX DJIA Lagged DJIA
Threshold Estimate 5.81017 -0.51457 -2.22486 -2.5347
Lagrange-Multiplier Test
of No Threshold 8.147961 9.017356 7.639175 7.008075
Bootstrap P-Value 0.405 0.305 0.515 0.581
The results show that the null hypothesis of no threshold cannot be rejected for
both equations (9) and (10), indicating that the relationship between sentiment and
returns does not depend on the level of stock market returns. This result is inconsistent
with our findings for the monthly Canadian data from 2001 to 2004 and with those from
the US data. A closer look at the full estimation results from the threshold model is
useful for exploring why it was rejected in favor of the linear model. Interestingly, the fit
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of the threshold model is usually better than the linear model. By looking at 95%
confidence regions, it is apparent that the model cannot find an estimate of a threshold
value with any degree of reasonable certainty. This can be seen in the extremely wide
range for the confidence levels, and may partially explain why this specification is
rejected in favor of the linear model. The only exception to this is seen in the instance
where the threshold variable is the current value of the DJIA return. In that case, the
threshold estimate is 8.9% and occurs at the lower bound of the 95% level. Consistent
with our previous results, the coefficients on the stock market variable increase in
significance when the DJIA return is above the threshold value (regime 2).
The results presented in this section suggest that the stock market is an important
determinant of consumer sentiment and that their relationship varies depending on the
level of stock market returns. The implications here are that investors' propensity to
buy/sell changes during times when stock market returns are above average, consistent
with the assumptions of Prospect Theory. The assumption here is that the investor's
propensity to buy/sell is represented by consumer sentiment. The model used in this
section is based on a simple equation relating sentiment to returns.
These results are consistent with the results from Chapter III and again may be a
result of the possible negative correlation between the S&P/TSX and the DJIA because of
the heavy inclusion of resource based companies. Additional potential explanations for
these results is of course, the fact the true model is one where the relationship between
consumer sentiment and stock returns in Canada does not undergo regime shifts.
It is significant that the results from the US case show a definite threshold effect
whereas the equivalent Canadian variables do not. This supports the findings from
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Chapter III that given its defensive nature the TSE 300 alone cannot be utilized as a good
representative of a market index. Consequently alternative factors will have to be
considered in the Canadian case in case the model is mis-specified, if not the US market
data from the DJIA, S&P500, possibly other economic variables like bankruptcy
numbers, automobile purchases or employment data.
Limitations and Robustness of this Methodology
The benefit of this (general) threshold model, one which relates a dependent
variable, y to a set of independent variables, x's which allows the intercept and slopes of
the relationship between the y and x to vary with the level of one of the x's, is its ability to
parsimoniously develop asymptotic confidence intervals for the parameters of a model.
This methodology also lends itself to the use of data in identifying regime changes or in
the terminology of this study, "turmoil" versus "non-turmoil" periods. Unfortunately,
there are some concerns with this methodology. Some limitations are that it is only
possible to have one threshold variable at a time and that the model does not allow for
endogenous threshold variables. Additionally this particular formulation of the model
does not allow for endogenous regressors. While another paper by Hansen does allow for
an endogenous regressor it cannot also be the threshold variable and would not have been
viable for the purposes of this study.
Potential steps in Empirical Analysis
This section describes the steps necessary to improve the model and address the
relevant econometric issues. Equation (4) assumes that the stock market return is
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exogenous with respect to sentiment. Since sentiment can also affect stock market
returns, it is necessary to consider a model that allows for the potential endogeneity of the
stock market variables. If the two variables are cointegrated as described previously, then
the ECM considers this. If the cointegration model does not apply, then the variables
need to be modeled in a simultaneous equations framework.
Evaluating the Economic Significance of Sentiment as a determinant of trading behavior
- an extension
In applied research, Granger causality (1969) is a well-known concept. The
meaning of causality in the Granger sense is based on the idea that the past cannot be
caused by the present or future. Hence, if an event takes place before another event,
causality can only come about from the first event to the second one. Granger formulated
a test statistic to test whether movements in one variable systematically precede
movements in another variable. In a regression framework, this means running a
regression of one variable on the past values of itself and the past values of any
potentially causal variable, and testing the significance of coefficient estimates associated
with the potentially causal variable. A uni-variate auto-regression model is a single
equation, single-variable linear one where the lagged variables are used to predict the
current value of a variable. Sims (1980) formulated a system of n equations and n
variables as an extension of the uni-variate case where each variable could be explained
by the lags of its own variable and the lags of the other n-1 variables. This model was
defined as vector auto-regressions (VAR). VAR performs vector auto regressions, which
are a set of unrestricted "reduced form" linear regressions with lags of the dependent
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variables on the right hand side. Sims et al. (1990)8 showed that the asymptotic
distribution theory could not be used to test for causality if the variables in the VAR
model are integrated.
To remedy this, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) introduced a modified Wald test
statistic that asymptotically has a chi- square distribution irrespective of the order of
integration or co-integration properties of the variables in the model. This test is based on
adding additional unrestricted lags. An extension of the dissertation can use a Granger
causality procedure as well as the Toda and Yamamoto modification to investigate the
relationship between returns, sentiment, as well as several other measures of financial
development and economic growth. The advantage of this approach is to provide a
model of descriptive capabilities that lead to structural inferences by determining cause
and effect in trading activities and enhanced policy analysis.
Conclusions
Chapters III and IV share a common theme and show decisively that trader
behavior depends on whether the market is in a period of turmoil/crisis or whether it is in
a relatively stable period. The fact that a definite difference is exhibited shows support
for the Prospect Theory hypothesis that during periods of extreme wealth altering
conditions (losses), the behavior of market participants is different.
8Reference given in Toda, Hiro Y and Peter C. B. Phillips, (1993) "Vector Autoregressions and Causality,"
Econometrica Volume: 61, Issue: 6.
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Chapter V - IS THERE EVIDENCE OF CONTAGION?
Introduction
The process of globalization has reinforced the various linkages among open
economies, thereby making these interdependent. To this extent, observations of
economic disturbances across regions are inevitable. The pertinent question however is
whether the strength of the transmission mechanism remains stable over time. Empirical
tests on the question of contagion in the returns of financial markets have focused on the
changes in the correlations of the affected markets between the 'crisis' versus 'non-crisis'
or tranquil periods. Arbitrary, impulsive (or irrational) trading following a disastrous
event can prove costly. Consequently, investigations into these "knee jerk" reactions can
prove economically beneficial.
In a series of innovating papers, Forbes and Rigobon (2001, 2002) (FR
hereafter) suggest that looking at unadjusted correlation coefficients is not appropriate.
The calculated correlation coefficient is an increasing function of the variance of the
underlying asset return, so that when coefficients between a tranquil period and a crisis
period are compared, the coefficient in the crisis period is biased upwards as volatility
rises and must be adjusted before conclusions can be made on the existence of contagion.
Studies that measure systematic risk during high volatility regimes are based on
the computation of cross-country correlations that exist beyond any fundamental links
between countries and common shocks. In their interpretation of the evidence, many
authors have argued that excess co-movement of stock returns may be explained by the
price impact of correlated investor demand, or common liquidity shocks (e.g. Pindyck
and Rotemberg, 1993; Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991; Froot and Dabora, 1998)
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Through this type of analysis, it is possible to infer whether sizeable losses occur.
The broad definition of contagion defines it as the cross-country or cross-market
transmission of shocks or any general cross-country/market spillover effect - whether
real, financial, or from exogenous sunspots. Contagion can therefore take place both
during the tranquil and crisis periods; accordingly, contagion does not need to be related
to crises.
However, studies on contagion have tended to emphasize crisis periods. FR
(2002) point out that the exercise of measuring the correlation coefficients over different
time periods may introduce bias into the measured correlation coefficients due to
heteroskedasticity in asset returns. The asset return variance of the crisis period is higher
than that of the stable period. They assert that once the data is adjusted for
heteroskedasticity, there is no longer any statistically significant evidence of contagion,
only interdependence or spillover effects. It is noteworthy that an increase in correlation
is not necessarily caused by contagion but may be a result of higher volatility of returns
since correlation depends on the volatility of returns during a market in crisis. Contagion
exists if a shift in cross-market correlation occurs even after even the volatility effects on
return correlation are controlled.
FR uses the definition of contagion as the significant excess conditional
correlation among the asset returns of different countries above what could be explained
by economic fundamentals (systematic risks). They define a slightly more restrictive
definition of contagion, interdependence as the transmission of shocks to other countries
or, more generally, significant cross-country correlations that exist beyond any
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fundamental links between countries and beyond common shocks., This definition is
usually referred to as excessive co-movement, and is commonly explained by herding
behavior leading to sunspots. 2 Sunspot equilibrium is a stochastic balance uncorrelated
with economic fundamentals. 3 FR asserted that once the data is adjusted for
heteroskedasticity, there is no longer any statistically significant evidence of contagion,
only interdependence or spillover effects. Theirs is a test on the parameters. It is
noteworthy that an increase in correlation is not necessarily caused by contagion but may
be a result of higher volatility of returns since correlation depends on the volatility of
returns during a market in crisis.
The aim in this chapter is to determine whether investor trading behavior is
influenced by market conditions in an individual country, in other words is there evidence
of contagion or interdependence in stock market co-movements. While there have been
numerous studies on the contagious natures of currency crises, the 1987 US stock market
crash and the 9/11 disaster, there has not been too much interest in the massive fraud case
perpetrated by the principals at Bre-X Minerals. The incidence of the fraud has been a
cause of embarrassment for the venerable Toronto Stock Exchange and has led to
'Forbes, K. & R. Rigobon (1999b), 'Measuring Contagion: Conceptual and Empirical Issues', Proceedings
of the World Bank Conference on International Financial Contagion, Washington D.C., Feb 3-4, 2001.
2Devenow, A., Welch, I., Rational herding in financial economics, European Economic Review 40 (1996)
603-615.
3Pericoli, Marcello & Sbracia, Massimo (2003), A Primer on Financial Contagion, Journal of Economic
Surveys 17 (4), 571-608.
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numerous changes in the reporting standards of mining companies on the Exchange.4 In
this chapter, this incident was used as an example to investigate the possible existence of
contagion on the returns of the G9 countries and Indonesia. Since the demise of the
USSR, Russia has been included in the group of G7 countries and they are collectively
known as the G8. 5 Analysis on the G9 countries includes Australia. Indonesia is
included in the analysis since the event was geographically focused there. China is
excluded because its markets have not been as open as the other industrialized countries
especially during the period under consideration.
Research Hypothesis and Methodology
The null hypothesis is: no contagion, only interdependence in the market returns
of the countries under investigation. The following steps were undertaken.
1) For the G9 and Indonesia, daily returns denominated in US currency were
retrieved on the major stock market indices, and short-term (overnight) interest
rates. For daily data, FR use two-day average returns to iron out time-differences
between the various countries. This study used a lagged return for Australia,
Indonesia, Japan and Russia to account for the time-differences.
2) The methodology required defining an event that could be tracked for the
contagion question. This event is defined by the data. The variance of returns
before and after this event was reviewed to see if it fulfilled the definition of a
4Speech presented at the Traders Association Annual Meeting by Barbara Stymiest CEO, TSX Group in
Boca Raton, Florida October 8, 2004.
http://www.tsx.com/en/tradingServices/docs/7704STAAnnualMeetingOct8-04_StymiestSpeech.pdf.
5http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/whatis-g8.html.
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"crisis". The literature considers returns greater than two standard deviations
from the mean as being unusually variable.
3) Following FR, this study began by defining the turmoil period as the 3 months
after the event, from March 24, 1997 to June 25 1997, and the stable period as the
7 months before the event, July 9, 1996 to March 23, 19976. The full period is the
sum of the turmoil and stable periods. To test for contagion, correlation
coefficients from the turmoil and full period are compared using a t-statistic. FR
implies that their results are robust to the choice of turmoil/stable periods.
According to Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001), FR's results regarding contagion
from the US 1987 crash, vary based on the number of observations in the turmoil
period. Consequently, results are shown for 3 months, 6 months, and 9 months
after the event. Experimentation with this window was done to check for
robustness in the results. The analysis included a comparison of the correlation
coefficients from the pre-event and post event periods. This differed from the FR
study where the non-crisis period correlation coefficient was obtained from the
full sample.
4) The next step calculated the heteroskedastcity-corrected (or unconditional)
correlation coefficient (p in Equation 11 in FR). Rather than calculate the
correlation coefficient on the stock index returns data directly, FR start by
6Excess stock market returns from the crisis country during the turmoil period are represented by residuals
from the estimated VAR models. Since our data sample starts in July 2, 1996 and the VAR analysis
requires using the first 5 observations for lags, the observations used to compute the correlations start in
July 9, 1996. Lags are used to adjust for serial correlation in stock market returns and external shocks.
7This follows a study by Hon, Srauss, and Yong in the Journal of Financial Research (vol 27(1), pp 95-
114), Spring 2004) which tests for contagion in financial markets after September 11 by comparing
correlation coefficients from the pre-event and post-event periods.
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filtering their stock market returns data by estimating a (bi-variate) Vector
Autoregression (VAR) of the stock returns conditional on the following variables:
a) short-term interest rate of crisis country (in this case Canada),
b) short term interest rate for the US, and
c) short-term interest rate for the other country being investigated for
contagion.
The US Interest rate is included to control for economic shocks (fundamental
factors) and/or monetary policy co-ordination. The study begins by looking at
pairs of countries; one of the pair is the country where the initial event occurred,
for example Canada and Italy. In this case, for simplicity only, the VAR with 2
lags is given (Y's stock returns and R's are LIBOR 1 month interest rates of the
relevant countries undergoing analysis):
YCan t = a +#P1YCan t-I +P2 YCan t-2+/3 Yitaiy t-i +/P4 YItay t-2+ P5 RCan t-i +,#6 RCan t-2+
P5 Rus t-i + P6 Rus t-2 +,/7 Ritaiy t-1 +,/s Ritaiy t-2 + EIt (1)
Yltaly t = a +#i YCan t-i +/P2 YCan t-2+/3 Yitaiy t-i + p4 YItaly t-2+ P5 RCan t-i +)6 RCan t-2+
P5 Rus t-I + 6 Rus t-2 + P7 Ritaly t-i + P8 Ritaiy t-2 + E2t (2)
This methodology simulates FR and the equations above closely resemble FR's
Equations 12, 13, 14.8 Following FR, the analysis begins with five lags to account
for within week variations. After estimating this VAR system for the full period
8FR Equations 12: X,= y(L) X, +<D(L) X,+ l, , FR Equation 13: X, = { x,c, x}, FR Equation 14: 1, {f4c,
i,us, i,J} where xc is the stock market return in the crisis country; x,' is the stock market return in another
market j; X, is a transposed vector of returns in the same two stock markets; y(L) and (D(L) are vectors of
lags; i,C, tus. i t' are short-term interest rates for the crisis country, the United States and country j,
respectively; and il, is a vector of reduced-form disturbances.
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(stable plus turmoil periods), the E's are the filtered data to which the correlation
formula will be applied (equation 11 in FR paper)9.
The covariance matrix of the estimated VAR gives the necessary ingredients for the
formulas. These are the covariance of El and E2 in the various sub-periods and their
individual variances. In this case, the variance of el is the variance of the 'crisis'
country return, which is needed to calculate 6 in equation 10 of FR that is the relative
increase in the variance of the crisis country from the stable to the turmoil period.
The uncorrected or conditional correlation coefficient, p* in equation 11, is given by
the usual correlation coefficient formula (p* = QEIE2/Ou1 oE2) but applied to the residuals
from the VAR, El and E2.
5) Given the estimates of p (the corrected correlation coefficient) for the sub-periods:
turmoil and full, FR test the following null hypothesis of no contagion, only
interdependence:
Ho: p turmoil 5 p fun
Hl: p turmoil > p full
The critical value for the one-sided t-test for differences in means at the 5%
significance level is 1.65. Therefore if the t-statistic > 1.65, then Ho is rejected
indicating 'Contagion'.
6) For the case of Canada as the country where the event originated, steps 4 and 5
were repeated for the other pairs of countries (Can/US, Can/Germany,
9FR Equations 10: 6 = (oa' / QaX ) - 1, this parameter represents the relationship between variances of
excess stock market returns from the crisis country during the turmoil period, and during the stable;
Equation 11: p = p * / {1 + 6[1 - (p*)2 ] )'12 , this is the correlation coefficient between the crisis and the
non-crisis market observed during the crisis period.
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Can/France, Can/Japan, Can/Britain, Can/Australia, Can/Russia, and
Can/Indonesia).
The crisis investigated is not a big one, especially compared to some of the
others mentioned in the literature. Therefore, it may be argued that the effects are
contained to the industry under question. In as much as the event under consideration
occurred in the gold mining industry, this methodology is repeated first to determine the
effect of the Canadian total market on the mining returns across the regional indices and
secondly the effect of the Canadian Gold Mining Index on the mining returns around the
world.
Sample & Data
The methodology required defining a notable crisis that originated in Canada
and may have caused similar market volatility elsewhere. The 1997 finding that the
Busang gold discovery in Indonesia was a massive fraud caused a major sell-off on all
the Canadian exchanges including the Toronto Stock Exchange, Canada's oldest and
most respected.
The relevant important dates pertaining to this event are:
1. Chief geologist 'fell' from a helicopter in the Indonesian jungles, a suicide note
was found on March 19, 1997.
2. Temporary Halt on S&PTSX on Friday Mar 21
3. Halt reported on WSJ on Mon Mar 24. On that day, the company put forth a
news report claiming it still had confidence in the gold find.
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4. Longer halt (overnight) on S&P/TSX on Wed Mar 26 reopened for trading on
the afternoon of Thursday Mar 27.
5. All these reports met with denials from the company until May 3 "when Bre-X
thereafter acknowledged that the numerous public statements it had made
touting the tens of millions of ounces of gold resources at Busang were
completely baseless, the product of outright fraud supported by bogus test-
drilling reports". That conclusion was confirmed in a final report from Bre-X's
independent mining consultant, which became known to the market on May 3,
1997.10
Other reports have implied dissemination of information since March 1, 1997
and confirmation by independent auditors sent to do due diligence work on March 10.11
While most empirical research use the date of most widely dissemination as the date
published by the Wall Street Journal our goal is to determine whether it was a crisis AND
whether it spread. Consequently, 'instantaneous' volatility of returns following the
methodology of Corsetti et al (2001 footnote 4) are computed and graphs are generated
to confirm that excess volatility of returns existed during the period the crisis is
suspected. Following this methodology, an exponentially weighted moving average
(EWMA) of a 1-month or 20 trading days moving average window size with a EWMA
10These dates are referenced in the class action suit brought against the principals of the case:
http://www.brexclass.com/graphics/docs/complaint.pdf.
"E-MJ - Engineering & Mining Journal; 8/1/1998.
1 2Corsetti, G., Pericoli, M. & Sbracia, M. 2001, 'Correlation analysis of financial contagion: What one
should know before running a test', Economic Growth Centre, Yale University, Center Discussion Paper
No. 822.
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smoothing constant, X of 0.96, is graphed and shown in Figure 1 for the eighteen-month
period between July 1, 1996 and December 31, 1997. EWMA is a special case of
Integrated GARCH.13 The X parameter is called the persistence measurement, a smaller
one implies higher reaction of the volatility to the market info in yesterday's return.
Larger window sizes show the volatility more clearly. X = .96, is very persistent but not
highly reactive. These finding were also robust to changes in the volatility model (using
a different constant of the exponentially weighted moving averages, or a GARCH (1,1)
estimate).
In these models, unconditional variance tends to infinity so it is undefined. This
maximum likelihood technique returns the annualized volatility of an asset based on a
sample of historic prices. The graphs are generated using an Excel add-in.' 4 Based on
this methodology and a one-month (20 days moving average), volatility changes from
10.6% on March 21, 1997 to 16.3%. The graph is shown in Figure 1. The volatility
change was not as dramatic after May 2, 1997. These readings can be compared on this
graph with an event well recognized as a crisis throughout the world, which originated in
Hong Kong. This crisis nicknamed the "Asian Flu" culminated on October 27, 1997
when short-term interest rates increased by thirty percent. Here the volatility of October
24 through October 30 changed from 10.6% to 27.8%. While the volatility change was
13The Exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) model uses exponential smoothing to give more
weight to recent closing prices than to older prices. The Standard EWMA estimator is a special case of
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, or a GARCH model (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev,
1986). When a = 0 and fi = 1- a, the GARCH model reduces to the Standard EWMA estimator,
alternatively known as Integrated GARCH or IGARCH. Volatility has been tested for with a GARCH
(1,1) process using Hoadley's excel add-in. The stationary condition for GARCH (1, 1) is a + P < 1.
These graphs used EWMA smoothing constant X= 0.96, a = 0.232 and f= 0.761.
'
4http://www.hoadley.net/options.
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not as dramatic as for the Hong Kong crisis, it was still a significant one and one of the
few crises originating in Canada in recent times.15 The EWMA model is improved for
longer time-periods and the graph is less volatile using a longer moving average window
size. Figure 2 shows the data one year before and after the event with a three-month
moving average. Additionally the chart in Figure 3 is produced which shows the changes
in the index levels over the two years.
Figure 1: Volatility of the S&P/TSE: Event date March 21, 1997
AGSPTSE Moving Average Volatility
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15 http://www.micromedia.ca/Timeline/1990-1999.htm.
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Figure 2: Volatility of the S&P/TSE with 3-Month Moving Average: Event date March
21, 1997
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Figure 3: Price Chart of the S&P/TSX from June 1996 to June 1998
AGSPTSE Price Chart
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Figure 4: Volatility of the S&P500 with 3-Month Moving Average: Event date March 21,
1997
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Figure 5: Price Chart of the S&P500 from July 1996 to December 1997
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Figures 4 and 5 give corresponding volatility charts for the S&P500 Index in the
United States. While the moves are not magnanimous, there is clearly some change in
volatility, approximately 13.3% to 16.3% during the course of the week beginning March
24, 1997. This motivates further investigation into evidence for contagion. Because of
the documented home country bias' 6 domestic buyers and sellers dominate most stock
market activity so the data was first analyzed in each local currency. While this made it
free from exchange rate fluctuations, the data suffered from the lack of a common unit.
Additionally because the main goal is to test contagion in the context of international
diversification, the tests are performed in U.S. currency. The data is collected from each
country's total market index in Thomson Financial International Datastream. In as
much as the incident occurred in the mining arena the analysis is duplicated for
Datastream's collection of gold indices accumulated by region. However, since the
Canadian gold industry is included in the Index for the Americas that comparison is
excluded and replaced by a comparison with the US gold index.
Research has shown that maximum benefits from portfolio diversification occur
from truly global diversification but investors' home country bias predisposes them to
investing in developed markets rather than developing ones, (Lewis 1999 provides a
survey of this literature).' 7 Consequently, the study will focus on the G9 countries.
Indonesia is included in the analysis since the event was geographically focused there.
16See French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) Tesar and Werner (1995) and Karolyi and
Stulz, 2002), for papers that document this phenomenon.
17Karen K. Lewis, (1999), Trying to Explain Home Bias in Equities and Consumption, Journal of
Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(2), pages 571-608.
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China is excluded because its markets have not been as open as the other industrialized
countries especially during the period under consideration.
Empirical Applications
The total country Indices
The initial analysis applies the methodology to evaluate whether the event in
Canada had any impact on each of the remaining nine country indices. Table 1 displays
the indices and the Datastream codes for the data analyzed.
Table 1: Total Country Indices from Datastream
Price Index in US Currency Datastream Code
CANADA-DS MARKET TOTMCN$
S&P500 COMPOSITE DS CALCULATED S&PCOMZ
AUSTRALIA-DS MARKET TOTMAU$
FRANCE-DS MARKET TOTMFR$
GERMANY-DS MARKET TOTMBD$
ITALY-DS MARKET TOTMIT$
JAPAN-DS MARKET TOTMJP$
RUSSIA-DS MARKET TOTMKRS
UK-DS MARKET TOTMUK$
INDONESIA-DS MARKET TOTMID$
Table 2 presents the correlation tests for contagion by adjusting for
heteroskedasticity following FR and Table 3 does not. Panels A and B differ in the
methodology of computing correlations. Panel A follows FR's methodology. Panel B
computes correlations when the non-crisis period is defined as approximately 6 months
before the event and the crisis period is defined as various time intervals after the event
occurred. The hypothesis that contagion existed is based on the measurement of
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correlation in the turmoil period being higher than that of the non-crisis period. A
negative large t-statistic indicates that the correlation coefficient in the turmoil period is
significantly lower than in the non-crisis period. Consequently, the hypothesis that
contagion occurred is not rejected (there is contagion) if the t-statistic is positive and
significant. The results show overwhelmingly no contagion occurred. These conclusions
depend heavily on FR's methodology. The literature review of Chapter II shows that
FR's methodology is biased against finding contagion. Thus the results may be subject to
these limitations. According to FR, the unadjusted correlation coefficient will increase in
the turmoil period because the variance of returns increases as well. This is compensated
for by computing the adjusted correlation coefficient, which corrects for the increase in
variance (or heteroskedasticity). As can be seen in Table 3 Panel B, without this
adjustment, contagion is found for Russia six months after the event, and Germany,
Japan, Russia and USA nine months after the event. The results are different once the
correlations are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Additionally three months after the event
the results are approximately the same whether the variances are adjusted or not. In
Table 3 Panel B, only Russia and USA exhibit contagion nine months after the event.
This scenario supports FR's main point, that if contagion is measured by unadjusted
correlation, evidence of contagion would be found when in fact there was only
interdependence. There is a possibility however that these nine month results are
reflecting Hong Kong's October crash since using a smaller window gives a different
answer. A separate framework is required to test this possibility and will not be
addressed here.
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Canada and the Regional Mining Industries
The methodology is extended for the total Canadian indices versus the regional
mining industries. Table 4 presents the Datastream codes.
Table 4: Total Canada Index from Datastream versus Gold/ Basic Resources of the Regional Indices
Price Index in US Currency Datastream Code
CANADA-DS MARKET TOTMCN$
AMERICAS - DS GOLD MINING GOLDSAM
DJTM CANADA GOLD MINING D4CNGL$
FT GOLD MINES TOTAL FTGMTO$
AUSTRALASIA-DS GOLD MINING GOLDSAZ
EMERGING MARKETS-DS GOLD MINING GOLDSEK
PACIFIC BASIN-DS GOLD MINING GOLDSPC
DJTM INDONESIA BASIC MATS D1INBM$
RUSSIA-DS RESOURCES RESORRS(PI)
167
b 
cl N b ;,
cl
b
c
w
C y O b
r" 
y 
o0 00
cz .- + I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O p O
E c zzzzzZ Z - E o Z> 1 Z Z ZZ Z
OCN OON 0 w ^ty
U U 3 0A
cd y
0
N... 50 00ON "oI oI'o b O >
c; c; c; ci Q c; -4 C3 ci C; C
O w y 3 s "v
o>"boO y p " a? 4,
.:. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x o w0O O zzzzzzzz Oro W ZZZZZZ Z ^b, c
U U a- o
.4 0 r- 0
ti 
f/] cd w A p N
e: tj co00 v) r- C14 tf) r- CN kf) 00 >
r- r- . r- G NoOMOMN Cr.r 000 .- O[ O a W..,
r N N (V "--i M C ,;, O O ^ O ^ ' -r O U v" 4.. op G C c0
00 04 (/)
C C O 
O , ,..
a a w cd>' ,
cts
E o , E (A . 'mo 
o
C p M o o o o 
o o 0 0 V 0 -
C
M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 V C,4 O OU zzzzzzzz OU ZZZZZZZZ ? a 00
to u 
U (A 4, 0 (A 
.r bq O O p o N bA W) N '-+ N N \-O prp c d
cyt,,r o cn E-1 okn 00 a, O o 0.3 \
0 00 v ,-;fir---o o E
ar 
OI 
I '~ 
I 
.-- O 0 a + I I I Q I O I I N M 
v O 00 
" 00 I I 00
"b 
' in 
b 
O 
t 
-
^M 
M M N N 
O 
O N N ON 
ON 
N 0 
'b 
C O y 
w
bq
cd ( CL 10? N I N A G .r b y OIt:$ 4 C v ll a- 00 00 O -+ 11 N M M N 00 It 00 0 0 p U' U C
.- .. r "" H r... .
i b 00 00 .14 sr b 00 00 00 t w a ' o cv00 00 O
C 
.- I M O V c cr u c
pp M ^N^ en , 0000 -- 4 N OMOo o y W .6 pb
-1 N I O N '-+ I O v 'o H
.. h cd O .+ H w 3
i. N .- 00 . oo O N ,-, 00 .- , 00 O v, U >, u ,0 r.
V 1 V7 V 1 V it V'1 'r H q U
GU cNb ntntn tv? W? n CU b tn " o u; c o .0 p c
O= y O
0 = co r-
r-1 r O A y p N
-. ' 4. -- "-- M w v d m 00 M -4
O (, N 0 0 0 "-! 0 i. 0 C,4 -- 1 0 0 0 -! I O
cq* U N 
-- IO\.pN[-oON UU 
-- 4 2 =0 Z5 t
Nb 1'. 0 ovn"ocntn o p b o cn 
cncn o O c. 
o
U a~+ !A 
.. fir I 1 '> 0 " y - ^d
00 1l4t N 
N O 1000 N5..
v, OU NM 
O 
.,
H U O M 
U G
z N N "-- v rn -r ^r 
z rlb M C) 00 "it MMMMMM 
00
G 
o 
O
Nb --o W tf) ) p cd > . O0 41
4) u 0 'bC) 
co 0.0 0
r+ h M 0 'E. 75- b
yd 
V] 
VJ
Q " C b "d Cd ' N h ' . T U bI rb co v 4) b _y H y Q 3
4) (u u
F1 a U d waw. -1 aC% 0 d dWaa+ z E' caa b
c a 
.a
b 
= 
a
N"Ib cts
H w 'b
U G C4:.
U
C a+ C r- O b ca
i U
V a 
0 4) 10 CA=
" > O O O O O O N O 0 0 
0 rA C)
" V O O O U co 00
U '; zzzzzz 'z 
c E z zz z z
., O O v' p a\ O a w .C
-v p U U rl s o
"v
00 00 M M M 00 C14 O "O M H Q\ t "--4 r U > O
M l- M, 5 N U U
C5 d c; c; C-i 61 7= -4 cl -4 6 C4 c b 3
x 
Ow g r-A
40. C o c N > 
.o
_ 
w
CIS W u. UV 
OA U 
U. -
E V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 E O O O O O O V O V x
p zzzzzzzz p o v zzzzzzyz v r
+-p C.d v E iy-
+ G "b
z 
N b 
.
_ Nv 
co 0 w
v 00 00OOv' l l- O v ooNNin00 W) eq 1-- 0 C) r-en 00
N N N O a :+ O CL Qi ' i" Q .- V 0 p' to O Q 4C
C C C Q O y ,O
G G O > C O > >
O = C :6 Ea a cd
C,4 I
" cn O O O O O O O p o C O M O O O O O O O p 0 id U a G, ,a 0 06 CL ,
O UU zzzzzzzz VU zzzzzzzz bOCN
0 0 
0 c a >
0 
40-
4) 48 In 4.) to C 3 r 
C, w 6.
cq*, 'A .0 r! 
0 tn 00 cr) r- a,
is
OG «+ 
OOOOO.--i^+
C6 OO CL
.. v
p w
p N OO...i p 
N MO -- " t O yE C u"''
O MM NNOO(M 1 O . " NNNM ," O O oU
C, C14 o
«7b y I I 
1-4 --4 9 u r- 0,0
M N 00 IRt 00 00 11 v N M M N DD 00 00 00 U U C O0 .
V b 00 oo oo 00 U c b o0 00 00 "., = . uo '$>..
"00 
M 
N C-4 W) O O O O CN cq W-) 00 w.r rl O Q O O U 0 y fi "0 
'b 10 I I 
... , 
-- 4 00 Q 
--I Ire ^i N .. r 00 00 O ' rn y V TU' w G
C,4 00 U ' -- I b v W N 'T N "It In Wi - cNb wl to vl . W) kn V
o C v zo
q -_ 'n p
O U 'y 
w rA 00 G J b4 1 U G N
C w" 
....-- iMOO ' ^NNN OO.M -iO C A E. T
U ^ N N NO 0 0 -+ w. II p
U II 
U U
N r' . ... Q pN OON O
o Nb %o"o ov inino 
g o
0 0 Nb o 
4 QO. n. NO. n.'O n.N 
[
U rn Eo>oo. b
... , p V o T c o42 
U n pUM M MN N Q U000tt 0 en r- y-+ 00- 
O o. qRT
C6 
CL p 010 z V O II ON O 00 O ON ON as 00 U :z
Nb o o10NVIkn o "o Nb MvMMMMMM N > "U
0 .
dE IE '*O dt b b > v 
n y 9 O p
k o o
o 
0 C7bC7 t a:CA 75
"v "v m "
z Q Vim. O c f . p p , N O N H 3 N
0 NOO c E n E M ='d Z F:t9 0 rao9. b c
H a U wasx avV Q WaC4
Again, the results show little evidence of contagion once the correlations are
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Based on Table 5 Panel B, contagion is only visible in
the Russian Gold Index, within six months of the event. Once again, there is some
evidence for contagion in the adjusted as well as unadjusted correlations nine months
after the event.
Canada's Mining Industry and the Rest of the World
The methodology is extended for the Canadian gold mining index versus the
mining industries around the world. In as much as the Canadian gold index is a
significant portion of the Index for the Americas the analysis here eliminates the Canada
Gold Index against the Americas Gold Index. Table 7 presents the codes used.
Table 7: Total Canada Gold Market from Datastream versus Gold/ Basic Resources around the World
Price Index in US Currency Datastream Code
DJTM CANADA GOLD MINING D4CNGL$
US-DS GOLD MINING GOLDSUS
FT GOLD MINES TOTAL FTGMTO$
AUSTRALASIA-DS GOLD MINING GOLDSAZ
EMERGING MARKETS-DS GOLD MINING GOLDSEK
PACIFIC BASIN-DS GOLD MINING GOLDSPC
DJTM INDONESIA BASIC MATS DLINBM$
RUSSIA-DS RESOURCES RESORRS(PI)
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In this section the only evidence of contagion spread from the Canadian gold
mining industry is to the US Gold mining industry nine months after the event both for
the data adjusted for heteroscedasticty and that unadjusted. It is noteworthy however,
that contagion occurred on data where the pre-event is defined as the stable period and
not using FR's methodology of using the entire sample period as the stable one. The
implication here is that even though the fraud concocted by Bre-X was felt in the
Canadian gold industry it did not significantly spread to the other countries of the world
since the null hypothesis of contagion was rejected.
Conclusions
The benefits from diversification are achieved if returns from global stock
markets are stable and not correlated. Many times mutual funds focus on a region or an
industry while still expecting benefits from diversification. Therefore, significant
structural changes across different regimes can be damaging to the economic well-being
of investors' portfolios. These advantages dissipate if these markets exhibit
interdependence or contagion. The increase in cross-market linkages must be significant
to be called contagion rather than simply interdependence. Contagion is an excessive
transmission of shocks from one market undergoing a crisis to another one beyond any
specific disturbance and fundamental links. If there are only fundamental financial
spillovers then there is evidence of interdependence but not contagion.
Evidence of contagion implies that over and above fundamental reasons, investors
follow massive selling in one region with equivalent selling in another region that is
related in some fashion to the initial one. Since there was little evidence found for
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contagion in this chapter the implications are that the herding behavior exhibited by
investors typical in the literature was not exhibited in a situation of fraud in a well
respected Canadian Corporation. Consequently no support for the assumption that after
periods of losses investors attempt to seek risk is exhibited in this situation. Some of
reasons for this may be because the incident was company specific as well as specific to a
particular industry.
This chapter shows that world markets did not follow the Canadian market after
correcting for heteroskedasticity. An exponentially weighted moving average chart was
used to identify the potential crisis originating in Canada. Results are robust to
specifications in the three, six and nine-month sample periods after March 24. The
analysis shows that a few of the gold markets throughout the world took their cues from
the Canadian markets and fell after the event investigated.
The results imply that investigations on correlations of global markets that
examine contagion may have produced spurious results because of their failure to correct
for substantial within-sample heteroskedasticity. Results indicate that the markets were
able to distinguish among countries that were able to successfully regulate their financial
markets for incidence of fraud. The conclusions are that contagion is rare and that the
magnitude and type of crisis can influence interdependence of financial markets. This
study contributes to the literature through its extension into the mining industry and in
validating Forbes and Rigobon (2002) contention of no contagion following the
heteroskedasticity corrections even though evidence was found without these corrections.
Further investigations can include a determination of whether these markets experienced
significant negative abnormal returns. Overall the results support "rational" behavior in
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the mining industry following the incidence of fraud in the Toronto gold markets
particularly given the psychological impact of a recognition among regulators that there
was a lack of adequate security market law enforcement.
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CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSION
Employing three separate methodologies, empirical evidence was presented on
the relationship between behavioral factors and investor reactions to changing market
conditions. Research questions were analyzed using the framework suggested by
Kahneman & Tversky's Prospect Theory. The issues that motivated the study included:
1. Whether or not traders behaved (as displayed by their trading activity)
differently after periods of significant wealth contractions.
2. Whether evidence based on sentiment data confirmed a relationship between
aggregate sentiment and changing market conditions.
3. Whether evidence of contagion in international markets exists and if so, could
still be found after adjusting for heteroskedasticity.
Summary and Conclusions of the Research
Chapter III on trader behavior questioned how the extent of the losses an investor
incurs can incite behavior changes and finds strong evidence for an important Prospect
Theory assumption that investors behave differently after sizeable wealth losses.
Systematic errors and biases are uncovered at two large brokerage houses. Traders here
possibly because of past accomplishments believed they had the wherewithal or intuition
to correctly 'time' their market purchases. Chapter IV identified regime shifts in
aggregate investor sentiment and rigorously determined when and if structural change
occurred in the relationship between aggregate behavioral factors like consumer/investor
sentiment and stock market returns. It also lends support to Prospect Theory with the
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finding that stock market returns have a bigger impact on consumer sentiment when
market returns are above average.
The literature has made use of correlation analysis to determine whether the
strength of the transmission mechanism of economic disturbances is stable over time. The
central idea is to determine whether the correlation coefficient between the stock markets
under investigation changes across periods of low and high volatility. Recent research
builds upon structural models of simultaneous equations that consider interdependencies,
and ensure these relationships are not mistaken for contagion. Using a methodology
designed by Forbes and Rigobon, this study found that the transmission mechanism
remains stable over time, suggesting contagion does not exist.
Chapter V reported on the lack of evidence for contagion once adjustments were
made for heteroskedasticity even in different industries. A test of contagion in the returns
of the industrialized countries of the G9 was given to determine if a crisis originating in
Canada affected the trading behavior of investors in other parts of the industrialized
world. The crisis considered involved an instance of fraud in the mining industry and
implicated Indonesia, so that country was also checked for evidence of contagion as was
the mining industry of the different regions of the world. The finding of no contagion
suggests that investors reacted to this crisis rationally. The inference here is that since
the condition of contagion implies trader/investor herding behavior it is deemed
irrational, and "no contagion" suggests rational behavior.
The literature offers many explanations for anomalies to rational human behavior
and this study attempted to provide evidence beyond anecdotal and experimental.
Conflicting evidence was found in certain instances. While the predicaments of the Dow
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Jones Industrial Average were found to incite trader reactions, neither the condition of the
S&P500 nor the S&P/TSX exhibited similar tendencies. The evidence presented on
contagion supported FR's observation that the magnitude of the originating crisis as well
as the methodology for its determination affected the conclusions. Some of these
findings display evidence in support as well as repudiate the rational activity of homo
economicus. The literature review in Chapter II details why investors continue to sell
stocks after crises using a Prospect Theory framework. More recently however,
situations arise where markets do not exhibit the massive sell-offs that occurred in the
past beyond fundamental concerns.' The evidence presented in the chapter on contagion
suggests that investor education on behavioral biases has influenced investors' trading
decisions. The dissemination of this type of research has encouraged investors to
recognize the heuristics that can lead to poor market performance. While the limits of
arbitrage has been previously provided as an explanation as to why the markets fail to
eliminate bounded rationality it may not necessarily be the case in the situations
discussed in this dissertation exercise.
Contributions to the Literature
The goal of this research is to deepen the understanding of the links between
investor reactions and fundamental market information. This work increases our
knowledge regarding investors' trading reactions to different information. This
dissertation contributes to the literature in at least three main respects. First, Chapter III
'Malkiel (2003) pointed out some rational fundamental reasons even for the crash of October 1987. He
showed that there were genuine reasons, such as the development of the Internet, for higher stock prices,
but he argued that as a result of psychological factors, "investors are exposed to a feedback mechanism
whereby higher stock prices beget even higher stock prices without diminishing investor confidence."
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provided direct evidence on Prospect Theory based on a proprietary data set from two
different brokerage houses. Specifically, the risk seeking behavior of a trader on a given
trading day was approximated using a logit regression model of the probability of
absolute position changes as a function of market returns and a dummy variable that
varies according to the level of market returns. The results of this study show that traders
behave differently during periods of severe losses as measured by a loss in the market
value of market portfolios. The finding that the probability that a trader changes
positions is different during times when stock market losses are occurring is consistent
with the hypothesis that investor risk aversion changes during wealth altering
circumstances. The trader buying activity here which showed the commitment of traders
to follow their intuition even in the presence of extensive selling, may have been in part
determined by overconfidence.
An alternative specification of the methodology presented in Chapter III included
checking for other explanatory factors that may influence a trader's behavior. The time-
period in the study (October 6, 1987 - October 30, 1992) does not suffer from
confounding effects that could be caused by shifts in the data nor above average
performance during a period in time when all the major stock averages experienced
excellent performance. Consequently since the period under consideration has not been
identified in history as being part of a major bull market nor bear market, the results have
the potential of being more robust.
Second, Chapter IV tested for regime shifts in the relationship between behavioral
factors identified under Prospect Theory and market returns. Specifically, a concise
threshold model was designed to check for changes in aggregate consumer sentiment in
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relation to varying market conditions in the context of the U.S and Canadian markets.
The results suggest that the stock market is an important determinant of consumer
sentiment and that their co-movement varies depending on the level of stock market
returns. In the threshold framework, the parameters of the model change depending on
whether returns take a value above or below a certain threshold value, which is
determined within the model. This suggests that investors exhibit different emotions
about the stock market during periods of rising versus falling markets and during periods
of high and low returns volatility. The implications here are that, investors' propensity to
buy/sell, to the extent that it is represented by investor sentiment, changes during times
when stock market returns are above average, consistent with the assumptions of
Prospect Theory.
Finally by following the methodology formulated by Forbes and Rigobon (2002),
the tests for contagion in Chapter V validate their contention of no contagion, only
interdependence. Tests performed which excluded their recommended heteroskedasticity
corrections provided some evidence on contagion. Additionally this study extended the
tests into the mining industry as a whole. The herding characteristics shown were not
extensive, suggesting investor education has partially succeeded in the avoidance of
irrational tendencies.
Limitations of this Study
As is typical of much research on human behavior, the data presented in Chapter
III on trader reactions left many unanswered questions. The most important limitation in
that chapter is the reliance of the empirical model on the assumption that trader buy/sell
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decisions reflect investor risk preferences, an assumption which is necessary in the
absence of another appropriate direct measure of risk aversion. Chapter IV acknowledges
the deficiency in using an empirical model, which does not consider a simultaneous
relationship between aggregate sentiment and market returns data. Since the market
returns data is the threshold variable to which aggregate sentiment responds, it was not
modeled as an endogenous variable. Chapter V found little evidence of contagion even
without the heteroskedasticity adjustment. One of the reasons for the lack of evidence of
contagion in this chapter may be the magnitude of the initial shock chosen for the study
or the relevance of this shock to the gold markets of the rest of the world.
Implications for Practitioners
Mark Twain noted, "The past does not repeat itself, but it rhymes." This
dissertation study has presented empirical research on actual trader behavior. It is evident
that while investors are now more cognizant of their behavioral biases, sometimes this
recognition is not enough to avoid less than perfectly rational behavior. Specifically, the
results of this study suggest that practitioners should not solely rely on forecasting
models that assume rational behavior. Predictions of investor behavior and their
implications on markets returns may be improved if behavioral variables such as
sentiment, market liquidity 2 and even weather 3 are considered as well.
2Baker, Malcolm, and Jeremy Stein, 2004, Market liquidity as a sentiment indicator, Journal of Financial
Markets 7, 271-299.
3Hirshleifer, D.A, Shumway, T, (2003) Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the Weather, Journal of
Finance, 58, 1009-1032.
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Implications for Future Research
This dissertation concludes by offering paths for future research. Each one of the
empirical chapters relates to a large literature and has unlocked the potential for
additional explanatory work. To that end, the dissertation study concludes by offering
paths for future research.
Additional research in Chapter III may include incorporating additional
behavioral factors to approximate risk aversion as well as other explanatory variables
such as lagged market returns, employment data, and other relevant macroeconomic
variables. Another approach may be to extend Fama-French's three factor model by
incorporating mean excess returns and using a VAR framework.
Several potential enhancements to the methodology are presented in Chapter IV.
One simple improvement may be to identify additional explanatory variables that have
the potential to be present when the threshold model shows a regime shift in the
relationship between sentiment and returns. A more elaborate extension, which requires a
more advanced econometric model, is to consider more than one threshold variable. For
example, aggregate sentiment may depend not only on the level of market returns but
also on the level of aggregate wealth. In this case, the model would include two threshold
variables, wealth and market returns.
Chapter V on Contagion hypothesizes how the methodology can be used to test
for contagion in various industries, not just across countries. The existence of
nonlinearities in the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks has important implications for
portfolio management and the measurement of the potential benefits from international
portfolio diversification. In as much as turmoil conditions in one region results in a loss
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of a portfolio's value, wealth effects can be considered and their possible influence on
interdependence of regional returns. Further research should assess the implications of
these results for the empirical measurement of the benefits of international portfolio
diversification.
The aim of this entire dissertation is to analyze the risk - reward tradeoffs while
acknowledging and identifying the extraneous psychological factors that affect that
evaluation. Through this process it should become possible to eliminate the
psychological barriers to successful trading and investing.
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APPENDICES
Appendix I
Theory of Asymmetric Information, the Precursor to Behavioral Finance Markets with
Asymmetric Information
Many markets are characterized by asymmetric information: actors on one side of the
market have much better information than those on the other. Borrowers know
more than lenders about their repayment prospects, managers and boards know
more than shareholders about the firm's profitability, and prospective clients know
more than insurance companies about their accident risk. During the 1970s, this
year's Laureates laid the foundation for a general theory of markets with
asymmetric information. Applications have been abundant, ranging from
traditional agricultural markets to modern financial markets. The Laureates'
contributions form the core of modern information economics.
George Akerlof demonstrated how a market where sellers have more information than
buyers about product quality can contract into an adverse selection of low-quality
products. He also pointed out that informational problems are commonplace and
important. Akerlofs pioneering contribution thus showed how asymmetric
information of borrowers and lenders may explain skyrocketing borrowing rates
on local Third World markets; but it also dealt with the difficulties for the elderly
to find individual medical insurance and with labor market discrimination of
minorities.
Michael Spence identified an important form of adjustment by individual market
participants, where the better informed take costly actions in an attempt to
improve on their market outcome by credibly transmitting information to the
poorly informed. Spence showed when such signaling will actually work. While
his own research emphasized education as a productivity signal in job markets,
subsequent research has suggested many other applications, e.g., how firms may
use dividends to signal their profitability to agents in the stock market.
Joseph Stiglitz clarified the opposite type of market adjustment, where poorly informed
agents extract information from the better informed, such as the screening
performed by insurance companies dividing customers into risk classes by
offering a menu of contracts where higher deductibles can be exchanged for
significantly lower premiums. In a number of contributions about different
markets, Stiglitz has shown that asymmetric information can provide the key to
understanding many observed market phenomena, including unemployment and
credit rationing.
Source: Press Release - The 2001 Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 10 October 2001
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Appendix II
Subset of the Excel Data File (Collected at First Boston, originally in Lotus)
PARTIAL LIST OF MONTHLY TRADING POSITIONS OF OVER 10% OF TOTAL EQUITY
PORTFOLIO (AS AT CLOSE)
FIRST BOSTON SECURITY OPENING CLOSING
DATE SECURITY NAME SYMBOL POSITION POSITION
6-Oct-87 Hudson's Bay Co. HBC 50850 95360
Molson Inc. Cl A MOL.A 2000 28000
7-Oct-87 Bank of Nova Scotia BNS 16000 25000
American Barrick ABX 25000 60000
Hudson's Bay Co. HBC 95360 95360
8-Oct-87 Teck Cominco Ltd. TEK.B 25000 75000
9-Oct-87 American Barrick ABX 60000 70000
Weston Ltd. George WN 15000 125000
Teck Cominco Ltd. TEK.B 75000 98000
13-Oct-87 Weston Ltd. George WN 125000 75000
14-Oct-87 Imperial Oil IMO 5000 25000
CAE Inc. CAE 9800 50000
15-Oct-87 Weston Ltd. George WN 75000 75000
Cott Corp. BCB 6000 50000
16-Oct-87 TransCanada Corp TRP 22000 100300
CAE Inc. CAE 0 50000
19-Oct-87 Cara Operations CAO.A 17000 30000
20-Oct-87 Rothman's Inc. ROC 4000 28000
21-Oct-87 Imperial Oil IMO 3000 70500
Maple Leaf Foods Inc. MFI 5000 75000
22-Oct-87 BCE Inc. BCE 12000 75000
Bank of Nova Scotia BNS 12400 100000
23-Oct-87 Leon's Furniture LNF 8700 95000
26-Oct-87 Bank of Nova Scotia BNS 100000 90000
Leon's Furniture LNF 95000 85000
27-Oct-87 Cara Operations CAO.A 3000 100000
28-Oct-87 Molson Inc. CI A MOL.A 28000 200000
Weston Ltd. George WN 100000 50000
29-Oct-87 CAE Inc. CAE 11200 125000
30-Oct-87 CCL Industries CCQ.B 115000 100000
Molson Inc. CI A MOL.A 200000 100000
2-Nov-87 Rothman's Inc. ROC 12500 55000
3-Nov-87 American Barrick ABX 60000 60000
4-Nov-87 Imperial Oil IMO 3000 80000
5-Nov-87 TransCanada Corp TRP 5400 70000
6-Nov-87 Shoppers Drug Mart SC 25000 75000
Brascan Corp., CI A BNN.A 12000 85000
9-Nov-87 American Barrick ABX 40000 100000
Imperial Oil IMO 25000 75000
10-Nov-87 BCE Inc. BCE 15000 50000
11-Nov-87 Bank of Nova Scotia BNS 26000 125000
Brascan Corp., Cl A BNN.A 12000 90000
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Subset of the Excel Data File (Collected at Merrill Lynch, originally in Lotus)
PARTIAL LIST OF MONTHLY TRADING POSITIONS OF OVER 10% OF TOTAL EQUITY
PORTFOLIO (AS AT CLOSE)
MERRILL LYNCH SECURITY OPENING CLOSING
DATE SECURITY NAME SYMBOL POSITION POSITION
6-Oct-87 Molson Inc. CI A MOL.A 15000 100000
Abitibi-Consolidated A 60000 220000
7-Oct-87 Systemhouse SHC 15000 89000
Canadian Pacific Railway CNR 17000 95000
8-Oct-87 Hudson's Bay Co. HBC 25000 112000
9-Oct-87 Weston Ltd. George WN 10000 55000
Teck Cominco Ltd. TEK.B 30000 112000
American Barrick ABX 18000 100000
13-Oct-87 Molson Inc. Cl A MOL.A 22000 122000
14-Oct-87 Weston Ltd. George WN 25000 55000
15-Oct-87 Bank of Nova Scotia BNS 20000 100000
Imperial Oil IMO 15000 90000
16-Oct-87 BCE Inc. BCE 2500 75000
CAE Inc. CAE 25000 125000
19-Oct-87 Cara Operations CAO.A 2000 142000
20-Oct-87 Leon's Furniture LNF 10000 110000
21-Oct-87 Bank of Nova Scotia BNS 25000 150000
Abitibi-Consolidated A 30000 100000
22-Oct-87 Systemhouse SHC 12000 50000
Canadian Pacific Railway CNR 5000 125000
23-Oct-87 Hudson's Bay Co. HBC 30000 120000
26-Oct-87 TransAlta Corp. TA 4000 120000
CAE Inc. CAE 15000 135000
27-Oct-87 Cara Operations CAO.A 25000 125000
28-Oct-87 Rothman's Inc. ROC 3000 103000
Imperial Oil IMO 15000 150000
29-Oct-87 BCE Inc. BCE 2000 75000
30-Oct-87 Cott Corp. BCB 25000 125000
Leon's Furniture LNF 5000 105000
2-Nov-87 Systemhouse SHC 20000 100000
3-Nov-87 TransAlta Corp. TA 10000 150000
4-Nov-87 Bank of Montreal BMO 40000 200000
5-Nov-87 CAE Inc. CAE 40000 150000
6-Nov-87 CCL Industries CCQ.B 50000 200000
Canadian Imperial Bank CM 20000 120000
9-Nov-87 Leon's Furniture LNF 25000 150000
Molson Inc. CI A MOL.A 10000 75000
10-Nov-87 BCE Inc. BCE 25000 125000
11-Nov-87 Bank of Nova Scotia BNS 5000 200000
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Appendix III
Summary Statistics for US Data Monthly From January 1979 - December 2004
Percentage Change Percentage Change
In Consumer Sentiment In DJIA
Column ] Column ]
Mean 0.045976 Mean 0.817172
Standard Error 0.259692 Standard Error 0.249083
Median -0.21622 Median 0.943706
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A
Standard Standard
Deviation 4.667237 Deviation 4.476578
Sample Variance 21.7831 Sample Variance 20.03975
Kurtosis 2.632954 Kurtosis 4.450213
Skewness 0.018386 Skewness -0.97144
Range 39.29651 Range 39.36309
Minimum -17.3236 Minimum -26.4195
Maximum 21.97286 Maximum 12.94355
Sum 14.85024 Sum 263.9466
Count 323 Count 323
Summary Statistics for Monthly Canadian Data from September 2001 to December 2004
Percentage Change Percentage Change
In Consumer Sentiment In TSX
Column1 Column ]
Mean 0.212929 Mean -0.01723
Standard Error 0.400251 Standard Error 0.621023
Median 0.712859 Median 0.686376
Mode #N/A Mode #N/A
Standard Deviation 2.743984 Standard Deviation 4.257522
Sample Variance 7.529449 Sample Variance 18.12649
Kurtosis 0.191835 Kurtosis 1.56144
Skewness -0.13735 Skewness -1.10642
Range 12.71972 Range 21.86222
Minimum -5.61178 Minimum -14.3136
Maximum 7.107947 Maximum 7.548669
Sum 10.00765 Sum -0.80997
Count 47 Count 47
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